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ABSTRACT 
 
Internal Auditing and Organizational Governance: The Combined Assurance Approach 
By Loïc DECAUX 
If risk is everywhere, why is not assurance? This is an especially important question for 
boards of directors since they are often required to attest the effectiveness and appropriateness 
of internal control and risk management systems, but how can a board do so without receiving 
holistic assurance? This dissertation tries to provide elements of solution by developing four 
essays around the concept of combined assurance. Originally introduced by The King III 
Report in South Africa, combined assurance represents the coordinated assurance from all 
assurance providers within an organization that holistically goes to the board in order that its 
members fulfil their risk management duties appropriately. These duties include: the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of risk management, and whether significant risks are 
managed adequately.  If a board does not understand these significant risks or does not form 
an adequate view of them, then a board is unable to attest that it is discharging its risk 
management duties. The first essay enters the black box of combined assurance by providing 
insights around interpretation of combined assurance, its drivers, and its benefits as 
experienced by several organizations having started to implement combined assurance. This 
essay builds on the risk management literature by describing combined assurance as a way for 
boards to enhance their risk management oversight duties to various stakeholders. The second 
essay examines the role of the internal audit function within the combined assurance 
approach. Interviews with key participants in the combined assurance approach suggest that 
the internal audit function has a pivotal role to play. The third essay explores the critical steps 
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that an organization should follow to implement combined assurance by collecting insights 
from multiple case studies. It suggests a six-step approach for adequate combined assurance 
implementation. Finally, the fourth essay deals with the determinants of combined assurance 
adoption. Through an online survey instrument administered to internal auditors, the study 
shows that several variables allow understanding why some organizations implement 
combined assurance, whereas others are not. 
Loïc Decaux (Brussels, 1987) holds a Master degree in Management from the Louvain School 
of Management (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium). Loïc is a teaching assistant and 
PhD student at the Louvain School of Management. His research interests lie between 
internal auditing, risk management and corporate governance. His work has been presented 
in various academic conferences such as the European Accounting Association and the 
European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance.  
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
“Imagine a driver preparing to set out on a journey. He has a destination in mind, a time by 
which he needs to arrive, and a vehicle capable (he believes) of getting him there. If he is 
appropriately cautious and a good planner, he will check potential routes and select the one he 
thinks is most likely to get him to his destination safely and on time. He also may check on 
expected traffic and weather conditions. Now consider the value to the driver of receiving 
assurance from a reliable source that: (i) his vehicle is in good condition and can be relied 
upon to respond to his commands to change speed or direction, including braking. It also will 
warn him if he starts to run low on gasoline, tire pressures fall, and other dangers emerge. (ii) 
The radio stations will provide timely warnings of changing traffic or weather conditions. (iii) 
His GPS system is up-to-date and will guide him not only on his planned route, but provide 
alternative routes if traffic, weather, or other conditions force him to change strategies. The 
GPS also will help him find a service station or restaurant as needed. This is the assurance 
that the internal audit function can provide to the board and top management, the drivers of 
the organization. We can assess and report on the condition of the vehicle and whether it is 
suitable for the journey. We can consider the planned route, the areas of greatest risk, and the 
tools at the driver’s disposal, and assess whether he is likely to receive the reliable, timely 
information he needs to understand and respond to risks along the way.” 
Marks Norman (2013). Assurance that matters. Internal Auditor, 70(5), p. 55 
1.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FAILURES 
A number of organizations have recently succumbed to what seem to have been avoidable 
catastrophes. In 2001, one of the largest publicly traded corporations in the United States 
declared bankruptcy following massive accounting fraud. Enron’s collapse also brought the 
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collapse of Arthur Andersen, one of the formerly ‘Big Five’ accounting firms, found guilty of 
criminal acts in their auditing of Enron’s financial statements. During its investigation, the US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2002) pointed to the role of Enron’s 
board of directors as critical in the collapse. Following that collapse, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) of 2002 set new standards for US public companies, increasing oversight role played 
by boards of directors.   
In 2007, an unprecedented financial crisis began in the USA, and spread worldwide. 
According to the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis 
(2011), there were dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at various 
financial institutions, leading to the crisis. With only limited capital, these institutions were 
highly dependent on short-term funding, such that they relied too heavily on risky trading 
activities in order to generate high profits. Simultaneously, Société Générale, in France, 
publicly revealed a €4.8 billion fraud attributable to one of its traders. There, again, risk 
management had failed. Internal controls worked as intended, but surprisingly did not prevent 
the fraud, when other internal controls, not implemented, would certainly have prevented it 
(Comité spécial du Conseil d’administration de la Société Générale, 2008). 
Risk management failures are not limited to financial institutions. In April 2010, the 
British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill took place in the Gulf of Mexico. Several 
investigations were launched to consider the root causes. The National Commission on the 
British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) concluded that 
the immediate causes of the explosion could be traced to various mistakes made by British 
Petroleum and its partners, revealing systematic failures in risk management. Although 
British Petroleum proclaimed safety as one of the company’s first values in 2009, with the 
development of rigorous risk management practices, the risk management processes were not 
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consistent or reliable, according to the report (p. 218). For example, security systems failed to 
stop oil flooding into the water, which was what caused the severity of the leakage.   
The official report into the Fukushima nuclear accident, by the Independent 
Investigation Commission (2012), revealed that the nuclear plant had not been prepared to 
respond to severe accidents, such as an earthquake or a tsunami. Even if regulators and the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company had been aware of the risk related to these disasters, no one 
had taken steps to establish preventive controls. According to the report, this lack of 
preparation led to the severity of the accident (p. 26).   
1.2 ASKING FOR BETTER RISK MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 
The above events all represent failures in corporate governance systems, and they have all 
somewhat refocused interest on one important corporate governance system: the risk 
management system (Conyon et al., 2011; Mikes, 2011). Certainly, these events illustrate how 
difficult it is for boards to oversee the management of significant risks (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 2009). Despite being 
sometimes criticized (Power, 2009), enterprise risk management (ERM) is far from being a 
forgotten idea (Huber and Scheytt, 2013). Three factors explain the growing perception 
around risk management, according to Soin and Collier (2013). First, there is nowadays an 
increased interest in organizational governance leading to a focus on the duties of boards to 
evaluate risk management effectiveness. Second, various initiatives, such as new regulations, 
have put more pressure on organizations to adopt risk management programs in order to deal 
with significant risks. The ERM integrated framework released by COSO is one example of 
such initiatives. Thirdly, the role of the media in publicly revealing scandals to multiple 
stakeholders has also led organizations to closely examine their risk management strategies.  
A company’s management is responsible for risk management, whereas a board is 
responsible for risk management oversight (Beasley et al., 2015b; COSO, 2004; 2009). In 
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fact, monitoring the effectiveness of risk management consists of judgements based on an 
assessment of whether the eight components of the ERM framework are both present and 
function adequately (Sarens, 2009). Figure 1 represents the ERM integrated framework as 
developed by COSO
1
, with the eight components at the front face of the cube. 
Figure 1: ERM Integrated Framework 
 
Source: COSO (2004).  
Various boards have been noted and criticized for failing in their risk management 
responsibilities. It now seems that boards have had cloudy crystal balls which distorted their 
ability to make sound decisions based on risk-related information (Pirson and Turnbull, 
2011). Similarly, many questions have been raised about whether boards practiced 
appropriate monitoring and/or oversight of risk management (COSO, 2009).  
                                                     
1
 There are alternatives to the ERM framework from COSO (see, for example, ISO 31000 – Risk management), 
however, the COSO framework is often referred to as the dominant standard in risk management globally (e.g., 
Baxter et al., 2013; Hayne and Free, 2014; Landsittel and Rittenberg, 2010; Tekathen and Dechow, 2013). 
According to Lundqvist (2014, p. 396), these frameworks “tend to be conceptually similar, but they differ in 
their structural representations, pertaining mostly to how dimensions or aspects of ERM are grouped – how they 
define the integral parts of ERM”.  
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As a result of positive trends towards the greater adoption of ERM programs, an 
interesting issue in risk management is that of a board’s specific risk management oversight 
(Beasley et al., 2008; 2015a; 2015b; COSO, 2009). Landsittel and Rittenberg (2010) noted the 
issue of the processes that should be in place to monitor the continued effectiveness of the risk 
management process as being an urgent research question.    
To obtain an understanding of ERM oversight, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants and a research team from the North Carolina State University’s ERM 
Initiative have been partnered since 2009 to release each year a Report on the Current State of 
Enterprise Risk Oversight among organizations (see Beasley et al., 2015a for the last update). 
Risk management oversight is still, to a large extent viewed, however, as a ‘black box’ in 
academic research. Until now, the literature has not provided any evidence and/or insight 
about how boards can monitor the effectiveness of their risk management system. 
1.3 INTERNAL AUDITING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
A board’s risk management oversight is often delegated to an audit or risk committee 
(Beasley et al., 2015a; Brown et al., 2009) with the internal audit function (IAF) helping 
governing bodies to fulfil their oversight responsibilities appropriately. The IAF has been 
identified as important in the governance agenda (Cohen et al., 2002; 2004; Gramling et al., 
2004; Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; Ruud, 2003). This is suggested in the definition 
adopted by The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, hereafter) since 1999, which states that 
internal auditing is “an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to 
add value and improve an organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes” (IIA, 2013a). 
As illustrated by the introductory quote, the primary role and greatest source of value 
of the IAF, is providing objective assurance to its key stakeholders, namely the board and 
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management, that governance systems function appropriately (Lenz, 2013; Marks, 2013). 
This is why an effective IAF relates to high quality governance (Ege, 2014; Gramling et al., 
2004; Lin et al., 2011; Messier et al., 2011; Prawitt et al., 2009). One way for IAF to 
contribute to good governance relates to its role in enhancing the quality of risk management 
(Leung et al., 2011; Sarens, 2009). This explains why IAFs have become fit for purpose in 
risk management throughout the years (e.g., Arena et al., 2010; de Zwaan et al., 2011; Fraser 
and Henry, 2007; Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; Spira and Page, 2003). The role of the IAF in 
risk management are sometimes confusing, including a facilitator role, initiating formalized 
risk management and pioneering in the creation of higher risk awareness in organizations with 
less mature risk management systems, and providing assurance to the board about the 
effectiveness of risk management in organizations with more mature systems.   
For clarification, The IIA issued a position paper delineating the core roles of the IAF 
in risk management, the roles that IAF can legitimately undertake with safeguards, and the 
roles that IAF should not undertake because it could impair its objectivity and independence 
(IIA, 2009). Table I depicts the corresponding role of the IAF in risk management. As part of 
the core internal audit role with respect to risk management, The IIA (2009) suggests: (i) 
giving assurance on the risk management process; (ii) giving assurance that risks are correctly 
evaluated; (iii) evaluating risk management processes; (iv) evaluating the reporting of 
significant risks; and (v) reviewing the management of significant risks.  
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] 
I raised the question above of how boards can monitor the effectiveness of their risk 
management systems. Based on the above arguments, I would answer when the IAF provides 
assurance about the effectiveness of risk management. This leads to a second question, which 
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is answered in the next two sections: how can the IAF provide holistic assurance to a board 
about the effectiveness of risk management?  
 
1.4 ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES AND THE PRODUCTION OF COMFORT 
According to the ERM Initiative and Proviti (2015), the missions of boards and satellites are 
analogous. Satellites orbit the earth in order to collect data, distribute information, make 
effective communication easier, and provide a clear view of the landscape. In the same vein, 
boards wish to collect “as much intelligence, as possible to ensure they have a clear view of 
the horizon of their organization” (p.1).   
 One such piece of intelligence can be found in assurance activities. Boards must 
particularly receive assurance that risks are identified and managed within the organizational 
risk appetite. Due to recent events, organizations are urged to reshape the world of their 
assurance (Dangre, 2013) in order to fill the assurance vacuum, experienced by many boards, 
which made their monitoring role particularly difficult (Chambers, 2008; Chambers and Odar, 
2015). 
 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1996) defines assurance 
services as “independent professional services that improve the quality of the information or 
its context for decision makers”. In short, assurance adds credibility and value to a report or 
an activity of interest to a third-party. The statutory audit of financial statements is a well-
known assurance activity. It produces comfort by reassuring stakeholders who have a 
financial interest in an organization (Carrington and Catasús, 2007; Pentland, 1993; Power, 
1999; Sarens et al., 2009; Sikka, 2009). Assurance services function as key monitoring 
activities. There are two issues related to assurance services.  
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First, assurance engagements are not limited to financial statement accounting 
(Chapman and Peecher, 2011; Elliott, 2002; Knechel et al., 2006; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), 2008). In a study of the different types of 
assurance services provided, Hasan et al. (2005) identified assurance about environmental 
performance as the most common type of non-financial service. They also found that internal 
controls were the most common types of systems to be assured. More recently, O’Dwyer et al. 
(2011) and Perego (2009) reported the need for companies to receive assurance about their 
sustainability reporting. Due to increased interest, organizational dynamics and practices have 
become more and more organized around risk (Arena et al., 2010; Soin and Collier, 2013), so 
that one of these practices relates to the provision of assurance services overseeing risk 
management, as suggested in the previous section. Soh and Martinov-Bennie (2015) 
investigated the nature and extent of IAF involvement in areas such as environmental, social 
and governance assurance in Australia. They found that assurance on risk management is 
perceived to be of greatest importance. They found that IAFs are currently very involved in 
assurance services related to governance issues, reasonably so in social issues, but only in a 
limited way in environmental issues. These risk management assurance activities, as provided 
to the boards, will certainly help boards attest to the effectiveness of their risk management 
systems, as recommended worldwide by many codes of corporate governance. 
 Secondly, assurance services are not exclusively provided by internal and/or external 
auditors. One stream of the auditing literature focuses on the relationship between external 
audit and the IAF. This literature investigates whether an external auditor can rely on the 
IAF’s work, suggesting that it could in turn influences audit fees paid to external auditors. 
Several authors noted the complementary role that both external audit and IAF play in 
increasing overall monitoring in an organization (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013; Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent, 2006b; Hay et al., 2008). For example, Mat Zain et al. (2015) find a positive 
 - 9 - 
 
relationship between IAF quality and audit fees, which confirms the complementary roles 
between internal and external auditors, as well as a reduction in audit fees when external 
auditors  rely on IAFs. The literature only seems to consider assurance services provided by 
internal and/or external auditors as being reliable and helpful sources of assurance, however, 
although this does not seem to be the case in practice. Some organizations have in fact 
realized that it is illusory that a single function, such as the IAF, can provide holistic 
assurance to a board about the effectiveness of risk management. Rather, these organizations 
use a variety of assurance providers from elsewhere within and/or outside the organization, 
and well beyond traditional internal and external auditors. This is so because internal and/or 
external auditors may fall short, in terms of understanding or skills, in providing assurance 
services for a specific risk. According to Fraser and Henry (2004) the IAF “composed largely 
of accountants might lack the expertise to carry out such a comprehensive appraisal of risk 
and the adequacy of management responses to risk issues” (p.28). 
Given the number of assurance providers across an organization, it is therefore 
important for organizations to develop an optimal organizational model, which considers all 
interdependencies and co-dependencies that exist among assurance providers, in order to 
assist the board in its accountability for effective risk management oversight. 
1.5 DELIVERING HOLISTIC RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE 
Several authors have suggested that collaboration between various assurance providers is a 
way to enhance overall governance. Sarens and De Beelde (2006b) suggested that the 
collaborations between the IAF and other assurance providers do not seem to be superfluous 
luxury given the increasing expectations of executives and boards. Sarens et al. (2009) also 
suggested that the overall level of comfort for the audit committee, and subsequently a board, 
can be enhanced via collaboration between IAF and external audit. Similarly, Lin et al. (2011) 
found evidence that external auditors are more likely to detect material weaknesses when they 
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coordinate their activities with the IAF. In their study of factors associated with the size of the 
IAF, Anderson et al. (2012) argued that future research should consider the coordination of 
various assurance activities as the IAF may be required to oversee the activities performed by 
other organizational functions. In a study of the roles of internal auditors in public sector 
organizations, Roussy (2013) argues that researchers need to take a global approach, with 
complementary and potentially overlapping roles between the governance, assurance and 
control functions in order to make optimum use of these resources to strengthen governance.  
All these authors have suggested coordination between the IAF and external audit as 
an important avenue for future research. Since organizations rely in practice on a multitude of 
assurance providers, well beyond the IAF and external audit, the avenue for future research 
could well be extended to include other assurance providers as well. I suggest that the 
coordination between the myriad of assurance providers for an organization will enhance a 
board’s risk management oversight as a result of receiving holistic assurance.   
This is the idea of the combined assurance approach introduced in the 2009 South 
African code of corporate governance, known as King III (Institute of Directors (IoD) in 
Southern Africa, 2009). Written during the financial crisis, when poor risk management was 
demonstrated, King III suggests that coordination between assurance providers is a great 
alternative for providing assurance to a board and its related subcommittees. That is why  
King III recommends the adoption of a combined assurance framework. Similarly, The IIA 
requires that IAFs coordinate with other internal and/or external assurance providers and 
consulting activities, to ensure proper coverage and to minimize duplication of efforts in 
assurance activities on risk management, internal controls, and governance (IIA, 2012, 
2013a). 
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Combined assurance
2
 is a combination of two or more assurance providers for the 
purpose of providing effective and efficient assurance for risk management and internal 
control systems. If interactions between boards, committees, management, and internal and/or 
external audit in the corporate governance mosaic are crucial for effective governance (Cohen 
et al., 2004), the same is true for interactions between all assurance providers. Combined 
assurance will help boards fill their assurance vacuum, by providing them with holistic 
assurance about the effectiveness of the risk management. They will subsequently better 
assume their risk management oversight responsibilities, which will then positively influence 
the quality of corporate governance.   
1.6 MOTIVATION AND OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Is global assurance possible and realistic? Recent events and increased regulatory scrutiny 
have fundamentally changed the way organizations think about risk (Bhimani, 2009). There 
has been increased expectation that boards will oversee risk management since the financial 
crisis. As a result, boards should ensure that their risk oversight responsibilities are properly 
met. 
The literature on risk management is quite extensive both in terms of its overall value 
and implementation, however, it has not been so extensive when it comes to risk management 
oversight, and, therefore, how to monitor the effectiveness of risk management. With this 
dissertation, I extend the literature on risk management by filling a gap around a risk 
management oversight. As accounting research should start with a practice research question 
that is important to the practice community (Hermanson, 2015; Kaplan, 2011; Moser, 2012; 
Parker et al., 2011), I particularly try to provide insights into how assurance providers can 
help boards monitor the effectiveness of their risk management systems.   
                                                     
2
 Combined assurance is also sometimes referred to as coordinated or integrated assurance, however, by using 
the term ‘combined (integrated) assurance’, I do not refer to sustainability assurance, the assurance provided on 
sustainability reports or their equivalent (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). From that perspective, sustainability assurance 
is one subset of holistic combined assurance.  
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Because risk management, organizational governance and internal audit are 
increasingly and inextricably interdependent (Bhimani, 2009), this dissertation also 
contributes to the literature in internal audit and organizational governance. For example, 
Kaplan (2011) described the relationship between risk management and internal audit as an 
interesting area for research that could have an important impact on the practice community.  
The main objective of this dissertation is to generate greater knowledge and 
understanding about combined assurance as experienced in the international accounting 
community. Through four essays, I try to provide insights into the practice of combined 
assurance. I believe this topic to be particularly important to the practice community because 
it can offer an important organizational model to assist boards in their accountability for 
effective risk management oversight.  
Each of the four essays is a stand-alone contribution and can be read independently of 
the other essays
3
. The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 enters the black box of 
combined assurance by providing insights into its understanding, its drivers, and its benefits. 
It proposes a framework for combined assurance. Therefore, Chapter 2 views combined 
assurance as an important organizational model helping boards to better inform stakeholders 
about a board’s role in risk management oversight. As such, it mainly contributes to the 
literature on risk management and to the auditing for stakeholders literature. Finally, it 
provides practical implications for policymakers, practitioners, and regulators by describing 
combined assurance as an efficient model for enhancing governance on behalf of 
stakeholders.  
                                                     
3
 Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 use the same data obtained from various case studies, however, it has to be 
stressed that these chapters are significantly different in terms of research questions and theoretical frameworks. 
Furthermore, analysis of the cases was performed three times given the different research questions these 
chapters address. 
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Chapter 3 focuses on the roles of the IAF in combined assurance. It contributes to the 
literature on the role of the IAF in organizational governance. The findings reveal that internal 
auditors are the best candidates to play a leading role in combined assurance by facilitating, 
coordinating, and reporting combined assurance activities to the board. The findings are 
particularly useful for internal auditors who want to be more meaningful and valuable to their 
board.   
Chapter 4 investigates how to implement a combined assurance program. The 
qualitative findings reveal that a successful combined assurance implementation includes six 
important components. The results have implications both for organizations that do not yet 
have a combined assurance program in place, and for those currently at the implementation 
stage. This chapter has already been published in Managerial Auditing Journal. 
Chapter 5 presents an empirical study of the determinants of combined assurance 
adoption. Based on a global survey of internal auditors, the results reveal that (i) risk 
management oversight maturity, (ii) the existence of a board subcommittee responsible for 
overseeing risk management processes, (iii) the number of different assurance providers, and 
(iv) other organizational characteristics, are significantly associated with combined assurance 
adoption. 
Finally, Chapter 6 proposes some concluding remarks. It summarizes the dissertation 
and then reviews the overall contribution of the dissertation, both to the literature and to 
practitioners. Finally, I review the main limitations of the dissertation and acknowledge 
several future research opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING COMBINED ASSURANCE4 
 
Crisis stimulates the search for new and more rigorous standards of surveillance and 
controls, a search which has given rise to auditing reforms and the demand for better 
standards of surveillance. (Power, 1999, p. 31) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
One tenet of modern governance is that boards of directors (boards, hereafter) are accountable 
to multiple stakeholders (e.g., Freeman et al., 2007, 2010; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 
1997). Given that, corporate governance has been defined as the “systems of checks and 
balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensure that companies discharge 
their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas 
of their business activity” (Solomon, 2007, p. 14). According to The Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) organizational governance represents the “combination of processes and 
structures implemented by the board to inform, direct, manage, and monitor the activities of 
the organization toward the achievement of its objectives” (IIA, 2013a).  
Because of the multitude of stakeholders’ interests, organizations need to develop and 
implement accountability mechanisms that enhance governance in the interests of their 
stakeholders (Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Collier, 2008; Ruud, 2003). Accountability 
mechanisms can be described as the means by which boards provide information about their 
duties to their stakeholders (Gray, 2001).  
Stakeholder theory emerged in the accounting discipline after a number of corporate 
scandals (Freeman et al., 2010). After the collapse of Enron in the early 2000s, the Securities 
                                                     
4
 This chapter is based on a working paper entitled “Risk Management Oversight: The Combined Assurance 
Approach” co-authored with Gerrit Sarens (supervisor of this dissertation). Earlier drafts of this paper have been 
discussed at the 36
th
 Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association (Paris, 2013), Research Day in 
Accounting (Brussels, 2013), Developmental workshop on Accounting for Stakeholders (London, 2013), and the 
PhD Day in Management (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2012). We appreciate the comments received during these 
conferences from participants. We have also benefited from the comments of Urton Anderson, Mark Beasley, 
Martine Cools, Ronald Mitchell, Mahbub Zaman. 
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and Exchange Commission extended its corporate governance requirements to include a 
broader range of stakeholders. Clarke (2005) explains that Enron’s collapse was intrinsically 
linked to shareholders’ focus on short term financial performance and their neglect of other 
primary stakeholders’ interests. Worldwide corporate governance reforms now consider the 
interests of other stakeholders (Waring, 2008). South Africa began this initiative with the 
three King Reports, making it one of the first countries to choose an inclusive approach 
(Baker, 2010; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Institute of Directors [IoD], 2009; Ntim et al., 
2012). Similar approaches were adopted in other countries, such as Australia (Australian 
Stock Exchange, 2007). The USA (New York Stock Exchange Commission, 2010) and the 
UK (Financial Reporting Council, 2012) have followed this movement, though not very 
closely because of their traditional focus on shareholders. 
Unsurprisingly, regulators and policymakers are still leading improvements in 
organizational governance amid the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In fact, many have attributed 
the crisis to poor boardroom governance, arguing that risk management failures made boards 
unfit to exercise their oversight role (Brown et al., 2009; Conyon et al., 2011; Landsittel and 
Rittenberg, 2010; Magnan and Markarian, 2011; Mikes, 2011; Paape and Speklé, 2012; 
Pirson and Turnbull, 2011). According to Beasley et al. (2010), these failures threatened 
stakeholder value. The codes described above all emphasize boards’ duty to monitor the 
effectiveness of risk management systems covering all kind of risks. The European 
Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing (ECIIA) and the Federation of European Risk 
Management Associations (FERMA) recently released practical guidance by which European 
organizations may monitor the effectiveness of risk management (ECIIA and FERMA, 2010). 
While King III, in South Africa, recognizes that boards must consider the expectations of a 
broader range of stakeholders, principles 2.13 and 4.9 require that boards (1) comment on the 
adequacy of their internal control system and (2) receive assurance about the effectiveness of 
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their risk management process (IoD, 2009). But, how can boards assess the effectiveness of 
risk management and internal control systems without holistic assurance?  
This study examines the process of combined assurance defined as “integrating and 
aligning assurance processes in a company to maximize risk and governance oversight and 
control efficiencies, and optimize overall assurance to the audit and risk committee, 
considering the company’s risk appetite” (IoD, 2009, p. 50). Risk management and assurance 
activities are essential for boards to discharge their duties to their various stakeholders 
(Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; Reding et al., 2009). This study provides insights into 
combined assurance as practiced within the international accounting community through 
several case studies. Theoretically, the study mainly contributes to the literature on risk 
management (e.g., Beasley et al., 2015a; 2015b; Gordon et al., 2009; Hayne and Free, 2014; 
Mikes, 2011) by filling a gap around board’s risk management oversight (Landsittel and 
Rittenberg, 2010). More particularly, this study describes combined assurance as an important 
organizational model that helps boards monitor the effectiveness of their risk management 
systems. We propose a framework for combined assurance, accordingly. Second, the study 
contributes to the literature on auditing for stakeholders (e.g., Baker and Owsen, 2002; 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [ICAEW], 2008; Lee, 1998; 
Roberts, 1998; Sutton and Arnold, 1998). Building on the stakeholder agency perspective, our 
combined assurance framework describes combined assurance as a vital mechanism helping 
boards become more knowledgeable and transparent about risk management duties to their 
stakeholders.  
Our findings have also practical implications for organizations, regulators and 
policymakers. Combined assurance provides boards with effective and efficient assurance to 
assess the effectiveness of risk management, which then improves a board’s oversight role on 
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behalf of stakeholders. Consequently, we find that combined assurance creates both internal 
value for the organization and external value for stakeholders. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section describes stakeholder agency 
theory. The second outlines boards’ duties to stakeholders, focusing on assurance activities as 
a means of improving board’s risk-management monitoring for multiple stakeholders. Next, 
the research design is discussed, followed by the findings of the case studies. In the final 
section, we discuss the research findings and propose a framework for combined assurance. 
We then review the study’s limitations and propose avenues for future research. 
2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 Stakeholder agency theory  
Agency theory, the preferred economic theory of corporate governance (e.g., Daily et al., 
2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), posits that managers (the agents) and shareholders (the 
principals) have different interests and expectations and that corporate governance aims to 
implement monitoring and accountability mechanisms for mitigating managerial opportunism 
and aligning the two groups’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
These mechanisms operate to assure the principals that organizations will take care of their 
interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Zajac and Westphal (1994) claim that incentive 
compensation and monitoring mechanisms are particularly valued methods for aligning 
principals and agents’ interests.  
However, agency theory has difficulty in describing the complexity of modern 
corporate governance. According to Waring (2008) the shareholder model is increasingly 
anachronistic and provides unhelpful and impractical guidance to directors in discharging 
their duties in contemporary organizations. Similarly, Conyon et al. (2011) argue that the last 
worldwide economic crisis has offered an opportunity to reconsider theories in corporate 
governance. That is why many have claimed that complementing agency theory with other 
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perspectives will enrich our understanding of corporate governance phenomena (e.g., Clarke, 
2005; Collier, 2008; Daily et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Ntim et al., 2012). 
Some authors have complemented agency theory with a stakeholder perspective to 
clarify some corporate governance phenomena. However, there are important insights offered 
by the agency perspective which should not be lost in the redefinition (Shankman, 1999). 
Among them is the development of monitoring mechanisms to reconcile principals and 
agents’ interests. According to Shankman (1999) “These insights should be incorporated into 
the stakeholder perspective of the firm. In this way, it can be strengthened as a tool for 
explaining organizational phenomena” (p. 332). Hill and Jones (1992) were the first to 
theorize a general stakeholder agency theory. According to these authors, agency and 
stakeholder theories are similar, and principal–agent relationships can be seen as a subset of a 
broad series of stakeholder–agent ones. Like agency theorists, Hill and Jones (1992) 
recognized that monitoring mechanisms can reconcile divergent claims between agents and 
stakeholders by reducing information asymmetry. In fact, stakeholders want to gather 
information about management activities to ensure that managers act in their interests. Risk-
related information is one example of such information. Moreover, organizations disclose 
many reports to stakeholders, such as integrated corporate social reports, that simply report on 
the management of the organizations’ critical risks (Ballou and Heitger, 2008). Hill and Jones 
(1992) argued that it is for managers to manage stakeholders’ expectations and be accountable 
to them as their agents, policed by the board. Unlike Hill and Jones (1992), Collier (2008), 
who focused on organizations’ accountability to stakeholders, argued that boards, not 
managers, are accountable to stakeholders. That is why boards want to receive information to 
ensure that organizations take care of their stakeholders. This is the purpose of risk 
management and assurance activities as we will see below. 
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2.2.2 Boards’ duties with respect to stakeholders 
The board is critical to ensuring that key stakeholder needs are met (Reding et al., 2009). 
Boards are ultimately responsible to their stakeholders and they have traditionally two 
governance responsibilities: (1) strategic direction, and (2) monitoring (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission [COSO], 2009; Daugherty and 
Anderson, 2012; Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; Reding et al., 2009; Ruud, 2003). Figure 2 
describes boards’ duties to stakeholders.  
First, the board establishes the strategic direction by defining objectives in line with 
stakeholders’ expectations; the goal is to enhance stakeholder value because stakeholders’ 
expectations are intrinsically valuable (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Stakeholder theory is 
highly topical in the strategic management literature (e.g., Crilly, 2013; Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman et al., 2007, 2010; Harrison et al., 2010; Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). Taken 
together, these authors suggest that organizations need to manage their stakeholders because 
this is at the root of value creation. Similarly, Ballou and Heitger (2008) argue that failure to 
manage stakeholder concerns can negatively impact stakeholder value. However, the board’s 
strategic role falls outside the scope of this study.  
Once boards have identified their stakeholders and understood their expectations, their 
second duty is to monitor managers’ behavior to ensure the accomplishment of organizational 
objectives. The board plays a significant role on behalf of stakeholders in its oversight of 
management. Among the monitoring mechanisms that help boards exercise oversight, Figure 
2 shows that risk management and assurance are key complementary activities (Daugherty 
and Anderson, 2012; Reding et al., 2009). 
2.2.2.1 Risk management  
According to Miller et al. (2008) the management of organizations is intertwined with 
the management of risks. Since 2004, enterprise-wide risk management (ERM) has emerged 
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as a paradigm that views risk holistically and goes beyond the traditional silos approach to 
managing risks. The COSO (2004) defines ERM as a “process, effected by an entity’s board 
of directors, management, and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to 
be within its risk appetite” (p. 2). Similarly, the Casualty Actuarial Society Committee (2012) 
defines ERM as the “discipline by which an organization in an industry assesses, controls, 
exploits, finances, and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose of increasing the 
organization’s short- and long-term value to its stakeholders” (p. 1). 
Figure 2: Boards’ Duties with Respect to Stakeholders  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Reding et al. (2009) 
Thus, ERM represents an interesting application of stakeholder theory in the accounting and 
finance discipline (Freeman et al., 2010). The adoption of ERM helps boards, and ultimately 
stakeholders, to receive reasonable assurance that organizations will reach their objectives 
(COSO, 2004). In simple terms, ERM requires risk identification, risk assessment, risk 
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management, communication, and the monitoring of risk management’s effectiveness 
(COSO, 2004). Hayne and Free (2014) recognize that the monitoring component assumes the 
entire process be constantly monitored and improved if necessary.  
From an agency perspective, risk management minimizes agency problems by 
reducing information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. From a stakeholder 
perspective, risk has negative consequences if not well managed but also allows organizations 
to enhance stakeholder value (COSO, 2009). Therefore, the board must ensure that risk 
management balances value protection with value creation for stakeholders (COSO, 2009; 
Frigo and Anderson, 2011). In fact, much literature supports the idea that ERM creates value 
for stakeholders. The ERM process is value-added and improves long-term organizational 
performance by supporting the achievement of objectives and increasing its likelihood 
(Beasley and Frigo, 2007; COSO, 2009). Furthermore, ERM deals more effectively with risks 
than does siloed risk management, preserving and enhancing stakeholder value (Beasley and 
Frigo, 2007; Beasley et al., 2006; COSO, 2009).  
One of the first studies in ERM is that from Beasley and colleagues who studied the 
factors associated with the extent of ERM implementation (Beasley et al., 2005). After that, 
the debate over ERM has long questioned whether ERM is associated with performance. 
According to Gordon et al. (2009) the relationship between ERM and performance is 
contingent upon the appropriate match between an organization’s ERM system and 
environmental uncertainty, industry competition, size, complexity and board monitoring. 
More recently, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) found a positive relationship between firm value 
and the implementation of ERM programs in insurance companies and argued that ERM 
improves risk awareness, allowing organizations to improve operations and strategic decision 
making. Furthermore, Power (2009) states that using ERM to do risk management represents 
good business even if he also admits that there still remain misconceptions at the level of 
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ERM design which may somewhat explain risk management failures during the last financial 
crisis. 
Nowadays, the debate over risk management has evolved. As it is accepted that ERM 
provides organizations with multiple benefits, monitoring the effectiveness of ERM is now 
highly topical. Recent corporate failures and changes in corporate governance have increased 
stakeholder expectations for boards to monitor the effectiveness of risk management systems 
(Arena et al., 2010; Beasley et al., 2006, 2015a; Beasley and Frigo, 2007; COSO, 2009; 
Landsittel and Rittenberg, 2010). According to Pirson and Turnbull (2011) boards’ 
monitoring role failed during the financial crisis because they either lacked relevant risk-
related information or were unable to process the information available. As such, regulators 
and industry observers started to issue recommendations in order to enhance risk management 
oversight since companies, such as Citigroup and Merrill Lynch to name but a few, had 
ineffective risk oversight (Mikes, 2011). Furthermore, Landsittel and Rittenberg (2010) have 
expressly called for meaningful research in ERM that makes risk management oversight at the 
center of researchable questions that need to be addressed.  
Risk management oversight is the board’s responsibility (see Figure 1), but the board 
traditionally delegates daily risk management to management. Risk oversight requires the 
board to assess how effectively the entire risk management framework responds to significant 
risks. Risk management is not only an internal management process for preserving and 
enhancing stakeholder value. As noted by Lam (1999), risk management should also be used 
to improve transparency for key stakeholders. Communicating about risk to stakeholders is 
intended to assure boards that management is following the appropriate risk management 
processes. Creating stakeholder value through risk management is important, but equally 
important is ensuring that stakeholder value is not destroyed; this is the purpose of assurance 
activities. The assurance aspect of risk management is discussed in the next section.  
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2.2.2.2 Accountability and assurance for stakeholders 
Agency theorists consider the audit as a mechanism for assuring shareholders that agents are 
running the organization in their interests (Baker and Owsen, 2002; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983). Audit produces comfort (Pentland, 1993) in reducing information asymmetry between 
principals and agents, therefore restoring trust in financial reporting; however, modern 
governance recognizes that the many stakeholders involved may each have different interests 
with respect to assurance activities (ICAEW, 2008; Ruud, 2003).  
In 1984, the US Congress passed the Single Audit Act requiring most recipients of 
federal assistance to have a single audit comprised of financial, internal control, and 
compliance audits. Several authors recognized that stakeholders need information beyond 
mere financial data, therefore the Single Audit Act was seen as an opportunity for 
organizations to improve auditing for multiple stakeholders (Baker and Owsen, 2002; Elliott, 
2002; Lee, 1998; Roberts, 1998; Sutton and Arnold, 1998).  
Boards must ensure that organizations meet stakeholders’ expectations, while 
assurance activities support boards’ discharge of their duties to stakeholders (ICAEW, 2008). 
Assurance services are responses by directors to concerns from stakeholders over the 
credibility of information provided by organizations to their stakeholders, in the same way as 
the independent audit addresses the principal-agent conflict between shareholders and 
directors” (ICAEW, 2008). Similarly, The IIA (2013a) defines them, an “objective 
examination of evidence for the purpose of providing an independent assessment in 
governance, risk management, and control processes for the organization.” Nowadays, many 
agree that effective governance is the result of a board’s assurance that risk management and 
internal control systems are effective (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; ECIIA and FERMA, 
2010; IIA, 2012; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010; IoD, 2009; Kinney, 2003; Spira and Page, 2003;).  
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The Three Lines of Defense Model 
 
Hay et al. (2008) suggest that an organization that is in need of greater controls will invest in 
a variety of mechanisms for control. Therefore, boards rely on a variety of assurance 
providers to fulfill their risk management oversight role. In practice, assurance services are 
delivered by many parties, such as line management, risk management, legal department, 
quality assurance, compliance, business continuity, environment, health and safety, corporate 
social responsibility, and external and internal audits. Though not all providers perform 
audits, all provide some sort of assurance service. For example, Ruud (2003) describes 
management control risk self-assessment as “one method for providing assurance by putting 
more emphasis on self-evaluation on the part of managers and employees as process-owners” 
(p. 77). The variety in the stakeholders’ interests influences the need for assurance services 
(Ruud, 2003). 
These assurance providers include risk management and assurance functions that help 
boards monitor on behalf of stakeholders. The multitude of assurance providers is often 
gathered together into three lines of defence (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; ECIIA and 
FERMA, 2010; KPMG, 2007; IIA, 2013b; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). The first is line 
management, the risk owner, which mitigates risk daily and provides continual risk 
monitoring, especially through risk control self-assessments. The second line groups together 
corporate functions that help risk owners implement effective risk management and control. 
They help the first line by providing them with the policies, methodologies, and tools needed 
to carry out risk management, representing a second level of risk management assurance. 
Finally, the third line relies on all the independent and objective assurance providers who 
confirm to the board the integrity and robustness of the risk management system.  
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In fact, each assurance provider is somewhat responsible to a specific set of 
stakeholders. Collier (2008) and Waring (2008) explain that stakeholders need compensation 
for the risks they undertake. In particular, that compensation comes from the provision of 
receiving assurance. As stakeholders’ representatives, boards want to be able to discharge 
their duties to stakeholders, especially concerning risk management. According to that, 
assurance activities confirm to boards that the risk management information, disclosed 
through various reports to their stakeholders, is adequate (ICAEW, 2008). Managers may also 
want assurance providers to suggest business improvements. Other stakeholders also see 
value in these assurance activities. Employees, customers, and suppliers have a vested interest 
in an organization’s viability and success (Freeman et al., 2010, 2007; Reding et al., 2009). 
Investors want assurance providers to confirm their return on investment. Finally, the 
communities in which organizations operate expect them to behave appropriately. Table II 
illustrates the assurance needs of some of the primary stakeholders and the potential lines of 
defense in assurance processes. 
[INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE] 
The problem with the assurance process is that assurance providers usually give 
assurance in silos, creating much inefficiency. Indeed, assurance providers may duplicate 
activities or fail to cover significant areas because they lack an integrated or global view of 
assurance. This lack of coordination also creates problems for reporting to the board. In that 
perspective, combined assurance aims to provide an integrated framework comprising all 
assurance activities and requires coordination among assurance providers for effective and 
efficient assurance. As suggested by KPMG (2007) “Having in place a strong set of defenses 
is crucial, but equally important is the need to coordinate these activities” (p. 15). 
The Combined Assurance Approach 
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ERM provides the proper infrastructure for assurance activities (IIA, 2012). Combined 
assurance therefore aims to bridge risk management and assurance activities while ensuring 
that business objectives are met (see Figure 2). However, stakeholders’ competing goals and 
interests make coordinating assurance activities particularly challenging.  
The South African King III Report encourages the coordination of assurance activities 
within a combined assurance framework (IoD, 2009). Combined assurance is therefore 
expected to provide boards with better information about the effectiveness of risk 
management and internal control systems. The IIA has likewise recently offered standards, 
guidance, and practice advisories on that matter (e.g., IIA, 2012; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). 
However, the literature is not so extensive when it comes to empirical research on combined 
assurance. To our knowledge, mainly professional organizations have studied combined 
assurance. In a KPMG global survey conducted jointly with the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
only 31% of organizations said they were successful at coordinating their assurance activities 
(KPMG, 2007). The IIA UK and Ireland (2008) surveyed the heads of internal audit from the 
public and private sectors and concluded that many organizations had an incomplete picture 
of assurance. This study revealed that (1) only half of the organizations successfully 
coordinated control and assurance concerning significant risks, (2) one third did not map 
assurance about significant risks, (3) one fifth misunderstood the link between assurance 
activities and significant risks, and (4) coordination between traditional assurance providers 
and other assurance providers (such as corporate social responsibility, environment, and/or 
health and safety) was limited at best. A more recent study performed by the same institution 
concluded that only 8% of organizations had a combined assurance program (IIA UK and 
Ireland, 2010). 
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Beyond these findings, however, we know little about combined assurance—
specifically, about how it works in practice, the reasons for implementing combined 
assurance, and its benefits.   
2.3 METHOD 
We followed an inductive approach to generate theory from our data. Because combined 
assurance is a new research area, we relied on Eisenhardt’s (1989b) process of inducting 
theory using case studies. We elaborate on Reding et al.’s (2009) framework to explain how 
combined assurance can help enhance risk management oversight for stakeholders. This paper 
provides qualitative answers to three research questions. (a) What is (are) the 
understanding(s) of combined assurance? (b) Why do organizations implement combined 
assurance? (c) What are the benefits of combined assurance? 
Similar to previous studies on related topics (Arena et al., 2010; Hayne and Free, 
2014; Mikes, 2011) we decided to gain insights into combined assurance using case/field 
studies for several reasons. First, qualitative research is widely used in governance, 
accounting, and auditing to counterbalance the “orthodox, positivist, quantitative and 
shareholder-centric approach to corporate governance” (Brennan and Solomon, 2008, p. 898). 
In a recent overview of qualitative research in corporate governance, McNulty et al. (2013) 
encourage researchers to conduct qualitative studies to provide a better understanding of 
corporate phenomena and help policymakers and practitioners develop more efficient 
governance mechanisms. In reviewing stakeholder theory studies published between 1984 and 
2007, Laplume et al. (2008) also recommend more qualitative research on how organizations 
respond to stakeholder expectations. Second, the lack of previous research and the exploratory 
nature of this study make qualitative research ideally suited for case studies on combined 
assurance (Bluhm et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2013). According to Cooper and Morgan 
(2008) case studies are particularly helpful in describing the details of how new accounting 
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and auditing innovations – such as combined assurance – are done. Qualitative research is 
more appropriate for theoretical formation and development, as it more effectively explores 
new phenomena and generates new theoretical insights about corporate governance than 
quantitative methods do (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Patton (2002) 
explains that qualitative studies can draw more detailed information from fewer cases. They 
can also provide new insights from “black boxes” that can later be investigated through 
deductive and quantitative research, leading to more generalizable findings (Power and 
Gendron, 2015). Moreover, Yin (2009) suggests that “the essence of a case study…is that it 
tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what results” (p. 17). Third, Zimmerman (2001) argues that empirical 
research in management control systems is constrained by the lack of information on what 
organizations are doing internally. The research tends to overuse external and publicly 
available data and neglect internal data. As no publicly available data on combined assurance 
are available and since combined assurance is a purely internal phenomenon driven by 
internal actors, we went into the field to speak with the internal actors involved.  
  This study adopts a multiple- rather than single-case study approach to identify the 
commonalities and differences between cases. The former is more robust and reliable for 
building theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Our selection of cases
5
 was 
theory-driven; we looked for organizations that had implemented combined assurance or, as 
in the case of one organization, were planning to do so. Theoretical sampling is more 
appropriate for developing a theory than for testing it because it illuminates and extends 
relationships and logic among constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
This study uses various sources of qualitative data to enhance construct validity. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key informants on the combined assurance projects 
                                                     
5
 Several cases were suggested by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation. 
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of six international organizations between September 2011 and February 2012. These key 
informants include organizational actors from different functional areas. Multiple key 
informant interviews have the advantage of increasing construct validity (Yin, 2009). A 
summary of the people interviewed is shown in Table III.  
[INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE] 
The interviews were also triangulated with relevant internal documents that were 
collected wherever possible, consisting mainly of internal presentations related to combined 
assurance, group risk management, and audit committee meeting reports. 
Levels of combined assurance maturity varied among the cases. The selected 
organizations operated in three industries: banking, communications, and mining. Case A is a 
European organization with a subsidiary in South Africa, where combined assurance is a 
recommended practice; the company wants to capitalize on that from a global perspective. 
Case B and Case C are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, where combined 
assurance is recommended. The challenge for both these organizations is their first attempt to 
issue a combined assurance report to their audit committees. Case D, a European bank, and 
Case E, an Australian natural resources firm, have decided to implement combined assurance 
voluntarily. Finally, Case F, an Australian telecommunications company, has recognized the 
usefulness of implementing combined assurance, but it continues to struggle because of 
certain barriers. Table III reports the characteristics of each organization. 
We sent an introductory e-mail to the contact person in each identified organization 
explaining the objectives of the study. Second, we e-mailed the interview agenda with the 
guiding questions one week before the interview, and participants were informed of the 
purpose of the study. Using that information, our contact person was free to invite several 
persons to discuss combined assurance.  
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We followed several methodological steps to enhance the reliability of the study. All 
interviews were recorded with the interviewees’ permission and transcribed immediately after 
the interviews to ensure accuracy and completeness. Each interview lasted from 30 to 100 
minutes and was conducted independently, except for cases A and D, which involved three 
and two interviewees, respectively. A copy of the transcribed interview was sent to all 
interviewees for review and approval, and participants were asked to react freely to them. 
Finally, the researchers guaranteed the confidentiality of interviewees and their organizations, 
and assured them that no other organization would have access to their transcript. 
We adopted a thematic approach to the data. All interviews and internal documents 
were separately coded. We had no preconceived constructs or categories in mind before 
analyzing the data and thus retained theoretical flexibility (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Codes 
reflecting concepts that emerged during the interview were used to develop standardized 
matrices for each organization (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Finally, a cross-case analysis 
was undertaken, generating insights to the research questions and the development of our 
framework for combined assurance. The next section presents the findings of the cross-case 
analysis. 
2.4 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS 
Table IV presents additional illustrative findings than those delivered in this section for each 
research question, including relevant quotes from the case studies.  
2.4.1 Understanding combined assurance 
According to the six cases, combined assurance ensures that risk management and internal 
control systems are designed properly as well as operate as designed. Though combined 
assurance is still a project for Case F, the Australian organization constantly looks for new 
ways to implement more efficient assurance program; combined assurance is therefore seen as 
a constant opportunity.  
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In fact, combined assurance serves a disclosure purpose since boards need to provide a 
statement about the effectiveness of their risk management and internal control systems. 
Combined assurance aims to provide meaningful information about risk to stakeholders. 
Moreover, they are accountable for monitoring the effectiveness of risk management. Hence, 
better disclosure to stakeholders could create value for stakeholders (through improved 
decision-making). As recognized by the Vice-President, Risk and Health, Safety, 
Environment, and Community (HSEC) Assurance in Case E, 
the challenge is to balance the information, and recognize that, in fact, you have 
different stakeholders for different purposes…Nowadays, expectations on 
corporations are continuing to evolve and the ability for companies to maximize 
shareholder value is very important, but you need to meet other stakeholder needs, 
which is where the combined assurance piece comes in…They all have a view about 
risk and want to know what a company does with respect to it. 
Similarly, the head of Risk Assessment and Assurance from Case E states that 
combined assurance is to deliver a more consistent and better outcome to 
management, to the board and to key stakeholders around assurance, and audit overall, 
across all functional areas.  
 
 As suggested in the theoretical background, each line of defense has its own 
responsibility to provide assurance to the board regarding the company’s risks because the 
risks and stakeholder interests are many. Combined assurance helps ensure that assurance 
efforts are coordinated and thus effectively cover the risks. Independent assurance from the 
third line is not the only valuable source of assurance: this line cannot visit every business 
unit every day of every year and provide a holistic picture of risk management to the board.  
 In practice, the coordination of assurance providers has produced combined assurance 
engagements where a team comprising many assurance providers performs assurance 
simultaneously, covering an entire business, rather than working separately. As a result, the 
meaning of combined assurance is twofold: (i) the integrate assurance that goes to the board, 
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and (ii) the combined assurance team to do an audit. Table IV reports interesting quotations 
about these combined assurance teams. Case A uses the metaphor of due diligence. Case C 
has developed the concept of combined assurance windows, where mines are visited during 
two windows. The first technical window is scheduled at the start of the year and aims to 
cover technical risks and provide assurance for such sectors as mining, engineering, 
metallurgy, and health and safety. The second commercial window is scheduled in the second 
half of the year and covers traditional financial and governance risks. Finally, Case E uses the 
analogy of going to the doctor and getting a full check-up. These combined assurance projects 
justify heavy intervention for a time; afterwards, the assurance providers leave for a period, 
giving management time to deal with the issues and suggestions raised. 
2.4.2 Drivers  
Cases A to E implemented combined assurance primarily because a number of practical 
factors made their assurance activities no longer efficient. Assurance resources were being 
wasted, and rationalization became urgent, with combined assurance seen as the best solution. 
Thus, combined assurance is a way to create value, not just for stakeholders but also for the 
organization itself. A more efficient use of assurance resources also increases the value of the 
organization. As suggested by the Vice President, Assurance Planning and Development in 
Case E, 
the primary driver was really to produce an in-depth audit that provides a lot more 
insight and value to the business.  
 
Thus, areas under assurance have seen many assurance providers come and repeat 
themselves (i.e., commit assurance duplication). Moreover, by operating in silos, assurance 
providers have risked not providing assurance on substantial areas (i.e., cause an assurance 
gap). These assurance inefficiencies impacted reporting, which destroyed value because the 
board was not able to play its monitoring role; they may also have destroyed value for the 
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stakeholders, who were insufficiently informed to make appropriate decisions. Table IV 
illustrates the rationalization driver of combined assurance. In Case D, the bank’s audit 
committee asked the internal audit function to reduce its audit fees in 2006; the internal 
auditors responded by creating synergies with other assurance providers. For example, under 
certain circumstances, the external auditor can rely on the internal auditors’ work if they 
follow an appropriate methodology. Though this cost aspect is not the primary driver for 
implementing combined assurance but merely a bonus, it is also a way to create value.  
 Many cases claim that a second driver for combined assurance implementation is the 
greater focus on improving board’s risk-management monitoring, which creates most of the 
value. Ultimately, combined assurance helps boards exercise their oversight properly and 
discharge their risk management duties to stakeholders. As stakeholders’ representatives, 
boards want to ensure that outcomes are delivered to stakeholders, and combined assurance is 
one accountability mechanism that ensures that organizations are managed properly. By 
consolidating assurance efforts, combined assurance provides directors, subcommittees, and 
stakeholders a clear perspective. Although Case F does not use combined assurance, senior 
management and the board are clearly eager to more actively improve risk management, and 
combined assurance should help:  
The question around why we will do combined assurance, it is because it is the right 
way to ensure that we are doing what is of most concern and most interest to our most 
senior stakeholder [the board] who have an interest and a desire to see it done…They 
want to know that what the risk management says is actually right. (Group manager, 
Case F) 
 
Additionally, several corporate governance codes have pressured organizations to 
enhance their boards’ risk-management monitoring for stakeholders. King III requires 
organizations to take a strong interest in combined assurance, as it can positively influence a 
board’s oversight and the effective of governance. Combined assurance is also a tick box 
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exercise for King III. Case B and Case C are directly involved. As listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, their audit committees must give a statement on the effectiveness of 
combined assurance. Similarly, with a subsidiary in South Africa, Case A aims to meet that 
country’s requirement and then capitalize globally. Cases B and C recognized that the first 
two drivers were more important and that King III only served to legitimate the concept.  
2.4.3 Benefits  
Obviously, organizations can benefit greatly from combined assurance. It helps boards 
understand, interrogate, and challenge their risk management and internal control systems and 
thus verify their effectiveness. Risk awareness and transparency increase significantly from 
the board’s risk perspective. Through combined assurance, organizations understand the risks 
on the ground, allowing them to make more informed decisions and ensure that their business 
is operating effectively. The benefit is thus an improved business as well as enhanced 
objectives and activities, so that combined assurance has created value for the organization. 
As suggested by Case E’s head of Risk Assessment and Assurance, 
combined assurance helps board and executives in discharging their responsibilities by 
giving them the information they need in order to make the decisions that are going to 
impact their success. 
 
Moreover, combined assurance helps directors improve their risk-management 
monitoring for stakeholders. If boards do not, first, understand the risks and, second, have a 
clear view of whether they are being mitigated properly, directors cannot claim to be 
executing their duties fully.  
 Thus, even if the primary purpose of assurance activities is value protection, combined 
assurance also offers more opportunities to identify tangible value improvement by 
calibrating across multiple functional areas, thus creating more value than a traditional audit 
would: 
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By bringing in someone who has not only the subject matter expertise, but also has 
been around the block with the organization, really knows the context of the 
organization’s values, its cultures and its strategy, and he or she is therefore able to 
translate that subject matter expertise into something that is more tangible and 
understandable to the management that is being evaluated, that provides natural 
credibility to the outcome…These assurance providers work together to deliver a 
product that neither party working independently would be able to produce. (Vice-
president, Assurance Planning and Development, Case E) 
 
All cases agreed that they obtained assurance’s rationalization benefit largely through 
the appropriate use of assurance resources. First, holding workshops and multifunctional 
combined assurance projects allows assurance providers to meet and embrace a common view 
of risk management and assurance. Combined assurance thus eliminates the silo effect by 
which each assurance provider protects its own territory. Second, engaging in common 
workshops and combined assurance projects allows the cases to recognize that assurance gaps 
cannot occur since all the assurance providers are in the room and/or on the team. 
Consequently, another benefit is the benchmarking between assurance providers. Combined 
assurance aims to improve assurance activities because assurance providers pick best 
practices from among the formerly isolated assurance providers. Third, combined assurance 
sources the right caliber of assurance providers and establishes solid communication bridges 
between assurance providers to avoid duplication. However, duplication or triplication may 
be needed among the three lines of defense if the risk justifies it. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
2.5.1 Developing theory from case study findings 
Case study research is particularly useful in highlighting new issues (Cooper and Morgan, 
2008; Power and Gendron, 2015). Building on the literature and case studies, a framework is 
proposed for combined assurance that extends the framework in Reding et al. (2009), shown 
in Figure 2. In line with Eisenhardt’s (1989b) inductive theory building process, we propose 
the following framework for combined assurance shown in Figure 3.  
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Building on the stakeholder agency perspective, the framework highlights the 
connections between the various constructs found in the case studies. The starting point is the 
recognition of multiple stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Boards need to consider their 
relevant stakeholders and their expectations to run their organizations effectively. According 
to Mikes (2011) the 2007-2009 financial crisis led organizations for a reassessment of 
stakeholders’ expectations of risk management. Stakeholders may differ in their assurance 
expectations (ICAEW, 2008) so that organizations will identify multiple monitoring and 
assurance functions to be particularly helpful for the board to exercise its oversight role on 
behalf of these multiple stakeholders. Table II presented those stakeholders and their 
respective assurance needs. 
Based on the risk management information required by stakeholders, organizations 
must collect assurance from the three lines of defense and other sources. By coordinating the 
assurance from those lines within a combined assurance model, boards and other stakeholders 
receive holistic assurance on the organization’s risks. Descriptive findings from the case 
studies suggest that combined assurance positively influences both assurance activities and 
the board’s risk-management oversight role. From an assurance perspective, without a 
cohesive, coordinated, limited risk and assurance resources may not be deployed effectively, 
and significant risks may not be identified or managed appropriately. Furthermore, combined 
assurance helps to create one shared vision throughout a group of assurance providers with an 
overview of key risks and core assurance providers working on the right areas from a board 
perspective. Finally, there is higher efficiency in assurance activities since combining 
assurance will prevent duplication with separate assurance engagements, so less audit fatigue 
and improved relationships between assurance providers and cost synergies. In short, 
combined assurance is more efficient than assurance performed in silos, as risk management 
is more efficient under ERM. Thus, combined assurance creates internal value for the 
 - 38 - 
 
organization.  From a board’s perspective, combined assurance limits the number of people 
reporting to the board and committees on assurance activities, so that it assists the board’s 
risk-management monitoring. Combined assurance gives a holistic view on risk management 
and internal control systems so that the board discharge its risk management duties to its 
stakeholders more appropriately, the external value for stakeholders. Combined assurance 
helps boards who need to provide a statement about the effectiveness of their risk 
management and internal control systems to their stakeholders.  
Both these benefits influence a board’s decisions about risks: directors can make better 
decisions (this is the internal value creation) and can continuously improve their risk 
management. In fact, boards become more knowledgeable about risks and are thus able to 
keep their stakeholders better informed; enhancing risk transparency for stakeholders (this is 
the external value creation). Reflecting the combined assurance findings, Figure 3 suggests a 
loop and an opportunity to improve the assurance coverage from assurance providers.   
Then, our framework suggests that combined assurance should improve governance 
for the benefit of stakeholders, the best way to create stakeholder value. Effective governance 
requires that outcomes be delivered to stakeholders, and this combined assurance approach 
ensures that organizations are run properly by providing both the board and other stakeholders 
with holistic assurance about the effectiveness of ERM.  
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Figure 3: Combined Assurance Framework
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, combined assurance allows for better reporting to stakeholders (Lam, 1999). 
Combined assurance enhances transparency with integrated corporate social reports, for 
                                                     
6
 All the arrows do not necessarily have the same meaning. Some are correlations, whereas others are causation 
(i.e., causal relationship or cause and effect). 
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example, which correspond to reports on organization’s significant risks (Ballou and Heitger, 
2008).  In short, combined assurance confirms to stakeholders that organizations are taking 
care of their interests.  
2.5.2 Implications for research and practice 
Given the increasing attention paid to boards’ risk-management monitoring, our findings have 
important theoretical and practical implications.  
By providing insights into combined assurance, this study first contributes to the 
literature on risk management. Our combined assurance framework suggests that combined 
assurance is an important organizational model that helps boards to monitor the effectiveness 
of their risk management systems (Beasley et al., 2015a, 2015b; COSO, 2009; Landsittel and 
Rittenberg, 2010; Reding et al., 2009). According to Daily et al. (2003) corporate scandals 
and regulatory changes always constitute opportunities for researchers to reconsider the 
importance of board monitoring.  As it is often required that boards attest the effectiveness of 
risk management and provide, accordingly, a statement to their stakeholders about risk 
management, our study describes combined assurance as a paradigm which helps achieving 
that.    
The second contribution is to the auditing for stakeholders literature. Our findings 
reveal that combined assurance is viewed as an important mechanism helping boards to 
become more knowledgeable and transparent about risk management to their stakeholders. 
First, we incorporate the assurance dimension missing in stakeholder agency theory (Collier, 
2008; Hill and Jones, 1992) to explain more comprehensively how boards can better inform 
stakeholders about risk and become more accountable to them. Combined assurance aims to 
assess the effectiveness of the risk management system considering the variety of 
stakeholders’ expectations for risk. As such, this study reconceptualizes board’s monitoring 
role (Daily et al., 2003) using a stakeholder agency perspective. Second, it shows how boards 
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can improve their accountability to stakeholders (Brennan and Solomon, 2008) by using 
combined assurance to discharge their risk-management monitoring duty. Like Collier (2008) 
who considered one quasi-public organization, our descriptive findings drawn from six 
private organizations provide insights that the board is central to stakeholder management and 
that it is the entity ultimately accountable to the stakeholders, not the managers, as suggested 
by Hill and Jones (1992). Rather, management as a first line of defense and other assurance 
functions provide assurance services to the board in order to help it be accountable to the 
stakeholders. Finally, our study contributes to the ‘joint-audit’ literature. Combined assurance 
also means combined assurance team to do an audit. This combined assurance approach 
creates more value than a traditional audit would. Rather than only considering the 
collaboration between internal and external auditors (e.g., Sarens et al., 2009), this study 
extends this joint-audit approach to all assurance providers and shows that enhanced 
coordination between these assurance providers reinforces the overall assurance a board 
receives. As such, combined assurance may well be seen as an organizational model that 
makes optimum use of assurance resources by seeing these assurance activities “as a network 
rather than a set of isolated practices” (Roussy, 2013, p. 570).   
We hope our study also provides implications for practitioners and policymakers. 
According to Power (1999), “practitioners constantly debate the efficiency of different 
methods and seek to elaborate cost-efficient solutions to the problem of providing assurance” 
(p. 7). Moreover, McNulty et al. (2013) have asked researchers to produce new insights into 
efficient governance mechanisms useful for policymakers, practitioners, and regulators. Amid 
the widespread failure of boards’ risk-management monitoring, our findings reveal that 
combined assurance is an effective and efficient way to provide holistic assurance to the 
board which then improves board’s risk management oversight role on behalf of stakeholders. 
Therefore, this study should offer important insights for organizations seeking to develop a 
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better understanding of the relevance of combined assurance and improve organizational 
governance. Policymakers and regulators may also be interested in this study. In a context in 
which their intention is to enhance risk management oversight to avoid that the same last 
catastrophic events occur again, the combined assurance findings reported in this paper may 
be useful for them.   
2.5.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
Finally, we would like to acknowledge the limitations of this study and suggest some 
directions for future research.  
The most important limitation involves comparability: the studies’ cases are at various 
levels of combined assurance implementation maturity, which must be remembered when 
interpreting the findings. The six cases are still learning as they implement combined 
assurance; there is no mature combined assurance model. There is much room for optimizing 
and making combined assurance a relevant governance mechanism. Second, the number of 
interviewees and their functions differed from one case to another because the interviews 
were scheduled by each case’s contact person. Three, combined assurance has been explored 
mainly through internal auditors’ perspectives in this study. It is possible that there are other 
people leading the combined assurance initiative whose views are not taken into account 
within this study.  
 Combined assurance is still an unexplored phenomenon, and our study offers 
opportunities for future research. First, to add credibility to the findings, future research may 
compare organizations that use combined assurance with others that do not, showing the 
benefits of using the approach even more effectively. One interesting question is whether the 
benefits of combined assurance outweigh the costs. Difficulties arise when organizations 
bring more risks into their scope because this requires deeper engagement with stakeholders. 
Figure 3 suggests that the extent of combined assurance or the intensity of coordination 
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between assurance providers may positively influence a board’s risk-management monitoring 
for stakeholders. However, as the complexity of coordinating assurance activities increases 
accordingly, its costs may outweigh its benefits at some point. Moreover, a follow-up of this 
study would be interesting given that the case organizations know that their combined 
assurance programs are not yet mature. An important avenue for future research is linking 
combined assurance with disclosures to stakeholders on the significant risks that impact them. 
The full integration of governance, ERM, and reporting is needed to manage risks 
successfully and report transparently to stakeholders (Ballou and Heitger, 2008). Similarly, 
Ntim et al. (2012) argue that disclosing good governance practices impacts firm value by 
sending a positive signal to the market about the organization’s strong commitment to good 
governance and accounting to stakeholders. Future research could therefore investigate if 
combined assurance implementation also sends this positive signal.  
As inductive and deductive approaches are “mirrors of one another” (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007, p. 25), future research could use quantitative methods to test our exploratory 
findings and our combined assurance framework. Particularly, combined assurance may be 
contingent upon the presence and structure of other mechanisms. As in Gordon et al.’s (2009) 
examination of the value of ERM, future research in combined assurance could look at the 
important contingency features conditioning whether combined assurance is effective or 
efficient in helping boards exercise their monitoring role.  
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNAL AUDITING AND COMBINED ASSURANCE7 
 
“The IAF has a unique opportunity to serve an important role in acting as a resource to the 
other parties charged with monitoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of an entity’s 
corporate governance”. (Gramling et al., 2004, p. 240) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, many countries have reformed their corporate governance codes following the last 
global financial crisis (e.g., Australia (Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council, 2010); UK (Financial Reporting Council, 2012); USA (New York Stock Exchange 
Commission on Corporate Governance, 2010); Europe (European Confederation of Institutes 
of Internal Auditing and Federation of European Risk Management Associations (ECIIA and 
FERMA, 2010)) and South Africa (Institute of Directors (IoD), 2009)). During this period 
major organizational failures were caused mainly by failures in risk management (e.g., Brown 
et al., 2009; Conyon et al., 2011; Magnan and Markarian, 2011; Mikes, 2011; Pirson and 
Turnbull, 2011). New regulation insists on oversight of the risk management processes, and 
has required organizations to demonstrate that they apply effective and efficient governance 
procedures. Among these procedures, risk management and internal control systems are 
particularly useful in helping organizations reach their objectives. One of the key 
requirements for a board is therefore to gain assurance that risk management processes are 
working effectively and that key risks are being managed at an acceptable level (The Institute 
of Internal Auditors (IIA), 2009, 2012; IoD, 2009; Reding et al., 2009). 
                                                     
7
 This chapter is based on LSM Working paper 2014/02, “The Champion Role of the Internal Audit Function in 
Combined Assurance”, co-authored with Gerrit Sarens (supervisor of this thesis). An earlier version of this paper 
has been presented at the 12
th
 European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance 
(Como, 2014). We would like to thank Andrew Chambers, Guiseppe D’Onza, Andreas Koutoupis, and Arno 
Nuijten for their suggestions. Comments from Urton Anderson, Antoine Pierre, and Mahbub Zaman are also 
greatly appreciated.  
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The internal audit function (IAF) has been described as the “go-to group” when it 
comes to governance (McCollum, 2006). The board’s oversight role requires that they receive 
assurance that risk management and internal control systems are working effectively, and that 
key risks are being managed at an acceptable level (COSO, 2009; IIA, 2009, 2012; Reding et 
al., 2009). By providing these assurance services to the board, an IAF contributes to 
enhancing organizational governance (Ramamoorti, 2003; Ruud, 2003). In Europe, negative 
opinions have recently been formed regarding the inability of internal auditors to prevent the 
global financial crisis. Both the effectiveness of internal auditors and their added value have 
been questioned in the aftermath of the financial crisis, which has led to the marginalization 
of IAFs (Lenz and Sarens, 2012). The uncertainty about identification of the chief stakeholder 
of the IAF has been particularly damaging to the legitimacy and status of the IAF (Chambers, 
2014; Lenz and Sarens, 2012). On the one hand, those charged with organizational 
governance, the board and executives, require that the IAF provides value through assurance 
services, whereas those managing the organizational operations, the operational managers, are 
looking for insights and recommendations on the other hand (Anderson and Christ, 2014). 
This is why Chambers and Odar (2015) suggest that IAFs failed to prevent the financial crisis 
due to not being “fit for purpose”. The IAF is still searching for a clear and a unique selling 
proposition to raise their profile (Lenz and Sarens, 2012) but the value of the IAF can be 
enhanced by providing more dependable assurance to boards (Chambers and Odar, 2015). 
Accordingly, Lenz and Hahn (2015) asked whether providing more integrated assurance will 
become the future role of an effective IAF. Similarly, Shortreed et al. (2012) suggest that one 
of the lessons of the crisis is that internal auditors need to develop new techniques for 
monitoring, reviewing and communicating to the board about the effectiveness of risk 
management and internal control systems.  
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The release of the new South African code of corporate governance – known as King 
III – suggests one innovative approach to providing such holistic assurance to the board. 
Rather than relying on isolated assurance activities, South African organizations are strongly 
advised to adopt a combined assurance approach that insists on the coordination of assurance 
activities to help boards with their oversight responsibilities when it comes to assessing the 
effectiveness of risk management and internal control systems (IoD, 2009). Similarly, The 
IIA Standard 2050 on Coordination states that the chief audit executive (CAE) “should share 
information and coordinate activities with other internal and external providers of assurance 
and consulting services to ensure proper coverage and minimize duplication of efforts” (IIA, 
2013a). Although the IAF is an important assurance provider, it cannot provide holistic 
assurance on its own. As a result, the IAF may rely on and/or use the work of other internal 
and/or external assurance providers in providing holistic assurance to the board, however in 
practice, there are only a few combined assurance programs, mainly, because no one takes 
responsibility for running combined assurance (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). 
The purpose of this paper is to use the sociology of professions to propose a new role 
that the IAF can embrace in organizational governance as its natural jurisdiction: that of 
combined assurance orchestrator. Using qualitative data from five organizations, we look at 
the role of the IAF within combined assurance. Our descriptive findings suggest that the IAF 
has three roles in the combined assurance approach: (a) facilitator; (b) coordinator and (c) 
ultimate reporter to the board. Our study contributes to the emerging literature on combined 
assurance (Decaux and Sarens, 2015) first by offering insight into who will become the 
combined assurance orchestrator. Secondly, it extends previous research on the 
professionalization of IAFs by proposing a new role that IAFs can play to enhance their status 
in organizational governance. We specifically found that playing a pivotal role in combined 
assurance offers opportunities for IAFs to become comfort providers not only to audit 
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committees (Sarens et al., 2009), but also to boards. As such, they really act as an extension of 
the boards’ eyes and ears (Chambers, 2014). By providing holistic assurance through 
combined assurance, IAFs become much more meaningful to boards and enhance their role in 
organizational governance. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature 
on the professionalization of internal auditing, the role of the IAF as a comfort provider, and 
the emerging literature on combined assurance. The third section describes the methodology 
used. The fourth section reports insights about the roles of the IAF within combined 
assurance, while the final section concludes by highlighting the paper’s contributions, 
limitations and opportunities for future research. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1 The professionalization of the IAF 
The sociology of professions literature (Abbott, 1988) focuses on the processes through which 
occupations define their jurisdiction, or the right to control the provision of particular services 
and activities. According to the sociology of professions, the development and maintenance of 
an abstract system of knowledge is particularly important for survival and the claim of 
professional stature for a professional group since it is from this knowledge that a profession 
establishes and legitimates the control of a jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988). Through this control, a 
profession can reasonably define and redefine the societal problems it addresses, develop the 
services and practical techniques to be performed to address these problems, and defend this 
resultant jurisdiction against competing professions (Abbott, 1988).  
One example of such professionalism is that of internal audit activity (e.g., Arena and 
Jeppesen, 2010; Covaleski et al., 2003; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1995; Rittenberg and Covaleski, 
2001; Sarens et al., 2009; Spira and Page, 2003). According to Abbott (1988) competition 
between professions drives the development of professions, so that the professionalization of 
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the IAF must be driven by inter-professional competition with the external audit profession. 
Covaleski et al. (2003) and Rittenberg and Covaleski (2001) explored the trend towards the 
outsourcing of internal audit services to the public accounting profession, which created 
jurisdictional disputes between internal auditors and external auditors in the late 1990s. 
Conversely, Arena and Jeppesen (2010) found little evidence of such jurisdictional dispute 
between internal auditors and external auditors in Denmark. Based on a case study of Danish 
internal auditing, these authors reported a subtle form of control from external auditors 
towards internal auditors by maintaining an intellectual jurisdiction over internal auditing 
which translated into controlling the knowledge base of internal auditors.  
 Given the definition of the IAF provided by the Institute of Internal Auditors, the 
professional jurisdiction of internal auditors lies in risk management, internal control and 
governance processes (IIA, 2013a). These areas are the comfort zone of IAFs. A large body of 
literature has considered the role of the IAF within organizational governance (e.g., Anderson 
and Christ, 2014; Gramling et al., 2004; Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; Sarens et al., 
2012a). For Cohen and colleagues, it is an integral part of the “corporate governance mosaic 
(Cohen et al., 2002, 2004, 2010) and the IAF is therefore considered a pillar of good 
governance (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; McCollum, 2006; Ruud, 2003). Sarens (2009) 
suggests that the effectiveness of the IAF should be considered in line with the impact it has 
on the quality of governance. 
3.2.2 IAF’s value proposition: Filling the board’s assurance vacuum 
At the beginning of the 21st century, large corporate scandals at companies such as Enron and 
WorldCom, which led to the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), forced IAFs to 
enhance their focus on internal controls and to develop assurance services accordingly to test 
the effectiveness of internal control systems (Abbott et al., 2010; Carcello et al., 2005a; 
2005b; Gramling et al., 2004). SOX, and similar laws in other countries, have meant that the 
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IAF had to focus extremely closely on the quality of the internal control system, so that chief 
executive officers and boards could issue a formal opinion about this. This meant a boost in 
the popularity of the IAF as suddenly all big companies needed large internal audit 
departments to comply with SOX. As a result of only considering this compliance role, the 
value proposition of internal auditors has rapidly become an issue, and, further, internal 
auditors have started to extend their areas of involvement in order to add value to an 
organization, by developing consulting activities (Anderson, 2003; Hermanson and 
Rittenberg, 2003; Ruud, 2003). Even if good governance implied that boards received 
assurance about the effectiveness of internal controls, some suggested that internal auditors 
consulted about the appropriateness and adequacy of risk management processes. Spira and 
Page (2003), for example, illustrated how UK corporate governance reporting requirements 
created opportunities for internal auditors to redefine their professional jurisdiction over 
internal controls into one over risk management. As such, two or three years before the global 
financial crisis, IAFs were again more focused on consulting as it turned out that SOX had 
exaggerated greatly by putting too much focus on the quality of internal controls. SOX had 
costed billions for compliance, without any formal proof that companies were doing better in 
terms of internal control and risk management systems. With the financial crisis in 2008, the 
role of the IAF was again questioned. Why hadn’t they seen all the big risk management 
issues? Why didn’t they warn boards and management? This led to the “marginalization” of 
the IAF (Lenz and Sarens, 2012). As a result of the crisis, many companies are forced to cut 
costs. Support functions such as the IAF are still on the list for downsizing and cost cutting if 
revealed ineffective and internal auditors are very strongly pushed to prove their added value 
in order to guarantee their own existence. There is still no clear path for internal audit, 
however, and discussion about the added value of an IAF is still ongoing (Lenz and Sarens, 
2012), but many suggest that assurance services around the effectiveness of risk management 
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remain the future of the IAF (De Zwaan et al., 2011; Leung et al., 2011; PwC, 2012b; 
Shortreed et al., 2012). 
Risk management is fundamental to organizational governance (Daugherty and 
Anderson, 2012; Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; Reding et al., 2009). As part of their risk 
management strategies, organizations have started to embrace holistic approaches to the 
management of their risks. One widespread approach is the enterprise risk management 
(ERM) framework developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) in 2004. Very much linked to the strategy of an organization (Sarens, 
2009; Spira and Page, 2003), in its last step ERM requires the effectiveness of the framework 
to be monitored (COSO, 2004).  
The IAF has become a risk and control expert (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 2006b; 
Spira and Page, 2003; Vinnari and Skӕrbӕk, 2014) so that its unique knowledge about risk 
management and internal control, combined with appropriate inter-personal and behavioral 
skills, mean that it has become an important comfort provider (Sarens et al., 2009). The IAF 
has been appointed as a usual function for improving and monitoring the effectiveness of risk 
management (COSO, 2004; IIA, 2009, Sarens, 2009).  
Internal and/or external auditors provide comfort for their stakeholders by delivering 
assurance services (Pentland, 1993; Power, 1999; Carrington and Catasús, 2007; Sikka, 
2009). According to the glossary of the IIA standards, assurance activities bring comfort to 
those responsible for governance, reassuring them that the organization is following effective 
and efficient governance processes (IIA, 2013a). The production of comfort relates to a 
situation where comfort seekers are confronted with discomfort (Sarens et al., 2009). In fact, 
risk management and assurance activities support each other (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; 
IIA, 2012; Reding et al., 2009). On the one hand, risk management provides the proper 
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infrastructure to perform assurance activities (IIA, 2012). On the other hand, assurance 
activities aim to monitor and improve the risk management framework. A particularly 
important area, in which one comfort seeker, the board, is confronted with discomfort, relates 
to risk management (Conyon et al., 2011; Pirson and Turnbull, 2011). According to Chambers 
(2008) boards are often exposed to a partial “assurance vacuum” which means that directors 
do not receive assurance that a board’s policies are being adequately implemented by 
management. This assurance vacuum therefore relates to the provision of holistic assurance 
that risk management and internal control systems are working effectively, and that key risks 
are being managed at an acceptable level (COSO, 2009; IIA, 2012). The IAF plays a critical 
role in fulfilling this assurance vacuum (Chambers, 2008; Chambers and Odar, 2015) but 
research remains silent about how, in practice, the IAF can realistically provide such holistic 
assurance to the board. 
3.2.3 Coordinating assurance activities 
A board is generally supported by different assurance providers in improving governance. 
Internal auditors are particularly important comfort providers as discussed above, and they fill 
part of the assurance vacuum. Other assurance providers include external auditors, risk 
management, compliance officers, corporate social responsibility officers, or quality officers, 
to name but a few. In a study of the attributes of assurance service providers that affect the 
demand for assurance services beyond the traditional financial statement audit, Knechel et al. 
(2006) found that expertise in subject matter was the most important attribute of an assurance 
provider. More recently, Soh and Martinov-Bennie (2015) investigated the nature and extent 
of IAF involvement in environmental, social and governance assurance in Australia. Their 
findings suggest that governance is a key area of focus for IAF assurance efforts, followed by 
social and environmental issues. Assurance on environmental issues is expected to increase in 
the future, but it will require the development of new IAF skills and expertise (Soh and 
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Martinov-Bennie, 2015). An alternative to environmental auditing is to supplement the 
knowledge, expertise, skills and competency of internal auditors with those of subject matter 
specialists (Power, 1997; Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2015). The specific example of 
environmental auditing more generally calls for a multidisciplinary approach or a combined 
assurance approach when one function cannot reasonably provide holistic assurance on a 
specific subject area. This is the case for holistic assurance about the effectiveness of risk 
management. 
The “three lines of defense” model has been traditionally used to identify and describe 
the roles and responsibilities of each assurance provider in governance (e.g., Daugherty and 
Anderson, 2012; ECIIA and FERMA, 2010; IIA, 2013b) and this model serves as a building 
block for improving coordination between assurance providers (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). 
Each assurance provider has a unique perspective and specific skills that are of value to the 
organization, so why not combine all assurance activities in one framework to holistically 
ensure that risk management and internal control systems operate effectively and efficiently? 
This would enhance governance by benefiting from complementarities, while avoiding any 
overlaps between these governance, assurance and control mechanisms (Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent, 2006b; Hay et al., 2008; Roussy, 2013). In practice, many organizations have 
experienced what they call ‘assurance fatigue’, inefficient reporting and/or ‘assurance gaps’, 
because assurance activities are uncoordinated (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; IIA, 2012; 
IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). Assurance fatigue comes when different assurance providers 
perform assurance activities on different occasions, leading to frustration being experienced 
by the areas and/or activities being assured. The reporting of these potentially different 
opinions is also inefficient because those in charge of governance receive reports from various 
parties that do not report holistically, giving them various perspectives on significant risks. 
Without a clear and holistic view of the areas that need to be assured, organizations suffer 
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from assurance gaps when no assurance activities are performed and areas justify some 
assurance being provided. All of these assurance inefficiencies contribute to the assurance 
vacuum experienced by boards.  
Coordination between assurance providers should improve governance by providing a 
higher level of organizational assurance (e.g., Roussy, 2013; Ruud, 2003). For example, 
Sarens et al. (2009) suggest that a joint-audit approach “combining the knowledge and 
expertise of internal and external auditing via well-considered collaboration, offers a way of 
combining both sources of comfort, thereby enhancing the overall level of comfort to the 
audit committee” (p. 102). A similar argument can be made for the coordination of all 
assurance providers in an organization. The coordination of assurance activities has also been 
recommended by professional institutions, such as The IIA, and in some regulations, in order 
to improve governance oversight. Specifically, King III in South Africa advocates that South 
African organizations implement a combined assurance approach to all assurance activities 
(IoD, 2009). Due to the multitude of risks faced by organizations, combined assurance 
requires better coordination among assurance providers in order to be more effective and 
efficient when dealing with assurance activities in the risk areas affecting an organization 
(IoD, 2009). The report also says the IAF should play a pivotal role by providing the board 
with assurance that the combined assurance model optimizes costs, avoids duplication, and 
prevents assurance fatigue (Baker, 2009; IoD, 2009). King III requires the IAF 
simultaneously provide a written assessment about the effectiveness of the organization’s risk 
management and internal control systems (IoD, 2009). Actually, this opens the door for IAF 
to play a leading role in the combined assurance approach, by overseeing the quality of the 
framework. Similarly, PwC (2012a) suggests that stakeholders place value on IAF’s role as a 
third line of defense, but they should value IAF’s ability to effectively coordinate across the 
first and second lines of defense just as highly. In the same vein, The IIA Standard 2050 on 
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Coordination requires the CAE to share information and coordinate with other assurance and 
consulting activities to maximize governance oversight (IIA, 2013a). The IIA has also 
provided guidance and recommendations about performing assurance mapping as a starting 
point for coordinating assurance activities (IIA, 2013a). Through an assurance map, 
organizations identify assurance fatigue, assurance gaps and the roles and responsibilities of 
each assurance provider to ensure that they are covering the right issues. If many 
organizations have tried to apply combined assurance, they have challenged doing that 
(ECIIA, 2009). According to a survey from the IIA UK and Ireland (2010) only eight percent 
of organizations have a combined assurance approach in place. Among reasons for failure in 
coordinating assurance activities, 34 percent of survey respondents pointed to the lack of 
ownership when implementing the approach (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). A previous study 
into combined assurance reveals that successful implementation requires someone to lead the 
implementation (Decaux and Sarens, 2015).   
Since, by definition, the IAF needs to add value in governance, risk and control 
processes, this study asks whether combined assurance could well become an innovative 
approach that might help the IAF to raise its profile in organizational governance and whether 
combined assurance could well fall into the IAF’s jurisdiction. More specifically, we ask: 
what is (are) the role(s) of IAFs in the combined assurance approach?   
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 The interviews 
We conducted exploratory semi-structured interviews with CAEs and other people involved 
in combined assurance. Data was collected within five worldwide organizations in different 
countries, whereas related literature on the role of IAF within risk management tends to focus 
on one specific country (e.g., De Zwaan et al., 2011; Fraser and Henry, 2007; Leung et al., 
2011). Table V provides a profile of these organizations.  
 - 56 - 
 
[INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE] 
Rather than trying to generalize the findings (Malsch and Salterio, 2015), we focus on 
understanding the roles of IAFs in combined assurance, given the lack of knowledge of this 
topic. Qualitative data seems to be particularly relevant to the purpose of our study for various 
reasons.  
In reviewing the first half century of internal audit research, Vinten (1996) first 
suggested that each field of research needed purely descriptive research in its early stage of 
development. As combined assurance is a relatively new phenomenon, qualitative data seem 
more appropriate than quantitative. According to Patton (2002) in-depth case studies produce 
more detailed information about a limited number of people and cases than large-sample 
studies that provide a generalizable set of findings.  
Previous research into the role of the IAF within organizational governance has been 
predominantly archival and survey-oriented, however, recent literature calls for more 
qualitative methods in accounting, auditing and governance disciplines (Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008; Gendron, 2009; McNulty et al., 2013; Power and Gendron, 2015). In an 
overview of qualitative research in the field of corporate governance, McNulty et al. (2013, 
p.183) note that “qualitative research can assist policy-makers and practitioners to develop 
more efficient governance mechanisms, by shedding light on the efficacy of policy 
prescription…Qualitative research provides a basis for rethinking and challenging some of the 
dominant assumptions and meanings about how governance actors and institutions actually 
function”.  
Combined assurance is a purely internal phenomenon driven by internal actors. There 
is nowadays no publicly available information on combined assurance. Organizations are not 
obliged to disclose whether they have a combined assurance approach in place or not. 
 - 57 - 
 
Combined assurance implementations are still rare in practice (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). 
This is why researchers need to go “into the field” and speak with these internal actors to 
collect insights.  
For these reasons, semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate choice for 
collecting data, as for previous studies (Cohen et al., 2002, 2010; Fraser and Henry, 2007; 
Sarens et al., 2009; Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2011). 
Interviews were conducted with 20 participants in the combined assurance approach. Table VI 
provides a summary of all functions interviewed. Most of these interviewees are involved in 
internal audit activities. 
[INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE] 
We tried to enhance the reliability of the research (Yin, 2009) by using multiple 
sources of information. We were interested in the perceptions of internal auditors, as well as 
those of other participants in the combined assurance process. We also asked whether it was 
possible to interview people from top management or the audit committee, suggesting that it 
would also be useful to gain their insights, but organizations were not well-disposed to this. 
Where possible, we collected internal documents to compare findings obtained from the 
interviews with those from internal documents. Interviews took place at the organizations, and 
each interview took approximately one hour to complete. Prior to the interviews, participants 
were informed that the purpose of the study was to enter the “black box” of combined 
assurance practices within their organization and interview questions were emailed to our 
contact person (generally the CAE or equivalent). The questions were designed to be as open 
ended as possible, and we emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers. This 
explains why we did not have preconceived categorizations in the analysis phase. We also 
insisted that responses would be held in strict confidence, both within and outside the 
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organization. Interviews were audiotaped with the permission of all participants to ensure 
accuracy and completeness, and were after transcribed for further analyses. In order to 
validate the data, all transcripts were emailed to each interviewee for approval. This allowed 
each interviewee to refine, clarify or add any relevant details. 
Our codes emerged a posteriori from the analyses of interview transcripts and internal 
documents. A matrix was used for each case to summarize the findings and help cross-case 
comparison (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
3.3.2 Case description 
The choice of the five organizations was theoretically-driven since we were looking for 
organizations who more or less worked with the combined assurance approach. All these 
organizations were at different stages of implementation when it comes to combined 
assurance. This offers opportunities for greater understanding of the role of the IAF in 
combined assurance. Case A was selected because due to practical experience with this 
organization. Cases B, C and E were selected by proposal of The IIA. Finally, Case D was 
selected during a roundtable meeting about the internal audit profession. 
Case A 
 
Case A set up their Internal Assurance Department in 2007 with the intention that it become 
an added value business partner and a training ground for future leaders. This internal 
assurance department wanted to become the first provider of assurance services and risk 
management services.  
In 2009, an assessment of Case A’s internal assurance department was executed by a 
Big-4 company, including benchmarking of organizational governance and assurance 
practices with a number of Fortune500 organizations. The main purpose was to identify the 
most relevant practices and the environment that would shape the future roles of internal 
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auditing. The review noted that (1) there was only limited coordination and no 
communication between assurance providers, (2) some significant risks were not receiving 
any coverage by assurance activities, and (3) there was no combined report summarizing the 
findings from various assurance functions. The Big-4 company thus recommended that Case 
A implement combined assurance. At the same time, a South African subsidiary of Case A 
implemented combined assurance as required by the new code of corporate governance. The 
implementation in South Africa would therefore serve as a pilot test for making combined 
assurance a relevant practice at a global scale. 
Case B 
 
Even before the release of King III, which set the tone for combined assurance, this South 
African bank decided to implement combined assurance and to initiate complete integration 
and coordination among the various assurance providers. The three lines of defense were 
already present in the company. In the past, risk management had been more a compliance 
function, but had now become an active component of strategic discussion. Case B saw 
combined assurance as an alternative means to avoid past problems such as assurance fatigue 
and assurance gaps. Assurance providers traditionally planned their work in isolation, which 
meant that the coverage of one assurance provider and the total coverage did not necessarily 
provide complete coverage of risk for the governing body. 
Case C 
 
As with Case B, risk was merely a compliance function in the past, but changes in this South 
African mining company brought risk management under business strategy. One of these 
changes was the development of the new group risk management framework. The new group 
risk management framework was formally initiated at the start of 2009, once the revised and 
invigorated focus on risk management was approved by the board. Case C started 
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documenting combined assurance, recommending it to the board about six months before 
King III came out. Case C recognized that some significant risks were never assured for the 
board, whereas others had too much coverage. As a result, Case C began putting in place a 
basis for coordinating assurance around risk, so that assurance providers could give a 
consolidated view to the board and its committees. 
Case D 
 
Case D made the decision to informally implement combined assurance because the audit 
committee asked the IAF to develop synergies between all assurance providers in the bank in 
order to reduce the external audit fees. Case D recognized that combined assurance made 
sense because the bank had different assurance functions, all providing assurance services 
from different perspectives and with different purposes, but all working for the same output: 
providing assurance about the effectiveness of risk management and internal control systems. 
Case E 
 
In the Australian mining company, Case E, the audit committee was referred to as a ‘risk and 
audit committee’. This committee not only looks at the financial statements and external 
financial reporting, it is also very much involved in the whole risk profile and all risk 
management activities being undertaken by the organization. 
Sustainability is the cornerstone of Case E and the organization sees combined 
assurance as a way to move the focus to assurance activities and risk management in a more 
integrated manner. Much risk management in the early days was strongly focused around 
financial risks, with assurance activities being provided on financial controls. Over time, that 
scope and focus broadened into other business areas. At the time of interviews, Case E was 
ending a twelve month program of comparing the processes of the sustainability and internal 
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audit departments, and merging them into one unified single process. Both departments have 
now been reorganized into the Risk Assessment and Assurance Group. Each side has gained 
from this unification. In the future, Case E wants to continue this integration with other 
assurance providers. 
3.4 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS 
This section provides insights about the role(s) of the IAF within combined assurance. Table 
VII summarizes some of the key findings found from the interviews. 
[INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE] 
3.4.1 Facilitator 
Most of the barriers to combined assurance implementation are generally identified at the 
very beginning. Sometimes, it is difficult to convince governing bodies, as well as assurance 
providers, that there is value in working together and combining assurance activities. For 
example, the senior auditor in Case A recognized that combined assurance implementation is 
more difficult when it is not part of anybody’s job description. The interviews and the 
examination of internal documents suggest that the IAF (mainly through the CAE) is a 
relevant function within the organization for creating awareness and obtaining buy-in from 
the board around combined assurance.   
In organizations without formalized and mature combined assurance, the IAF 
expressed their intentions to play a role in the formalization. This finding is similar to that of 
Sarens et al. (2009) who suggested that the IAF initializes the formalization of risk 
management in less mature organizations. Case A started to dedicate resources to the 
combined assurance project in 2010. The final decision to practically evaluate the benefits of 
adopting the approach was taken by the CAE. The CAE suggested implementing combined 
assurance to the CEO and chairman of the organization. The latter was very pleased with the 
approach and requested that it be made a priority approach for the business in order for them 
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to become leaders in this area. Creating combined assurance awareness and stimulating 
discussions on combined assurance are important means by which the IAF can explain that it 
will bring comfort to the board (Carrington and Catasús, 2007). The CAE also endorsed the 
role of the combined assurance initiator within Case B. Case B’s CAE generally tried very 
hard to elevate the role of the IAF within the governance process. This CAE preached 
combined assurance wherever it could (e.g. IIA conferences, audit roundtables, audit 
committee conferences). Also acting as a non-executive director on other South African listed 
organization boards, this CAE advocated the concept of combined assurance both inside and 
outside its organization. This CAE has driven combined assurance in order to enhance 
responsibility and accountability for controls and risks across the organization. 
 I issued a guidance document on combined assurance to the whole organization on 
what combined assurance is and what it entails. I must admit internal audit played a 
critical part in terms of driving this combined assurance approach…From a group 
perspective, we drove it obviously because of the fact that we changed our approach to 
a risk-based approach. We have this control framework with the three lines of defense 
that insures that everybody takes accountability for the role they are playing in the 
control framework. But we also drove it from the perspective of making sure that 
people are aware of their roles and responsibilities. (CAE, Case B) 
Even the external auditor from Case B agreed that combined assurance should become 
the responsibility of internal audit. The following finding suggests that there is no 
jurisdictional dispute over certain assurance activities between internal and external auditors 
as suggested by Covaleski et al. (2003). 
 The coordination must start with a board that drives it out. But, in practical terms, I 
think it must be the internal auditor that drives and I think [name of the CAE] in this 
organization is the best person who did. (External Auditor, Case B) 
Additionally, both CAEs from Case C and Case E made a very good job of socializing 
combined assurance in the business, making people aware of the concept. The IAF played the 
role of the educator, making both other assurance providers and the board aware of the 
importance of combined assurance, and this is an important strategy by which the IAF can 
 - 63 - 
 
promote itself as an expert in the jurisdictional domain of combined assurance. At Case D, 
this is quite different. It was also recognized that the IAF played a role as champion in 
initiating the approach, even if it was the audit committee that initially asked the IAF to 
develop a program of synergies between all assurance providers in the bank. Case D has no 
formal combined assurance officially endorsed, however. It is not currently approved by any 
committee. 
 In practice, the internal assurance division initiated a series of initiatives trying to talk 
to all these assurance providers to render clear that it’s for the interest of the bank to 
have synergies in order to avoid overlapping in various phases. Why the internal 
assurance division was the initiator of this concept? In my opinion, because the staff 
working in internal audit traditionally made the audit of these units. So, we have direct 
knowledge of their activities, and we understand almost better than them their 
problems. (Associate Director Group Internal Audit, Case D) 
The different cases report various reasons for the IAF taking the leading role in 
facilitating this combined assurance approach. First, internal auditors have a better 
understanding of the wider business compared to other assurance providers who probably 
have more of a silo view of their activities. Second, internal auditors have a very good 
methodology and approach to providing assurance services. Thirdly, internal auditors are 
independent of the operational functions being assured. Fourthly, internal auditors have full 
access to the different assurance providers because part of the internal audit process is to 
examine all these assurance providers. Finally, one specific reason for South African 
organizations is that internal auditors have a strong vested interest in making sure that 
combined assurance is effective. King III suggests that the CAE provides assurance to the 
board for all controls and risks within the organization. 
3.4.2 Coordinator 
One responsibility of the CAE is to provide assurance about the extent to which the 
organization is – or is not – managing risk well. Within the combined assurance approach, the 
IAF plays an additional pivotal role in the governance process: that of assurance coordinator 
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(Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; PwC, 2012a). In most cases, the coordinator develops (1) 
the assurance plan, and (2) the assurance map. 
CAEs are typically given responsibility for developing the combined assurance plan in 
accordance with insights obtained from the board, audit committees and senior management. 
According to Case A, the combined assurance approach is seen as the input for the IAF to 
deal with The IIA Standard 2050 on Coordination, which suggests that the IAF should 
consider activities performed by other assurance providers before doing the internal audit plan 
(see IIA, 2013a). As such, the combined assurance approach is seen as a way to help the IAF 
to drive its audit assignment. Similarly, the assurance plan is established with the input of the 
other assurance providers at Case D.  
Now, the annual audit plan is designed taking into consideration what they have done 
in risk management, compliance, SOX, etc. So, we get all this data and we end up with 
our plan. So our plan is based on their input, their directions and our opinion from 
what we have seen…We can change the scope of our audit, or we can insist in areas 
where we see that they haven’t done the job properly. (Associate Director Group 
Internal Audit, Case D) 
In the governance model of Case B, the chairman of the audit committee is responsible 
for signing off on the combined assurance model, but a distinction must be made between 
who takes a leading role in terms of coordinating activities on a daily basis. That is the role of 
the CAE. Case B has also introduced facilitated assurance planning workshops, where the 
CAE develops the assurance plan with all assurance providers for one particular business unit 
or project. As the CAE explains: 
We play a coordinator role to facilitate the workshop to help us devise the assurance 
plan. The entire workshop is facilitated with a view to come up with a process risk and 
control matrix which highlights key processes and key risks in one particular area. 
That is a mini-combined assurance session for individual project. So you cannot have 
gaps in your assurance coverage because you got all the key players in the room. 
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The study from The IIA UK and Ireland (2010) suggests that no assurance provider 
seems to assume overall responsibility for listing all assurance providers within an 
organization. One step for implementation in combined assurance requires mapping all 
assurance activities (Decaux and Sarens, 2015). This is something that the IAF can embrace. 
The IAF may take the initiative for developing the assurance map of the organization. This is 
facilitated by the fact that the IAF has traditionally close relationships with other assurance 
providers. The assurance map exercise consists of linking assurance providers with risks, so, 
the IAF is an important assurance provider in its own right, but also encompasses all the other 
assurance providers, as illustrated in Case E: 
 We look at the risk register across the business. The map shows what controls are in 
place to mitigate those risks and then we map out who are the assurance providers in 
terms of lines of defense that provide assurance on those risks. (CAE, Case E) 
The execution of the combined assurance activities then requires the establishment of 
a team of different assurance providers with a different skill set in order to go through every 
risk. During these combined assurance activities, it is also the role of the IAF to coordinate 
the activities. In a study of environmental auditing, Power (1997) argued that many 
professional occupations compete against each other and claim to possess expertise in 
environmental auditing to develop new jurisdictions, however, only a multidisciplinary 
approach comprising several experts with different skills and expertise will provide a 
complete picture of environmental auditing. 
In all combined assurance projects that we undertake, I always take the lead role and 
final accountability for the delivering, the scope and the planning, the execution and 
the reporting. We live and breathe assurance, risk and controls on a daily basis. So, 
we bring in that level of credibility in creating the direction and the methodology and 
the understanding of the process and the risk management framework that guides 
combined assurance (CAE, Case E). 
As pointed out by the CAE from Case E, the coordinator role is almost naturally 
driven by the IAF. Power (1997, p.130) argues that “experts in multidisciplinary teams can 
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only work in varying degrees of superiority and subordination. In terms of professional and 
market aspirations what matters is less who does the majority of the work and its skills base 
but who is the institutionally legitimate orchestrator of this work”. An important challenge for 
the IAF/CAE is thus to understand that the relationships between IAF and other assurance 
providers should be on a shared basis, not a dictated one. Even if the IAF plays a leading role 
in the coordination of assurance activities, discussion and participation between assurance 
providers requires equality in partnerships, otherwise, combined assurance will not be 
meaningfully delivered. The moment internal auditors start dictating, they will exclude many 
key people from the combined assurance process. As recognized by the Head of Regulatory 
Risk at Case B: 
 I think we would probably find it is very convenient that combined assurance is 
forcefully driven from an internal audit perceptive…But except for internal audit 
taking the lead role in terms of facilitating the process, you pretty much got equal 
partners around the table and if you leave any of them out or you make one those 
parties to have a dominant role, you are going to lose the entire value. Just the 
concept of combined assurance means it is a true equal partnership among those who 
bring assurance services.  
Similarly, a senior audit manager from Case C states that: 
If you think of a technical department in a mining industry, this person will be your 
experienced specialist in this specific area…Now, the moment you [internal auditor], 
as assurance coordinator, want to come and dictate to them to say sort of ‘What 
you’ve been doing in last ten or fifteen years of your life was actually wrong, we now 
want you to do this’, then you are going to lose them. They are not going to buying 
into the process and you are going to lose the benefit of combined assurance. But if 
you do combined assurance on a sharing approach, or a coaching approach, I think 
your chances are better. The moment you start saying ‘Let me roll a bit part of your 
team so that I can learn from you’, it is just playing right. 
3.4.3 Reporting role 
Our empirical findings suggest that the final responsibility for IAFs within combined 
assurance is to report on the combined assurance findings. King III ideally requires that CAEs 
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annually perform an objective assessment of the effectiveness of risk management and 
internal control frameworks.  
 King III stipulates that we [internal auditors] have to provide a written assessment 
about the internal control and risk management systems to the audit committee. 
Combined assurance is therefore from my reporting perspective in order to report 
more effectively and efficiently to the governance committees. (CAE, Case B) 
The same is true for non-South African organizations. As noted by Case A, the audit 
committee must ensure the appropriateness of the combined assurance framework for 
properly addressing significant risks, however, this role is taken over by the CAE, acting as 
the owner of the combined assurance process on behalf of the audit committee. According to 
Case E, the IAF should take the lead in the combined assurance report because it is an 
independent function that brings a necessary level of objectivity that would not otherwise 
filter up. 
The report that is issued is under the Group Risk Assessment & Assurance (GRAA). 
We have a professional responsibility for making sure that whatever we are reporting 
on, we are comfortable with that. So, whilst we do not exercise any direct managerial 
control over these other functions, when they come work on one of our large audit, 
they need to take direction and guidance from the GRAA. Unless that GRAA is 
comfortable with the results of that professional’s work, those findings will not get 
reported in the combined assurance report. (VP Assurance Planning and 
Development, Case E) 
As a result, sub-responsibilities for CAEs include (1) assessing the reliance that can be 
placed on all assurance providers, and (2) providing recommendations for re-engineering the 
assurance process.  
Generally, the audit committee will sign off the quality of the combined assurance 
framework in order to provide the board with holistic assurance about the effectiveness of risk 
management and internal control systems, however, as internal audit involves the combined 
assurance coordinator, the CAE needs to report the combined assurance findings to the audit 
committee. Part of its mandate is to assess whether the assurance received from the other 
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assurance providers is reliable. When preparing the final combined assurance report, our case 
study findings reveal that internal auditors look to a list of criteria to determine whether they 
can place reliance on the assurance activities of other assurance providers. For reasons already 
described, the IAF is often best placed to assess each assurance provider and its contribution 
to the combined assurance. 
The list of criteria may comprise the following. Independence and objectivity supposes 
that the assurance provider should not be involved in the business unit/area/project that is 
going to be assured. Conflict of interest suggests that the assurance provider should not have 
been recently involved with the business unit/area/project under review. Knowledge and skills 
states that assurance providers should well understand the business unit/area/project and have 
adequate skills accordingly. Experience means that an assurance provider should have the 
requisite level of expertise, both in terms of qualifications as well as years of experience 
within the subject matter. For some assurance providers certification may also constitute a 
criteria that improves the degree of reliance that the IAF can place on an assurance provider. 
Internal auditors also have more confidence when assurance providers follow an appropriate 
and documented methodology to provide assurance services. Finally, what does the structure 
of reporting look like? Do assurance providers provide reports, recommendations or follow-
ups? Also, to whom do they report? 
Note that this list is not exhaustive, it was developed based on case study findings. 
Interestingly, the IIA Practice Advisory 2050-3 on Relying on the Work of Other Assurance 
Providers also recommends some of these criteria (IIA, 2013a). Evidently, assessment against 
these criteria, on a five-point scale for example, will be different regarding the line of defense 
to which the assurance provider belongs. In some situations, there might also be a trade-off, 
with two or more criteria being contradictory. 
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Finally, the CAE is responsible for proposing improvements in order to re-engineer 
the assurance process. If internal auditors can place reliance on the work of other assurance 
providers, then it is good, otherwise, they will explain what these assurance providers must 
change so that internal auditors can place reliance on them. The assurance map will probably 
attest to the existence of assurance gaps and/or assurance fatigue. These problems will be 
reported in the combined assurance, but it is the responsibility of the CAE, as owner of the 
combined assurance process, to propose improvements in order to enhance the quality of the 
combined assurance framework. 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
Several authors have recently expressed concerns about the IAF regarding both its value and 
effectiveness (Chambers and Odar, 2015; Lenz and Sarens, 2012). Others have required IAFs 
to develop new techniques for monitoring and communicating to the board about the 
effectiveness of risk management (Shortreed et al., 2012). Recently, South African regulation 
and The IIA have recommended IAFs to coordinate their assurance activities with other 
assurance providers in order to maximize risk and governance oversight. As occupational 
professions, such as the IAF, are often bounded by expertise in a particular subject matter 
(Pentland, 2000), IAFs need to understand that they cannot act alone to provide holistic 
assurance to the board about risk management, and that they are therefore not “super auditors” 
(Chambers, 2008). Given the many sources of assurance within one organization, it is vital to 
ensure proper coordination between assurance providers. However, research has been silent so 
far about what IAFs think about their role in combined assurance. 
This study has provided first insights into the role the IAF could play in combined 
assurance: that of combined assurance orchestrator. There are two limitations. First, this study 
relates to IAFs’ perceptions about their role in combined assurance. It is possible that there 
are other functions leading combined assurance whose views are not taken into account. 
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Second, the case studies and interviewees were recruited on a voluntary basis. This may skew 
the findings in favor of organizations in which the IAF represents better practice than the 
wider population. Nevertheless, the study provides two contributions to the literature. 
First, it extends the literature on combined assurance. Research into combined 
assurance is only in its infancy. Our study builds on Decaux and Sarens’ (2015) findings 
about the critical success factors for combined assurance implementation, by providing first 
insight into who is able to lead the combined assurance approach. This paper proposes an 
innovative alternative to the traditional provision of assurance services by the IAF to those 
responsible for organizational governance. Previous literature has insisted that governing 
bodies often place substantial reliance on the IAF to help them provide an independent 
assessment of risk management and internal control systems (Leung et al., 2011; Sarens et al., 
2009), however, IAFs need to develop new monitoring techniques if they want to enhance 
their role in organizational governance (Shortreed et al., 2012). With this study, we propose 
that the IAF could play an additional role in organizational governance: that of combined 
assurance orchestrator. In the South African context, King III has almost forced IAFs to play 
a leading role in combined assurance, but this leading role was also naturally taken by IAFs in 
other contexts.  
Second, our study extends the literature on the professionalization of the IAF. By 
facilitating, coordinating and reporting combined assurance activities, the IAF can become a 
much more meaningful comfort provider to the audit committee (Sarens et al., 2009) and to 
the board by providing more dependable assurance (Chambers and Odar, 2015). Through a 
combined assurance approach, the IAF delivers holistic assurance to the board about the 
effectiveness of risk management and how risks are managed at an acceptable level which 
allows a board to exercise its oversight role appropriately and fill its assurance vacuum 
(Chambers, 2008). According to the sociology of professions, IAFs are legitimate candidates 
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to lead the combined assurance initiatives. More than the control over substantive knowledge 
for professional stature (Abbott, 1988), our findings reveal that the combination of the IAF’s 
familiarity with the organization, the IAF’s internal and independent position that is still close 
to assurance providers, and the IAF’s knowledge and methodology in providing assurance 
services make the IAF well-suited to play a leading role in the jurisdiction of combined 
assurance. Contrary to the concept of inter-professional competition suggested by Abbott 
(1988), and further illustrated by the jurisdictional disputes between IAF and external auditors 
reported by Covaleski et al. (2003) and Rittenberg and Covaleski (2001), we found, similar to 
Arena and Jeppesen (2010) and Sarens et al. (2009), that the knowledge bases of internal and 
external auditors do not conflict. Rather, by working together, the various assurance providers 
create valuable synergies that, in turn, create a higher level of comfort for the board. As a 
result, our findings corroborate those from Sarens et al. (2009) who suggest that a joint audit 
approach will enhance the overall level of comfort, but we expand this argument to the 
collaboration between all assurance providers (Roussy, 2013). The jurisdictional domain of 
combined assurance is therefore shared by various assurance providers, for which the IAF 
plays the orchestrator.   
There are also practical implications. A first implication is for regulators. As we 
described combined assurance as a relevant technique for monitoring and communicating 
about the effectiveness of risk management, The IIA, the global setter for internal audit 
activities, may obviously benefit from our study. The IIA is constantly looking for ways to 
further refine its guidance of the role that the IAF can or should play in risk management, 
control and governance. A second implication is for IAFs, in their desire to add value to the 
governance process. An important issue related to combined assurance is to determine who is 
going to be accountable for the process (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). This study shows how 
internal auditors can strengthen their profile in governance. Championing the combined 
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assurance approach will help internal auditors to enhance the effectiveness of organizational 
governance by supporting boards and audit committees in effectively assuming their risk 
oversight responsibilities. In our view, King III has elevated internal audit phenomenally. As 
soon as IAFs understand the risks, how these are assured, and who is doing what, they 
become a lot more valuable and meaningful to the organization; they become the eyes and 
ears of the board everywhere (Chambers, 2014). Championing the combined assurance 
approach could well become the role of an effective IAF (Lenz and Hahn, 2015; Lenz and 
Sarens, 2012) and help IAFs provide stronger assurance to the board by strengthening internal 
audit’s relationship with the board (Chambers and Odar, 2015). Our findings also have 
implications for current internal audit practices and/or potential future research. 
Combined Assurance Plan 
 
Traditionally, the IAF follows a risk-driven approach to planning its resources (Castanheira et 
al., 2009; Coetzee and Lubbe, 2014). Following a combined assurance approach to assurance 
activities can help the IAF to schedule its resources even more efficiently. Because the IAF 
follows a risk-based approach to performing its assurance services, IAFs are not able to cover 
hundred percent of the risk universe every year. Many organizations and many internal audit 
departments have failed to understand that. At best, they can cover one hundred percent of the 
high risk issues. Saying that, IAFs need to ensure that medium and low risks are being 
monitored or checked by someone else in order to provide a global opinion of the 
effectiveness of risk management and internal control systems to the board. In other words, 
IAFs may need to rely on combined assurance, and develop working relationships with a 
diverse range of assurance providers. The internal audit plan could therefore change 
drastically with this combined assurance approach. As suggested by two CAEs in our study, 
their intention is to take the results of the combined assurance report in order to drive the 
internal audit plan for next year. 
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Combined Assurance Activities 
 
In order to cover the broad complexity of risks facing organizations and the assurance 
expectations of its stakeholders, IAFs need to develop working relationships with other 
assurance providers. The traditional internal auditor still needs to carry out their audit as they 
used to do. The difference is that they will do it with other assurance providers. Providing 
assurance on risk management, as suggested by The IIA (2009), is not an activity an IAF can 
do on its own. Auditors exert control primarily over process, not content (Power, 1999), so 
that if IAFs understand that they are limited in terms of skills and expertise, they will see the 
value of this combined assurance approach. Similar to environmental auditing (Power, 1997), 
only a multidisciplinary and coordinated approach is required to provide a complete picture of 
assurance. With this combined assurance approach, IAFs can spend enough time interrogating 
and challenging the risk management system because they go through every aspect with other 
assurance providers. These collaborations will also influence IAFs so that they will become 
much more knowledgeable about their own business.  
This combined assurance approach could change the way organizations recruit their 
IAFs. Based on our findings, one important challenge is that an internal audit department 
might look totally different when adopting a combined assurance approach. There is some 
real potential to embrace a broader constituency of potential internal auditors. The IAF needs 
to infiltrate the technical discipline as well as the sustainability discipline that encompasses 
risks such as environmental, community, safety and security, to name but a few. Recruitment 
and the type of people organizations may have in the IAF will change drastically. 
Organizations cannot simply approach accounting firms for skill sets. Organizations need to 
bring in people who have different industry, and technical subject matter expertise, and then 
combine that with audit skills to be effective. Specifically, there is potentially a whole new 
area, or potential members in the sustainability area, that will be looking for assurance. In the 
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future, maybe, an internal audit department may look totally different based on this combined 
assurance approach. Ideally, assurance providers all need to sit together in one department. 
We would therefore encourage future studies to examine these issues. 
Combined Assurance Report 
 
The combined assurance report holistically summarizes findings from various assurance 
providers. Often, this responsibility is undertaken by CAE. By collecting data from various 
assurance providers, then reducing it to information relevant to the board, IAFs become much 
more meaningful to the board (Chambers and Odar, 2015). By reporting holistically to the 
board, CAEs also have the opportunity to re-engineer the whole assurance process within an 
organization. In organizations requiring an overall opinion from the CAE, such as in South 
Africa, the CAE needs to understand the nature, scope and extent of assurance activities 
performed by other assurance providers, and rely on them if appropriate. This is similar to 
suggestions from The IIA (2013a) insisting that boards need confidence that the overall 
assurance is adequate for validating that the risks are being managed effectively. This also 
suggests a need for IAFs to rely on combined assurance. 
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CHAPTER 4: HOW TO IMPLEMENT COMBINED ASSURANCE?8 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
If risk is everywhere, why is not assurance? How can directors comment on the effectiveness 
and appropriateness of risk management and internal controls systems without a more holistic 
assurance approach? 
Combined assurance is a relatively new phenomenon but could well become a 
significant area of research owing the requirement for boards of directors (boards, hereinafter) 
to comment on the effectiveness of their risk management and internal control systems for all 
kind of risks (Chambers, 2009; Ruud, 2003; Sarens and De Beelde, 2006b; Shortreed et al., 
2012; Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2011; Spira and Page, 2003). In a nutshell, combined 
assurance aims to provide holistic assurance to the board on the effectiveness of risk 
management and internal control systems by coordinating assurance activities from various 
sources of assurance. 
Organizations have traditionally used a multitude of assurance providers to help their 
boards fulfill their monitoring duties and apply effective governance practices—legal 
departments, quality assurance, compliance, health and safety, corporate social responsibility, 
and internal and/or external audits, to name but a few. As assurance providers perform 
assurance activities in isolation, auditees, management and the board can suffer from 
assurance fatigue and assurance gaps that lead to inefficient reporting to governing bodies 
(Sarens et al., 2012b). By receiving multiple opinions, boards are therefore not in a position to 
exercise their oversight role appropriately (Sarens et al., 2012b).  
As a result, coordination among these various assurance providers is necessary. 
Bringing many assurance providers together to perform assurance activities allows for 
                                                     
8
 This paper is published. See, Decaux, L. and Sarens, G. (2015). Combined Assurance Implementation: Insights 
from Multiple Case Studies, Managerial Auditing Journal, 30(1), pp. 56-79. 
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immediate rationalization and efficiency gains (Sarens et al., 2012b). The Institute of Internal 
auditors (IIA), the global internal auditing authority, recently released standards, guidance, 
and practice advisories on this matter (see IIA, 2012, 2013a; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). The 
IIA standard 2050 on coordination requires that the “chief audit executive (CAE) should share 
information and coordinate activities with other internal and external providers of assurance 
and consulting services to ensure proper coverage and minimize duplication of efforts” (IIA, 
2012). Combined assurance is also required by the third version of the South African code of 
corporate governance, known as “King III”, effective since March 2010, which recommends 
the application of a combined assurance program. Formally, the Institute of Directors in South 
Africa (IoD) defines combined assurance within King III as the process of “integrating and 
aligning assurance processes in a company to maximize risk and governance oversight and 
control efficiencies, and optimize overall assurance to the audit and risk committee, 
considering the company’s risk appetite” (IoD, 2009, p. 50).  
Despite the lack of relevant research, studies conducted by professional bodies suggest 
that combined assurance implementations are rare (European Confederation of Institutes of 
Internal Auditing (ECIIA), 2009; Paterson, 2011; IIA UK and Ireland, 2008; 2010) because 
organizations have encountered difficulties with the implementation. Combined assurance as 
a business paradigm is new and as a result there is little research about how organizations are 
implementing combined assurance approaches. This study contributes to the literature by 
being one of the first to provide initial insights about factors affecting the launch of combined 
assurance. Doing so will hopefully provide insights to organizations seeking to embrace 
combined assurance as a governance tool and it will hopefully provide a foundation for future 
research once the embrace of combined assurance grows.  
We use data from six multinationals at different stages of combined assurance 
implementation to provide guidance on effective implementation. In total, 23 semi-structured 
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on-site interviews took place between September 2011 and February 2012 with key 
participants in the combined assurance program. Internal documents were collected where 
possible to triangulate data. 
The descriptive findings show that combined assurance implementation requires six 
important components: (1) establish a mature risk management framework, (2) create 
awareness around combined assurance, (3) identify a combined assurance champion, (4) 
develop an assurance strategy, (5) map assurance providers to their assurance activities, and 
(6) report combined assurance findings. By undertaking these six important components, 
combined assurance implementation helps the board and audit committee to exercise their 
oversight roles properly.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature and formulates the research question. The third section describes the methodology 
used. The fourth section reports the descriptive findings, while the final section concludes by 
highlighting this paper’s limitations and opportunities for future research. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
4.2.1 Background to the study 
In reviewing the causes of the 2008 global financial crisis, many have pointed to risk 
management failures (Baker, 2009; Brown et al., 2009; Conyon et al., 2011; Financial 
Stability Board, 2009; Lenz and Sarens, 2012; Magnan and Markarian, 2011; Paape and 
Speklé, 2012). Baker (2009) argues that risks were either discovered too late or not 
adequately mitigated because of identification or assessment inefficiencies. Pirson and 
Turnbull (2011) explain that boards either lacked access to risk-related information to perform 
their oversight role properly or were unable to process the available risk-related information. 
According to Shortreed et al. (2012) inadequate functioning is rather explained as inadequacy 
of controls versus effectiveness of functioning. Similarly, a recent study from PwC (2012a) 
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revealed that, of the 74% of organizations with formal enterprise risk management (ERM) 
frameworks, only 45% were comfortable with their management of significant risks. Some 
have thus recommended that the focus of monitoring and control functions must move from 
assuring the effectiveness of internal controls to assuring the effectiveness of risk 
management processes (Fraser and Henry, 2007; Sarens and De Beelde, 2006b; Shortreed et 
al., 2012; Spira and Page, 2003). Simply put, internal controls are part of risk management; 
they are ways to manage risks, but risk management takes a broader perspective, linking with 
the strategic side of business, whereas internal controls focus on the operational side of 
business and sometimes lacks a connection with higher objectives and strategies. 
In this context of crisis recovery, worldwide regulators are searching for new ways to 
improve organizational governance. Some have argued that effective organizational 
governance occurs when boards receive assurance on the effectiveness of risk management 
and internal control systems (e.g., Chambers, 2009; Shortreed et al., 2012; Soh and Martinov-
Bennie, 2011). As suggested by The IIA UK and Ireland (2010), “thought given to assurance 
is partly being driven by the need to manage costs during difficult economic conditions, but 
the growing interest also comes from the pressure upon organizations to improve the 
effectiveness of their governance in the wake of the financial crisis” (p. 1).  
In Europe, the 8
th
 Directive article 41, released after the crisis by the ECIIA and the 
Federation of European Risk Management Associations (FERMA), encourages boards and 
audit committees to monitor the effectiveness of risk management and internal control 
systems because it has been recognized that investors are becoming increasingly aware of risk 
and are therefore demanding information on all the risks an organization is facing and how 
those risks are being mitigated down to an appropriate level (ECIIA and FERMA, 2010). In 
the UK, the accountability section of the new code of corporate governance suggests that 
boards should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems: “the board 
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should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company’s risk 
management and internal control systems and should report to shareholders that they have 
done so” (Financial Reporting Council, 2012, p. 18). In the USA, principle A. 2 of the report 
of the New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance (2010) asserts that a 
“board should also ensure that appropriate risk management systems are in place so that 
excessive risk taking is avoided” (p. 27) in order to be totally transparent about their risks. 
Finally, South Africa’s King III requests that organizations place a much stronger focus on 
risk management activities (IoD, 2009). By recognizing that sustainability will become the 
imperative of the 21
st
 century and that organizations must consider the expectations of a 
broader range of stakeholders, principle 4.9 of King III states that boards will need to 
comment on the adequacy of the internal control system, in consideration of many kinds of 
risks, and receive assurance on the effectiveness of the risk management process (IoD, 2009). 
King III also recommends the application of a combined assurance framework to help 
organizations with that process. 
4.2.2 Assurance activities as an aspect of organizational governance 
As stakeholders’ representatives, boards have two main responsibilities: providing strategic 
direction to the organization and overseeing activities (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; 
Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; Reding et al., 2009; Ruud, 2003). The oversight role aims 
to ensure that organizations achieve their objectives, which both risk management and 
assurance services facilitate in complementary ways (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; 
Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003). On the one hand, organizations traditionally apply ERM to 
receive reasonable assurance on the achievement of objectives. The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) defines ERM as a “process, effected by 
an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personal, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
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manage risk to be within its risk appetite” (COSO, 2004, p. 2). On the other hand, the last step 
of ERM recommends monitoring the effectiveness of the whole risk management system. As 
such, the Glossary to the IIA Standards defines assurance as an “objective examination of 
evidence for the purpose of providing an independent assessment on governance, risk 
management, and control processes for the organization” (The IIA, 2013a).  
Organizations will often use an army of assurance providers, since different 
stakeholders may have different needs and interests regarding information and assurance 
(Ruud, 2003). Because stakeholders and their representatives cannot perform monitoring and 
assurance activities themselves, they will rely on these assurance functions to provide them 
with the relevant information (Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; ECIIA and FERMA, 2010). 
Relying on these assurance providers helps the board to fulfill its oversight responsibilities 
with respect to risk management and internal control processes. Traditionally, these assurance 
providers work in isolation rather than through coordination, leading to inefficiencies such as 
assurance fatigue, assurance gaps, or inadequate reporting that negatively impact governance 
because these inefficiencies hinder boards’ exercise of their oversight role (KPMG, 2012a; 
IIA, 2012; Sarens et al., 2012b).  
4.2.3 Combined assurance and the ‘Three Lines of Defense’ model 
Risk management and control functions are frequently described as comprising three lines of 
defense (Daugherty and Anderson, 2012; ECIIA, 2012; ECIIA and FERMA, 2010; KPMG, 
2007; IIA, 2013b). The IIA (2013b) states that “in a perfect world, perhaps only one line of 
defense would be needed to assure effective risk management and internal control systems. In 
the real world, however, a single line of defense can prove inadequate” (p. 4). Moreover, 
KPMG (2007) argues that “having in place a strong set of defenses is crucial, but equally 
important is the need to coordinate these activities” (p. 15). All three lines play a role in the 
governance framework by helping organizations manage risk. In addition to their respective 
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activities in risk management, the three lines of defense also provide monitoring and 
assurance activities that give comfort to senior management, board and boards’ committees 
that risk and control processes operate as intended. However, the accountability framework 
must be accurately defined so that each line of defense understands its responsibilities; 
otherwise, duplication and assurance gaps will persist.  
Coordination among the three lines of defense is the ultimate objective of combined 
assurance, with each line of defense playing a role in ensuring that risks are efficiently and 
effectively managed and monitored, as required by the board and executives (Daugherty and 
Anderson, 2012; ECIIA, 2012; ECIIA and FERMA, 2010; KPMG, 2007; PwC, 2012a; IIA, 
2012; 2013b; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010; Sarens et al., 2012b). Accordingly, the three lines of 
defense model can serve as the starting point for improving assurance provider coordination 
(IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). The first line of defense usually groups together the functions 
that own and manage risks on a daily basis. They are responsible for the identification, 
assessment, and mitigation of risks. As a first line, they also provide management assurance, 
through risk control self-assessments, for example. Ruud (2003) describes control risk self-
assessment as “one method for providing assurance by putting more emphasis on self-
evaluation on the part of managers and employees as process-owners” (p. 77). The second 
line of defense comprises all the functions that oversee the risks, e.g., risk management, 
compliance, health and safety, environmental and/or quality functions, to name but a few. 
These functions help the first line implement the policies and procedures set by the board 
after it has defined the organization’s strategic direction and risk appetite by proposing 
frameworks and guidance. As a matter of fact, the second line of defense provides assurance 
activities by monitoring the first line of defense and the way it has implemented effective risk 
management practices. It is essential to note that the first and second lines of defense provide 
non-audit assurance activities. Finally, the third line of defense comprises all independent 
 - 83 - 
 
assurance providers required in order to help the board fulfill its oversight responsibilities. 
The internal audit function (IAF) is probably the best known independent assurance provider. 
Particularly, the IAF provides independent assurance activities that (i) the risk management 
system is effective, and (ii) significant risks are being managed appropriately through an 
effective internal control system (IIA, 2012; IIA, 2009). Other assurance providers such as, 
the external auditor, specialist reviews, external credit agencies and/or regulators also belong 
to the third line. These functions provide independent assurance services to the board if the 
IAF lacks competences and skills or if the risk area falls beyond the risk-based internal audit 
plan (IIA, 2013a).  
Kaplan and Mikes (2012) recognize three risk categories that require different 
approaches for managing risks: preventable, strategic, and external risks. The objective of the 
risk management system for preventable risks is to avoid and eliminate the occurrence in a 
cost effective way (Kaplan and Mikes, 2012). Therefore, assurance activities have to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the risk management system to avoid and eliminate 
occurrence cost-effectively. On the other hand, the objective of the risk management system 
for strategic risks is to reduce likelihood and impact in a cost effective way, whereas for 
external risks it is to reduce the impact cost-effectively if the risk event occurs (Kaplan and 
Mikes, 2012). As a result, assurance activities for these two risks have to ensure that the risk 
management system is built adequately for the purpose of reducing likelihood and impact 
cost-effectively. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the risk, some assurance activities can be 
provided by using assurance providers from different lines of defense.  
The literature on combined assurance is not extensive. No scholarly paper on the issue 
seems to have been published, except for those on the coordination between the IAF and 
external audits. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006b) and Hay et al. (2008) argue that internal 
control mechanisms such as the IAF and external audits are complementary assurance 
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mechanisms rather than substitutes because, according to Hay et al. (2008), “it seems 
unreasonable that a company that is in need of greater controls would achieve this by utilizing 
just one control dimension—it is more likely to make a broader investment in a range of 
mechanisms for control” (p. 11). Importantly, this view could well be extended to other 
assurance providers and provides a foundation for understanding the usefulness of combined 
assurance.  
In fact, many organizations have already tried to implement a combined assurance 
program, but many have run into difficulties when executing (ECIIA, 2009). Though IIA 
(2009b) and IIA (2012) suggest performing an assurance mapping exercise as a “valuable tool 
for coordinating risk management and assurance activities” (IIA, 2012, p. 1), Paterson (2011) 
states that organizations find it difficult to do that. In 2008, The IIA UK and Ireland suggested 
in a study that most of those responsible for governance have only an incomplete picture of 
assurance. The study’s results revealed that (1) only half of the organizations said they were 
successful in organizing control and assurance activities for significant risks, (2) a third had 
difficulties with their assurance mapping exercises for significant risks, (3) a fifth were 
unclear about to which significant risks assurance activities relate, and (4) the interactions 
between IAF and certain assurance providers were limited (IIA UK and Ireland, 2008). More 
recently, The IIA UK and Ireland (2010) revealed that only 8% of organizations have a 
combined assurance program. The reasons for failing to coordinate assurance activities 
included (in order) the different taxonomies and methodologies among assurance providers 
(40%), the immature ERM (39%), the difficulty of identifying the process coordinator (34%), 
the self-interest of the assurance providers (27%), the lack of an executive and board buy-in 
(26%), and the assurance providers’ lack of competence and skills (21%) (IIA UK and 
Ireland, 2010, p. 5). As a result, coordinating assurance activities seems to be the exception 
rather than the rule (KPMG, 2012b). This study contributes to the literature by providing 
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initial insights about factors affecting the implementation of combined assurance. Our 
research question aims to identify the important components in successful combined 
assurance implementation: 
RQ: What are the important components for implementing a combined assurance program? 
4.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
Given the paucity of literature on combined assurance, we naturally assume that exploring 
this topic through a case study is preferable, for several reasons. First, according to Yin 
(2009), “the essence of a case study…is that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of 
decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what results” (p. 17). 
For example, Fraser and Henry (2007) use interviews to explore risk management structures 
and approaches. Semi-structured interviews are particularly useful for gaining insight into 
interviewee perceptions and developing a better understanding of organizational governance 
practices (Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2011). Second, there are no publicly available data on 
combined assurance. Three, combined assurance is a purely internal phenomenon driven by 
internal actors. Finally, the literature suggests that actual combined assurance 
implementations are few. Researchers must thus speak with the internal actors involved. 
This paper adopts a multiple case study approach since, as it aims to identify the 
important components in combined assurance implementation, it is much more appropriate 
and reliable than a single case study approach (Yin, 2009). We collected evidence from six 
multinationals, a sufficient number in terms of data saturation and the emergence of new 
thematic insights (Guest et al., 2006; Malsch and Salterio, 2015).  
Following Yin (2009), several steps were followed to improve the validity and 
reliability of our data during the design and execution of the research. A case study protocol 
for data collection was developed in order to replicate the study at different organizations. All 
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interviews took place on-site in English, as it is universal for business matters. After having 
explained the objectives of the study, we sent the research protocol to each organization one 
week before the interviews. Afterwards, semi-structured interviews were used to collect data. 
In addition to a small number of open questions asked in each case, specific questions were 
raised during the interviews, depending on participants’ reactions.  
Several key participants were used in each case to increase construct validity. The 
contact person (usually the CAE) scheduled interviews with people working on the combined 
assurance program. These interviews were face-to-face, except in cases A and D, where three 
and two participants were present, respectively. To mitigate the potential for response bias, 
we sometimes repeated our questions in another way to enrich our data or clarify confusing 
findings (Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2011).  
A total of 23 interviews lasting approximately 60 minutes took place with participants 
involved in combined assurance between September 2011 and February 2012. We tried to 
enhance the reliability of the research by using multiple sources of information. Most of the 
participants interviewed belong to internal audit, not all of them. In addition to interview data, 
we collected internal documents wherever possible with which to verify the findings from the 
interviews. These internal documents consisted mainly of internal presentations related to the 
combined assurance program, group risk management, and audit committee meeting reports. 
Data confidentiality was guaranteed both inside and outside the organization, and all 
participants were aware that the interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. To 
ensure accurate and complete data, a copy of the transcription was sent to all interviewees for 
their approval and clarification where necessary; they were also asked to respond to the 
material (Patton, 2002). Table VIII provides the summary of interviews. 
 [INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE] 
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The sampled organizations operate in three sectors—mining, banking, and 
communications. The choice for these six organizations is theoretically-driven not by a 
concern of representativeness. We were looking for organizations that had already 
implemented combined assurance or that would like to implement the approach in the future. 
Furthermore, sampled organizations are at different stages of combined assurance 
implementation maturity. These organizations come from different regions of the world but 
they have operations in various places: two are European organizations (Case A and Case D), 
two are South African organizations (Case B and Case C), and two are Australian 
organizations (Case E and Case F). The country of residence for the six case studies 
corresponds with the region where the interviews have been realized. These localizations also 
correspond with the headquarters for each case study. Table IX outlines the characteristics of 
each organization. 
[INSERT TABLE IX ABOUT HERE] 
Case A was selected because of practical experience. Actually, Case A has a 
subsidiary in South Africa, where combined assurance is becoming recommended practice, 
and the organization wants to capitalize on these pilot results globally. In 2009 an assessment 
of the Case A’s IAF was carried out by a Big-4 company including a benchmarking of the 
corporate governance and the assurance practices with a number of selected Fortune500 
organizations. The review noted that there was only limited coordination and no 
communication between assurance providers. On the basis of these results, Case A started 
looking at combined assurance. 
Case B and Case C were suggested by a panel of experts from the IIA Research 
Foundation. Owing to the listing requirements, these South African organizations are well-
advanced in the implementation of the combined assurance program, but they are still 
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learning. Both organizations started combined assurance implementation with several pilots at 
different business units even before the release of King III. Their main challenge nowadays is 
to formalize a combined assurance report to be submitted to the audit committee and to the 
board as required by King III. At the time of the interviews, Case B was still rolling out 
combined assurance to achieve full maturity and to make it as holistic and all-inclusive as it is 
supposed to be. On the other hand, combined assurance was implemented in all Case C’s 
business units in 2012 as a system which aims to effectively avoid the element of surprise in 
risk management. Formerly, combined assurance implementation started in 2006 when group 
internal audit began using a combined assurance approach for providing assurance on capital 
and sustainability projects. 
 Case D was identified as a relevant case study to be examined during a round-table 
discussion about the internal audit profession. The decision to implement the combined 
assurance approach came from the audit committee asking the IAF to work on synergies with 
all relevant assurance providers in order to make assurance activities much more efficient. By 
coordinating all assurance activities within the bank, Case D sees combined assurance as an 
opportunity to reduce assurance costs, through the decrease in external audit fees. 
Like South African organizations, Case E was also suggested by the experts from The 
IIA Research Foundation. Given the wide range of risks and activities this mining company 
encounters, Case E recognized that combined assurance could be useful. Case E started by 
merging the internal audit and sustainability departments in the Group Risk Assessment and 
Assurance. In the future, Case E wants to continue the integration with other assurance 
providers.  
Finally, Case F was recommended by word of mouth from Case E because both 
organizations have their headquarters on the same location. Case F admitted that it would be 
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useful to implement combined assurance in the future as a way to improve assurance 
activities, but continues to struggle with this decision due to certain barriers and challenges.  
We adopted a thematic analysis approach. Daly et al. (1997) state that “thematic 
analysis is a search for themes that emerge as being important to the description of the 
phenomenon” (p. 3). We did not have preconceived codes. All a posteriori codes emerged 
during the analyses of interviews and internal documents. A matrix was used for each case for 
comparability and cross-case analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The codes related to the 
important components in the combined assurance implementation are discussed in the next 
section. 
4.4 RESULTS 
The six case studies correspond to six combined assurance stories. Not all organizations are at 
the same level of combined assurance implementation maturity, but common important 
components emerge from the analyses.  
4.4.1 ERM maturity 
During our interviews, the majority of organizations agreed that there is a clear link between 
the risk management system and the combined assurance program but that “to put the cart 
before the horse” is a mistake. A well-developed risk management process is the antecedent 
to combined assurance; otherwise, what are assurance providers going to assure? Case D uses 
the analogy of the external auditor relying on the work performed by the IAF to explain that: 
The external auditors must have confidence that we [internal auditors] can do the job 
and that they can be based on our work. It’s the same for us that the risk and control 
units are doing their work right…If they are not mature, we cannot take the output of 
their work. (Associate Director Group Internal Audit, Case D)  
Without a proper and mature risk management system, combined assurance is a 
worthless exercise, and organizations will struggle with its implementation. According to the 
Vice-President (VP) Group Internal Audit in Case C, the risk management system is now 
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certainly approaching a level of maturity that will help in combined assurance 
implementation. The mining company initiated a discussion on combined assurance in 1997, 
but it has taken 14 years to move to the next step because risk management was not mature. 
Risk management in the mining company was limited to the identification of risks. 
Nowadays, the organization has really started managing risk on a daily basis with all the steps 
required by ERM. The difference is that the information on risks is now reliable, whereas it 
was once less accurate and up-to-date. In fact, the more mature the risk management, the 
better the combined assurance: 
 I’ve seen a lot of examples where when we come to do combined assurance, the risks 
are so poorly articulated that there is no way of being able to assure them. You’ve 
actually to fix your risk management first before you can fix your combined assurance 
framework. (External Audit Partner, Case C) 
According to Case F’s Executive Director, Risk Management and Assurance, if an 
organization is still struggling with the implementation of combined assurance, it is mainly 
because its risk management is not yet mature. In terms of identification of risks, which is 
important in terms of developing an assurance program, it is fairly good. But it is not so good 
at the monitoring and management of risks on a regular basis. 
4.4.2 Combined assurance awareness 
The second important component in laying the foundation for implementation is educating 
people about and creating awareness of combined assurance. Organizations need to be ready 
for and want to do this: having a well-defined concept and common understanding drives the 
rest of the implementation. First of all, organizations must understand that there is value in 
this combined assurance approach. As expressed by Case D’s Associate Director Group, 
Internal Audit:  
Why some fail to implement combined assurance? Because they haven’t understood 
the benefits yet…They are still afraid that the one is going to steal the work of the 
other one, which is not the concept.  
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Many respondents observed that preliminary meetings are used to develop the 
appropriate mindset. In time, discussions become much more detailed about what 
organizations were experiencing in their combining assurance. In Case B, the CAE issued a 
guidance document on combined assurance to the whole organization in order to define the 
concept and demonstrate the benefits of the approach. 
The biggest aspect for me was to get executive buy-in and that’s why in earlier 
presentations it’s quite important that the first thing we did was to create that buy-in 
from executives on this concept and what it entails…The feedback we’re getting is that 
it’s very positive. It’s ‘beneficial discussions,’ to quote our Chief Financial Officer. He 
says that these discussions are riveting. We’ve never had this type of discussions 
before across the globe. (CAE, Case B)  
At this stage, the tone and support of top management are important, because, once 
buy-in is obtained, executives will dedicate resources to it. Case E suggests that combined 
assurance is probably not something that a risk or audit function can do on its own; it requires 
a tone or culture in the organization and some level of support for the concept that risks are 
significant and need to be overseen. The following statement also illustrates the importance of 
buy-in at Case C: 
When I wanted to stop talking about combined assurance, our CEO started talking 
about combined assurance. So the board and the executive management are fully 
bought into this concept, and they see the benefits to management, to the mine, and 
also to the assurance process. (VP Group Internal Audit, Case C) 
If Case F is still struggling with the implementation of its combined assurance 
program, this is also due to the lack of internal risk management culture:  
If you want this coordination between assurance providers, it needs to come from the 
CEO because it needs to be seen that it comes from the highest level of the company 
and they’re deadly serious about it…The tone at the top is reasonable in this company 
but it hasn’t been communicated…it’s not in our DNA yet.  (Group Manager, Case F) 
4.4.3 Combined assurance champion 
The third important component is deciding who will be the single point of coordination during 
the combined assurance process. As discussed above, 34% of organizations fail to coordinate 
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assurance activities because there is no combined assurance coordinator in place (IIA UK and 
Ireland, 2010). Organizations should identify a champion who will steer the initiative. As 
illustrated by several cases, the CAE/IAF could fulfill this role effectively. Interestingly, this 
is recognized both by internal auditors and other participants in the combined assurance 
program. 
In 2010, Case A brainstormed on the future roles of the CAE. When facing a problem 
at a site, the CEO will certainly ask different assurance providers for their opinions on key 
risks and, ideally, collect these into a single report. A consulting firm reengineered the 
assurance process, and, naturally, the CEO then asked the Head of Internal Assurance to 
initiate this combined assurance program. 
Relevantly to the South African organizations (cases B and C), principle 3.5 of King 
III suggests that the audit committee should ensure that assurance activities are coordinated 
into a combined assurance program, making the audit committee the driver of combined 
assurance. However, someone must be accountable to bring all of this together:  
Ultimately I think it’s the governance structure that should drive the initiative. It 
should probably be the chairman of the audit committee. In fact, in our model, it’s 
really the chairman of the audit committee that ensures and that basically signs off the 
combined assurance model…That must be distinguished between who coordinates, 
who takes a leading role in terms of coordinating the activities.  (Head of Regulatory 
Risk Management, Case B) 
King III requires that the CAE comprehensively assesses the effectiveness of risk 
management and internal control systems. This should be enough to give this function the 
leading role. Among the reasons why the CAE should take the lead at Case B:    
I must admit internal audit played a significant part in terms of facilitating the whole 
combined assurance process through the preliminary meetings…We drove it obviously 
because of the fact that we changed our approach to a risk-based approach…One of 
the biggest reasons is also because of our knowledge of the entire organization. (CAE, 
Case B)  
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I think the internal auditors are in the best position to endorse the combined assurance 
almost by default. I think in terms of external audit, I don’t think we should. It’s almost 
a management function, so I don’t think we should play a management function 
because it is in contradiction of what we do and what we should be doing. Is it 
compliance? Compliance people are more legally oriented. If you look at the risk, risk 
management could do that, but you need someone who is independent from 
management. From that perspective and in my mind it makes sense that internal 
auditors take the lead. (External Auditor, Case B) 
This is the same story for Case C where the internal audit and ultimately the CAE 
must become the custodian of combined assurance because they understand standards and 
ways in presenting reports to the board, the audit committee, and management. 
Case D’s audit committee asked the internal assurance department to work on 
synergies among assurance providers to reduce the external audit fees. The Associate Director 
Group Internal Audit consequently drove the combined assurance initiative. 
Finally, in Case E’s initialization of combined assurance, the internal audit department 
merged with the sustainability department to create a unique assurance department. In fact, 
assurance used to be focused on financial controls in this mining company, but that scope has 
broadened into other business areas requiring implementing combined assurance.  
4.4.4 Assurance strategy 
The fourth important component in developing combined assurance requires agreement at the 
top about significant risks, so that efforts can be properly focused. As recognized by the chief 
risk officer (CRO) of Case B “it’s almost don’t start at the risk, start at the business strategy 
and at business objectives.” Thus, organizations need to obtain a policy statement from the 
board and the executives that sets the tone. In doing so, organizations identify the significant 
risks that will prevent them from achieving their objectives. According to Case C’s external 
audit partner 
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That is why I’ve seen a lot of executives really liking combined assurance because 
what they are saying is for at least I get a sense that we’re looking at the real issues in 
the business, about how we get assurance as opposed to just what the auditor thinks. 
In fact, all that risk management does is to provide a view of what is the universe that 
needs to be assured through a combined assurance program. This universe groups together all 
areas where persons like the CEO or the board are looking for assurance, as suggested by the 
Head of Risk of Case A:  
For example, quality of the product, make sure that we deliver products of the 
expected quality is an area where we believe the top management is looking for 
assurance…even if we knew since the beginning that no line of defense is in charge of 
delivering quality assurance in this group.  
This is confirmed by Case B: 
Before I set the agenda for the combined assurance meetings, I had a discussion with 
my audit committee chairman and I had a discussion with the CEO and CFO…I asked 
them ‘Tell me what are your top of mind issues, what is it that concerns you from a 
board perspective, from a non-executive perspective’…That’s how we set the agenda 
for combined assurance…I need to get feedback on those top of mind issues. (CAE, 
Case B)  
Furthermore, the external audit partner of Case C argues that if management in the 
processes of risk management have assessed that a particular risk is well-managed, this 
particular risk must become an area for assurance “because you want to know that 
management is not in some dreamland.” 
In undertaking this step, Case A and Case B have developed a combined assurance 
plan. One of Case A’s internal documents suggests that 
the combined assurance plan is designed to highlight the relevant high-risk areas and 
the assurance to be provided by management, IAF, external audit, and other 
consultants or assurance providers, in order for Board, the risk management 
committee, CEO, General Management Board, and executive management, to be 
appraised of the risk management efforts undertaken to manage the risks to an 
acceptable level.  
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Cases B, C, and E suggest two approaches for identifying areas that need assurance: 
the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The former aims to link combined 
assurance directly to the objectives or values of the organization, whereas the bottom-up 
approach assesses the processes at risk in all business units. In other words, the top-down 
approach assumes that boards and/or executives communicate their assurance needs; in the 
bottom-up approach, however, line management, as the risk owner, defines the areas of risk 
and assurance based on its own experience. In practice, these three organizations have a 
hybrid structure that combines both approaches. In an exclusively top-down approach, 
organizations might miss some of the basic areas that must be covered; therefore, a 
combination of both approaches should provide the right balance. 
About the added-value of each approach, two persons from Case C have different 
points of view: 
I think the top-down approach makes a lot of sense…but a lot of companies are 
actually doing the bottom-up…they’re throwing their nets trying to catch everything 
that they can…but I think it’s a difficult way to start, especially if you are a 
multinational company.  (Senior Audit Manager)  
By contrast, the external audit partner defends the bottom-up approach, observing that 
the ERM is not always mature: 
The process view is the best approach mainly because risk management has not 
identified risks properly in the past…therefore to provide assurance on such risks is 
very difficult…However, in a process view, the transaction starts and it ends…so you 
got better understanding of the areas of risks that need to be assured…You’ve got at 
least better chance of covering everything.  
4.4.5 Assurance mapping 
Having a clear accountability model is essential. This is the objective of the fifth important 
component, and this is where the ‘three lines of defense’ model can help. In most cases, 
combined assurance implementation continues by listing all assurance providers and mapping 
them, in their respective line of defense, besides significant risks. Undoubtedly, difficulties 
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occur as organizations bring more areas and more assurance providers within their scope, 
making it difficult to formulate an integrated view. 
You need excellent clarity of roles and responsibilities within a control framework. If 
that’s not clear, you run the risk of people sort of getting in each other’s way and 
duplicating or overstepping their responsibilities. (Executive Director, Risk 
Management and Assurance, Case F) 
The three lines of defense ensure that everybody takes responsibility for their roles in 
the control framework. It is thus essential that each line understands its role and 
responsibilities and the only way to reinforce that is by having regular discussion between 
assurance providers to remind people of their responsibilities and accountabilities. For 
example, Case D has managed open doors and communication between assurance providers 
in order to discuss all the matters that these assurance providers are concerned with.  
Organizations cannot just assign assurance providers for each key risk. They must also 
perform a “status quo” to understand who is doing what and stay informed about the 
assurance activities of each provider.  
The combined assurance should not only give a sort of a general view of the assurance 
provided by the assurance providers, but also an indication in terms of scope…scope 
in quantity and in quality…We address that for each assurance provider in order to be 
more strict and more precise in terms of quantity and quality of assurance provided by 
the different assurance providers.  (VP and Head of Internal Assurance, Case A)  
At this stage, organizations must enjoy support from assurance providers, which is 
even more important than that from the top (i.e., the second important component). This is 
confirmed by cases C and E: 
You need to have the buy-in first of all right at the top that cascaded down into the 
different assurance providers…The moment you start driving the project and you 
haven’t got the buy-in [from assurance providers], you’re going to hit a dead 
end…Your assurance providers aren’t going to want to work with you, so you’re going 
to lose a lot of benefits that you can actually get out of it.  (Senior Audit Manager, 
Case C) 
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There are more interfaces, more touch points, more stakeholders to engage with…You 
need to engage a lot more with the broader community within the company…different 
assurance providers to coordinate with. So the complexity goes up. I think the benefit 
is there in the end but if you don’t invest more in planning and that engagement early, 
you can run into difficulty down the tract when you actually try to execute.  (Head of 
Risk Assessment and Assurance, Case E) 
Moreover, a clear description of the mission of each assurance provider is essential; 
otherwise, the benefits of the combined assurance will not be achieved. The Head of Risk 
Management of Case A observes the following: 
We believe that the assurance objectives of each of these functions should be clearly 
defined, precise in the job description, understood and validated…otherwise if you 
don’t say since the beginning that they have to contribute to global assurance…you 
will never receive something.  
In the majority of cases, both audit functions, internal and external, are probably the 
only ones with the methodology to perform assurance services. Other functions that deliver 
assurance are more pragmatic but sometimes they miss what it means providing assurance in 
terms of testing, scoping, reporting, and opinion. This view is shared by the VP Assurance 
Planning and Development of Case E, who believes it is important to understand that some of 
the assurance providers brought into a combined assurance team during a project are not 
auditors and lack an auditor’s level of scepticism when looking at a process:  
There is inherent bias in the way these persons look at things especially if they have 
been within the organization for 20 or 25 years. For these various guest auditors who 
join the audit teams, we [internal auditors] have to understand that a geologist is not 
an auditor, by its training, its background and its natural motivation…So when he 
comes and participates on a combined assurance project, he brings the very valuable 
skills set due to its subject matter expertise, but we need to understand that he’s not an 
auditor. 
There, it seems that a common assurance methodology is required to ensure 
consistency among assurance providers. Once the areas needing assurance have been 
identified (i.e., the fourth important component), integrating into a combined assurance 
 - 98 - 
 
program requires that assurance providers agree on common methodologies to provide 
assurance activities in these areas. The Head of Risk Management of Case A says this: 
I don’t dream and I don’t think it’s relevant that it will be necessary that all assurance 
providers use absolutely the same discipline, the same rigor of the IAF to perform 
assurance activities…At least the main steps of a methodology, yes…to make sure that 
opinions are consistent between the safety auditor A and the safety auditor B working 
in another plant. 
This is also illustrated in Case C where, 
in one pilot project we did, we actually had two teams together doing their own 
things…they didn’t work together but they were there at the same time and the end 
product was different…The one said it was good and the other one said it was okay 
but there were issues.  (Senior Audit Manager, Case C)  
During the merger between the internal audit and sustainability departments in Case E, 
the two assurance providers had their own history of providing assurance, but combined 
assurance required them to align with each other:  
Let’s get the methodology the same, let’s get the reporting the same, let’s get the way 
we write findings all the same…So we got the two sides together to agree on the best 
practices. The benefit of that was you’re actually improved because you picked the 
best practice from the different activities that previously were isolated.  (Head of Risk 
Assessment and Assurance, Case E) 
4.4.6 Combined assurance report 
Combined assurance implementation should end with the regular delivery of a combined 
assurance report. Importantly, none organization has already achieved formal reporting. Even 
more surprisingly, none of Cases D, E, and F has already thought about the reporting aspect 
of combined assurance. 
For Case A, the combined assurance report should give not only a general view of the 
assurance provided by the assurance providers but also an indication of each assurance 
provider’s contribution to the areas where executive management and the board are looking 
for assurance. To this end, the organization uses a radar for each assurance provider with 
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different levels alongside all areas that need assurance, ranging from zero (no assurance 
activities being performed) to five (when a systematic, detailed, and in-depth audit exists). 
Based on these radars, the combined assurance report provides an overview to the board 
and/or executives on the situation as well as regular feedback and recommendations designed 
to help reengineer the assurance activities in the group. 
Ultimately, since Case B is a South African organization, its audit committee has to 
sign off on the combined assurance. Case B has created a new governance committee, a 
combined assurance forum, in order to go through various aspects of the combined assurance 
report. This new governance structure ensures that the organization receives the right amount 
of assurance in the right areas from assurance providers with the best and most relevant 
expertise and skills as cost effective as possible (Internal Document, Case B). During the 
forum, participants go through various aspects of combined assurance, such as the assurance 
providers’ views, the assurance activities being done, the assurance activities being planned, 
and the areas of concern. Formally, the group’s combined assurance forum duties and 
responsibilities are to (a) report on the combined assurance activities to the audit committee in 
order to provide assurance to the board and other stakeholders that an appropriate combined 
assurance process exists, (b) define a framework and consistent reporting requirements for 
combined assurance as well as the taxonomy to be used, (c) communicate combined 
assurance activities and impacts to the stakeholders, (d) provide guidance and direction 
regarding combined assurance activities, and (e) escalate when combined assurance activities 
are not progressing as intended (Internal Document, Case B). Case B’s next most urgent goal 
is obtaining the formalized combined assurance report:  
We’re trying very hard to get it done…our first attempt was during the last August 
audit committee meeting but still the packs are quite thick…so we need to do a lot 
more cleaning up at the top when we start filtering information through to the main 
audit committee. (CAE, Case B) 
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Delivering the final outcome, the combined assurance report, is easier if assurance 
providers share a common language and thus report more efficiently. Because there is value 
for working together, assurance providers should also agree on a common language. As 
suggested by the CRO of Case B the biggest thing in the bank was to change and create a 
standard terminology in the organization to be used between all assurance providers. 
Traditionally, each assurance provider used to report to the audit committee or to the risk 
committee or to the board itself using different language for the same issue. 
As for Case B, the current issue for Case C is reporting the combined assurance 
findings. Similar to Case A, the last important component of the combined assurance program 
is assessing the degree of reliance that can be placed on the activities performed by each 
assurance provider and relate it back to the risk register:  
What we’ve done is that we have developed our own tool to actually assess assurance 
providers. Our assessment is meeting up with the assurance providers and talking 
them through that list of questions that we’ve got…We look at independence, 
objectivity, skills, knowledge, reporting, methodology…and then we conclude and say 
can we actually place reliance on them or not?...We know all these assurance 
providers, let’s now start working through the reports and the scope of the work that 
they’ve done and make sure that they actually did cover our risks…Because it could be 
that you’ve got the assurance provider that do wonderful work but in terms of the top 
ten risks, he actually doesn’t address your risk at all.  (Senior Audit Manager, Case C) 
Table X illustrates a combined assurance matrix, adapted from Case C, in the form of 
a formal document being presented to the audit committee, which must sign off on the 
combined assurance report. The organization uses different colors to assess the degree of 
reliance felt by each assurance provider from the three lines of defense. 
[INSERT TABLE X ABOUT HERE] 
This combined assurance matrix illustrates the kind of documents that can be 
integrated into the combined assurance report in order for boards to discharge their duties 
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properly, by evaluating the effectiveness of the risk management and internal control systems. 
This combined assurance matrix also provides a global assurance picture to the boards, 
helping them to eventually reengineer their organizations’ assurance activities.  
Table XI presents a summary of all important components for each case. 
[INSERT TABLE XI ABOUT HERE] 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This study has identified the important components in implementing a combined assurance 
program by investigating the implementation processes of six multinationals. Our descriptive 
findings reveal the importance of six components.  
First, organizations must understand that combined assurance is not a silver bullet for 
effective ERM but, rather, that the success of combined assurance implementation will 
depend on ERM’s maturity.  
Second, organizations must understand the concept of combined assurance and the 
benefits of implementing such an approach by creating awareness of the concept. The tone at 
the top is particularly important. If boards understand that combined assurance is not only an 
efficient approach to assurance activities but also helps them exercise their oversight role 
appropriately by providing assurance on the effectiveness of risk management and internal 
control systems, they will see the value of this approach concretely.  
Third, a combined assurance coordinator has to be appointed, who will take 
responsibility for the project. Ultimately, the board, through the audit committee, is the driver 
of combined assurance since it helps in oversight activities; in practice, however, the 
CAE/IAF could well become the custodian or champion of daily combined assurance.  
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Four, it is important to identify areas that need assurance based on board, executive, 
and stakeholder priorities. The combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches ensures 
that no significant risk will be missed.  
The fifth important component requires that organizations recognize and list all 
assurance providers besides areas that need assurance in an assurance mapping. Based on the 
significance of a risk, organizations will use one of their three lines of defense or some 
combination of them if the risk justifies it. The assurance mission for each assurance provider 
must be clearly defined to avoid duplication or gaps.  
Finally, the implementation ends with the release of a combined assurance report 
presenting a global picture of assurance coverage to the board and the audit committee in 
order to allow them to exercise their oversight role appropriately. For the sake of consistency 
among assurance providers, a common language and an agreement on methodologies are 
vital; otherwise, inefficiencies will persist, making it impossible for boards and/or audit 
committees to exercise their oversight role appropriately.  
This study offers several contributions. Combined assurance as a business paradigm is 
new and as a result there is little research about how organizations are implementing 
combined assurance approaches. First, this study contributes to the literature by being one of 
the first to provide initial insights about factors affecting the launch of combined assurance. It 
complements the study from The IIA UK and Ireland (2010) by illustrating combined 
assurance in six multinationals from three sectors, each at a different combined assurance 
implementation stage. Doing so will hopefully provide insights to organizations seeking to 
embrace combined assurance as a governance tool and it will hopefully provide a foundation 
for future research once the embrace of combined assurance grows. 
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Because combined assurance is still in its infancy, there is much room for improving 
its relevance. Therefore, this study’s second contribution is its timing, since it will be 
appreciated particularly highly by organizations struggling with this kind of implementation. 
The many organizations trying to recover from the global financial crisis are looking for new 
standards and practices to apply in order to improve their governance. This study promotes 
combined assurance to be particularly useful for boards in exercising their monitoring role 
properly, as they face a multitude of risks and stakeholder interests. 
Our descriptive findings also have implications for regulators, policymakers, and the 
CAE/IAF. This study reveals how assurance activities can meet the challenge of providing 
holistic assurance about the effectiveness of risk management and internal control systems, as 
is required by many recent regulatory changes. Until recently, only South Africa, through 
King III, had recommended combined assurance implementation for listed organizations. 
However, our case studies reveal that organizations in other nations have already observed 
South African improvements in organizational governance. Moreover, the multiple standards 
and guidance and/or practice advisories recently released by The IIA provide evidence on the 
usefulness of combined assurance for worldwide regulation. This study also has managerial 
implications for the CAE/IAF, who may be in the best position to steer combined assurance 
implementation. Because internal auditors need to add value in governance, risk, and control 
processes, this combined assurance approach can well become the role-model of an effective 
IAF in order to raise internal auditors’ profiles in organizational governance 
Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. The first is its use of the qualitative 
approach to collecting data; its descriptive findings are thus not widely generalizable. 
However, given that the aim of the study was to provide insights into the important 
components in combined assurance implementation, using qualitative data was considered the 
most appropriate approach (Power and Gendron, 2015). Second, the maturity levels of the 
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cases’ combined assurance implementations differ; this may be one strength but also limits 
comparability. The number of interviews and the functions interviewed in each case could 
raise further comparability issues. Three, all cases are still learning through their combined 
assurance implementation processes; none has yet attained full maturity. Therefore, it is 
impossible to describe what a mature combined assurance program looks like. On the other 
hand, this study has potentially addressed some, but not all, of the key ingredients of 
combined assurance implementation. Finally, case studies were recruited on a voluntary basis 
and may reflect more active and engaged organizations than is typical with respect to 
combined assurance. 
There are many opportunities for future research. First, a follow-up study after the 
organizations have attained full combined assurance implementation maturity would be 
interesting. Second, it would also be interesting to explore in more details the role, ideally the 
leading role, of the CAE/IAF within this combined assurance program as suggested by the 
third important component. Three, combined assurance implementations may also be rare 
because individuals will have different views on the concept. As such, future research could 
address the understanding(s) and/or drivers of adopting such program. Further quantitative 
studies could also generalize the descriptive findings of this exploratory study. As recognized 
by Vinten (1996), qualitative and quantitative studies are not mutually exclusive. Future 
research could investigate the variables associated with the implementation of a combined 
assurance program. For example, this study finds that a key success factor is having a formal 
ERM in place. There might also be influence from regulation on the maturity of assurance in 
different types of industries. Other characteristics such as the organization size could also 
affect the establishment of a combined assurance program.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE DETERMINANTS OF COMBINED ASSURANCE9 
 
“A sound governance, risk management, and internal control environment starts by stretching 
the strategic planning exercise to consider alternative outcomes. That is, while the strategy is 
being developed, management and the board should consider a number of questions: What are 
the major risks this plan exposes the company to? How much risk exposure are we willing to 
accept? What are the mitigating controls that need to be in place to effectively limit these 
risks? How will we know if these controls are working effectively?” (Bies, 2004). 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The above quote from Ms Susan Schmidt Bies, member of the Board of Governors of the US 
Federal Reserve, in a speech given at the Risk Management Association and Consumer 
Bankers Association Retail Risk Conference, in Chicago during summer 2004, provides a 
tenet for understanding the importance of risk management in effectively executing business 
strategies. Risk oversight has thus gained prominence in recent years (Beasley et al., 2015b; 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 2009; 
Franzel, 2014; Hines and Peters, 2015; Landsittel and Rittenberg, 2010). One reason is that 
the last financial crisis has been somewhat attributed with poor governance caused by failures 
in the risk management oversight role of boards (e.g., Beasley and Frigo, 2007; Brown et al., 
2009; Conyon et al., 2011; Magnan et Markarian, 2011; Mikes, 2011; Pirson and Turnbull, 
2011). 
While regulators and policy makers are trying to focus on mechanisms to improve risk 
management oversight, combined assurance, defined as “integrating and aligning assurance 
processes in a company to maximise risk and governance oversight and control efficiencies, 
and optimise overall assurance to the audit and risk committee, considering the company’s 
                                                     
9
 This paper is based on a LSM Working paper 2015/02 “The Determinants of Combined Assurance Adoption: 
A Global Survey”. It has been presented at the 38th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association 
(Glasgow, 2015).  
 - 107 - 
 
risk appetite” (Institute of Directors (IoD), 2009, p.50), has emerged as a new paradigm for 
receiving holistic and coordinated assurance about the effectiveness of risk management (IoD, 
2009; Sarens et al., 2012b).   
 Despite the recommendations and value of applying a coordinated approach to all 
assurance activities (IIA, 2012; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010; Sarens et al., 2012b), only a few 
organizations have implemented combined assurance (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010), and there is 
currently little academic literature on this topic. Research is particularly necessary in order to 
understand why some organizations are adopting combined assurance, whereas others are not.  
 The purpose of this study is to fill this gap. Using a survey targeting chief audit 
executives and other internal auditors, we explore the determinants of combined assurance 
adoption. Based on 186 usable survey responses, our results suggest that (i) risk management 
oversight characteristics, (ii) the number of different assurance providers, and (iii) other 
organizational governance characteristics, are associated with the adoption of a combined 
assurance framework for monitoring the effectiveness of risk management processes.  
This study mainly contributes to the existing literature on risk management. It offers a 
follow-up of Beasley et al.’s (2005) study of the antecedents of enterprise risk management 
(ERM) implementation, arguing that the last step, when ERM is implemented, lies in 
monitoring its effectiveness (COSO, 2004). More precisely, this study extends the literature 
on risk management oversight (Beasley et al., 2015a; 2015b; COSO, 2009; Landsittel and 
Rittenberg, 2010) by providing important insights into the determinants associated with a 
combined assurance adoption. This study also contributes to the emerging literature on 
combined assurance (Decaux and Sarens, 2015; Sarens et al., 2012b) by being the first to 
examine the determinants of combined assurance adoption using a unique dataset.  
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This study also has implications for practitioners and regulators. In a context in which 
policymakers and regulators are trying to improve risk management oversight, this study 
provides the first evidence about the determinants of combined assurance adoption that may 
be of some interest. Viewed as an alternative to uncoordinated assurance activities, combined 
assurance may be an important organizational model that enhances risk management 
oversight role of boards and  organizational governance accordingly.   
 The article proceeds as follows. The second section provides background to the study. 
The third section develops hypotheses. The fourth section describes the research method. The 
results are reported in the fifth section. The final section concludes, identifies limitations, and 
offers opportunities for future research.  
5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Since the release of ERM – Integrated Framework (COSO, 2004), more and more 
organizations have embraced ERM as a way to better link risk management with business 
strategy. The framework consists of eight risk management processes: (i) internal 
environment, (ii) objective setting, (iii) event identification, (iv) risk assessment, (v) risk 
response, (vi) control activities, (vii) information and communication, and (viii) monitoring 
the effectiveness of the whole framework (COSO, 2004). At the same time, a large 
community of researchers has followed the initiative and provided many publications on the 
topic (e.g., Arena et al., 2010; Beasley et al., 2005; Hayne and Free, 2014; Lundqvist, 2014; 
Mikes, 2011; Power, 2009). According to Miller et al. (2008), the omnipresence of ERM is 
attributed to the proliferation of tools and technologies such as chief risk officers, risk maps 
and/or assurance framework. 
 There have been a multitude of debates in ERM over the years. Some academics have 
explored the factors associated with ERM implementation (Beasley et al., 2005; Kleffner et 
al., 2003; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Lundqvist, 2014). Others have studied the value and 
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performance of ERM (Gordon et al., 2009; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Nocco and Stulz, 
2006; Smithson and Simkins, 2005). Nowadays, the question of risk management oversight is 
of greatest importance (Beasley et al., 2015b; Franzel, 2014; Hines and Peters, 2015; 
Landsittel and Rittenberg, 2010). Monitoring the effectiveness of ERM represents the last step 
of the eight “ideal typical ERM processes” (Hayne and Free, 2014, p. 311). It requires that the 
board assess how effectively the entire risk management framework is present and functions 
in responding to significant risks (Beasley et al., 2015b; 2006; Beasley and Frigo, 2007; 
COSO, 2009). Proponents of enhanced risk management oversight argue that it helps boards 
to better exercise their risk management duties, while at the same time, reinforces the strategic 
role of the board (Beasley et al., 2015b; Reding et al., 2009).  
Recent corporate failures and changes in corporate governance have increased 
stakeholder expectations with respect to risk management, and they have asked boards to 
demonstrate better accountability when it comes to risk management oversight. According to 
Pirson and Turnbull (2011) the risk management oversight role of boards failed during the last 
financial crisis because directors either lacked the relevant risk-related information or were 
unable to process the information at their disposal. Accordingly, several governance 
initiatives were released with guidance and recommendations for improving risk management 
oversight. In Europe, guidance on the 8
th
 Directive, article 41, was released by the European 
Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing (ECIIA) and the Federation of European Risk 
Management Associations (FERMA) to encourage boards and audit committees to monitor 
the effectiveness of risk management and internal control systems (ECIIA and FERMA, 
2010). Similar approaches were adopted in other countries, such as the USA (New York 
Stock Exchange Commission, 2010) and the UK (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). South 
Africa went a step further. The updated South African code of corporate governance – King 
III – particularly insists on the responsibility of boards to comment on the adequacy of their 
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internal control systems (Principle 2.13), and to receive combined assurance about the 
effectiveness of the entire risk management process (Principle 4.9) (IoD, 2009). 
Nowadays, effective governance suggests that boards receive assurance about the 
effectiveness of risk management (IIA, 2009, 2012; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010; Sarens and 
Christopher, 2010; Spira and Page, 2003). The exercise of risk management oversight 
requires that a board collects assurance from different assurance providers – management, 
internal and/or external audit, compliance, corporate social responsibility, to name but a few 
examples – in order to help the board exercise its risk management oversight responsibilities 
(Decaux and Sarens, 2015; IIA, 2012; Reding et al., 2009; Sarens et al., 2012b). In a nutshell, 
these assurance providers are internal and external functionaries “who tell managers what is 
on track and what is not within the company” (Deloitte, 2011, p. 1). Risk management and 
assurance activities are therefore mutually dependent on one another (Daugherty and 
Anderson, 2012; Reding et al., 2009) since risk management provides the proper 
infrastructure to support the assurance process (IIA, 2012). The idea of coordinating 
assurance activities between the whole set of assurance providers emerged within King III 
due to the multitude of risks faced by organizations, and therefore the multitude of assurance 
activities required (IoD, 2009). Combined assurance aims to optimize the assurance delivered 
by a multitude of assurance providers on the risks that organizations are facing (IoD, 2009). 
Even if there were some elements
10
 of combined assurance before King III, the South African 
code was the first to formalize that coordination by suggesting that it would improve the 
board’s risk management oversight role. Very quickly after King III, The IIA embraced the 
initiative and started to release guidance and practice advisories to help organizations 
coordinate their assurance activities (IIA, 2012, 2013a). Combined assurance is thus described 
as a paradigm to provide coordinated assurance in order to help boards monitor the 
                                                     
10
 See the literature on the coordination of internal audit and external audit (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013; Hay et al., 
2008; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006a; 2006b; Mat Zain et al., 2015). 
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effectiveness of their ERM (Decaux and Sarens, 2015; IIA, 2012; IoD, 2009; Sarens et al., 
2012b). In the same vein as ERM coordinates risk management activities between previously 
siloed risk functions, combined assurance does the same with assurance activities
11
 with the 
objective of providing holistic assurance to the board. 
The combined assurance literature is not so extensive, but it is emerging. A first 
survey from The IIA UK and Ireland (2010) revealed that only eight percent of organizations 
coordinate their assurance activities. That survey also reported an initial list of different 
assurance providers that organizations use frequently, the benefits of coordinating assurance, 
and reasons explaining why it could be difficult to coordinate assurance. Sarens et al. (2012b) 
and Decaux and Sarens (2015) used case studies to enter the “black box” of combined 
assurance. One interesting finding from their interviews with combined assurance participants 
is that combined assurance should ultimately improve a board’s oversight role by improving 
assurance reporting to the board and by reducing assurance duplication and assurance gaps 
(Sarens et al., 2012b). They also provide first insights about how to implement combined 
assurance (Decaux and Sarens, 2015). Nevertheless, research has been silent so far about the 
reasons that some organizations are adopting combined assurance, and others are not. To 
investigate this area, this study uses several determinants from the risk management 
literature
12
 (e.g., Baxter et al., 2013; Beasley et al., 2005; 2015b) and explores whether they 
are also associated with combined assurance adoption.  
5.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
5.3.1 ERM oversight 
Presence of a Committee Responsible for Risk Management Oversight. Board 
subcommittees exist to support directors in performing their roles more effectively. When it 
                                                     
11
 According to many, the three lines of defence model can serve as the starting point to identify and coordinate 
all assurance providers an organization is facing. See Daugherty and Anderson (2012), ECIIA and FERMA 
(2010), IIA (2013), IIA UK and Ireland (2010) for further details. 
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comes to risk management oversight, a board traditionally delegates this task either to an 
audit committee or to a risk committee
13
 (Beasley et al., 2015a; Brown et al., 2009; Hines and 
Peters, 2015; Subramaniam et al., 2009). Kleffner et al. (2003) found that the tone of boards 
was an important factor underlying the adoption of ERM for Canadian companies.  Assigning 
the responsibility for overseeing risk management processes to one of its subcommittees 
engages, accordingly, some of the board in risk oversight (Beasley et al., 2015b). In a survey 
of the state of risk management oversight, however, Beasley et al. (2015a) pointed out that the 
assignment of risk oversight to a committee seems to be the exception rather than the rule, 
with 46% of sampled organizations having done so. Further, Beasley et al. (2015b) found that 
boards that formally assign risk oversight to a subcommittee are positively associated with 
increasing levels of ERM maturity. Given the important role of board subcommittees in risk 
management oversight, we predict that in cases for which the board assigns to one of its 
subcommittees the responsibility for overseeing risk management processes, there will be 
greater chance that organizations adopt combined assurance in order to receive holistic 
assurance about the effectiveness of risk management.  
H1: The presence of a committee responsible for risk management oversight is positively 
associated with combined assurance adoption.  
ERM Oversight Maturity. Since 2009, a team of researchers from the ERM Initiative
14
 
Group at the North Carolina State University has collected annual data on the state of risk 
management oversight (see Beasley et al. (2015a) for the last update). These researchers have 
shown a growing interest in risk management oversight because of the higher percentage of 
companies having had complete ERM in place each year. This suggests that when ERM 
implementation becomes mature enough, the last step is to monitor the effectiveness of risk 
                                                     
13
 Risk committees often exist as a substitute to the presence of a chief risk officer (Beasley et al., 2015b). 
14
 See  www.erm.ncsu.edu for more details. 
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management, and to potentially adopt combined assurance.  Whereas in 2009, only 9% had a 
complete ERM in place, this percentage was just below 25% in 2014 (Beasley et al., 2015a). 
According to the same survey, many factors put pressure on organizations to enhance ERM 
oversight, such as board expectations, external pressure from investors and/or rating agencies, 
regulation, and new governance requirements (Beasley et al., 2015a; 2015b). Sarens et al. 
(2012b) discussed whether combined assurance could well be seen as an efficient and 
effective alternative to provide assurance services in order to help boards monitor the 
effectiveness of risk management. In a recent study of the components of combined assurance 
implementation , Decaux and Sarens (2015) reveal that combined assurance adoption depends 
on the maturity of ERM. According to them, a well-developed risk management framework 
leads the adoption of combined assurance. Taken these findings together, we can assume that 
there is more chance that organizations will implement combined assurance when the level of 
ERM oversight maturity reaches a higher level.  
H2: ERM oversight maturity is positively associated with combined assurance adoption. 
5.3.2 Multiple assurance functions 
Number of Different Assurance Providers. Traditionally, assurance services are 
provided by a multitude of different assurance providers (Sarens et al., 2012b). In order to 
avoid problems such as assurance gaps, assurance duplication, and inefficient reporting due to 
uncoordinated activities, organizations may request that their various assurance providers to 
coordinate their activities within a combined assurance approach (IIA, 2012; IIA UK and 
Ireland, 2010; IoD, 2009; Sarens et al., 2012b). Undoubtedly, organizations with a greater 
number of different assurance providers will mostly benefit from coordinating assurance 
services in order to achieve effective and efficient assurance coverage in comparison with 
those with fewer assurance providers. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
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H3: The number of different assurance providers is positively associated with combined 
assurance adoption. 
5.3.3 Organizational characteristics 
Board independence. The board is an important monitoring mechanism (Reding et al., 
2009). The presence of non-executives on the board improves monitoring since non-
executives better represent principals’ interests from agents’ opportunism (Beasley et al., 
2009; Pincus et al., 1989). According to agency theory, independent boards are more 
objective when assessing management actions, and take greater decisions as a result of their 
impartiality in comparison to boards in which the percentage of non-executives is lower 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The presence of non-executives is more likely to increase the 
quality of monitoring since they are more likely to suggest other internal and/or external 
monitoring mechanisms to complement their own monitoring duties (Desender, 2008; 
Subramaniam et al., 2009). For example, Beasley et al. (2005) found that a more independent 
board is positively associated with ERM deployment. Therefore, we argue that a board with a 
larger proportion of non-executives is likely to more actively engage in combined assurance 
adoption as a way to support board members with their risk management oversight 
responsibilities.  
H4: Board independence is positively associated with combined assurance adoption. 
CEO/Chairman duality. CEO duality relates to a situation in which the CEO and the 
chairman of the board are the same individual. An independent chairman is often seen as 
providing better monitoring because they undertake an independent check on the CEO. As 
such, an independent chairman is more likely to seek high quality monitoring mechanisms. 
Jensen (1993) pointed out that CEO/chairman dual role may lead to failures in internal control 
systems. Subramaniam et al. (2009) also found that the existence of an independent chairman 
was positively associated with the existence of a risk management committee. This implies 
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that an independent chairman will make a greater investment in risk management oversight. 
Desender (2008) also found that the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board 
was significantly related to ERM implementation. As a result, we predict that an independent 
chairman is more likely to promote the adoption of combined assurance as it would enable 
better risk management oversight.  
H5: CEO duality is negatively associated with combined assurance adoption. 
Big-4 audit firm. Auditing has long been recognized as a key monitoring mechanism 
that principals use to reduce agency problems (Adams, 1994; Anderson et al., 1993; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Through post-audit recommendations, 
external audit firms are generally able to propose suggestions to further improve internal 
control and risk management systems to their clients (Subramaniam et al., 2009). Cohen et al. 
(2004) found that Big-4 audit firms were more likely to encourage higher quality internal 
monitoring mechanisms than non-Big-4 firms. In the same vein, Beasley et al. (2005) found 
evidence that enterprises audited by a Big-4 audit firm had greater levels of ERM 
implementation. Moreover, Hines and Peters (2015) found that if a financial institution 
employs an external auditor, it is more likely that the organization will form a risk 
management committee.Taken together, these results suggest that organizations audited by a 
Big-4 audit firm achieve higher quality monitoring. There is also greater interest nowadays 
among audit firms in the coordination of assurance services. Many audit firms have 
consequently started to release reports on this subject (e.g., Deloitte, 2011; EY, 2010; KPMG, 
2007; PwC, 2012a) to encourage organizations to apply combined assurance. Based on the 
above discussion, we expect that organizations audited by a Big-4 audit firm will more 
opportunity to implement combined assurance.  
H6: A Big-4 firm is positively associated with combined assurance adoption. 
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Compliance with IIA Standards. The IIA is the global setter for internal audit 
standards. Recently, The IIA embraced the idea of coordinating assurance activities in order 
to enhance governance effectiveness (IIA, 2012). According to different standards and 
practice advisories, it is suggested that the internal audit function not only takes responsibility 
for monitoring ERM (IIA, 2009), but also coordinates with other assurance providers. IIA 
Standard 2050 on coordination states that the chief audit executive “should share information 
and coordinate activities with other internal and external providers of assurance and 
consulting services to ensure proper coverage and minimize duplication of efforts” (IIA, 
2013a). Just as the COSO played an important role in the institutionalization of ERM (Hayne 
and Free, 2014), The IIA advocates the concept of combined assurance so that we explore 
whether organizations in which the internal audit function complies with IIA standards have a 
greater chance to coordinate their assurance activities with other assurance functions through 
a combined assurance approach. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H7: Compliance with IIA Standards is positively associated with combined assurance 
adoption. 
  Size. Many studies attest that larger organizations use more effective monitoring 
techniques, such as ERM, in comparison with smaller organizations (Beasley et al., 2005; 
2015b; Colquitt et al., 1999; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Pagach 
and Warr, 2011). For example, Carcello et al. (2005b) found that larger firms are more likely 
to encourage greater investment in internal audit in order to apply higher monitoring 
standards. Similarly, Baxter et al. (2013) found that larger entities have higher ERM quality 
programs. According to KPMG (2012b) large companies embed various assurance functions 
in the organization to provide a higher level of assurance. Taken together, these results may 
also show that larger organizations have a greater propensity to implement combined 
assurance as a way to provide holistic assurance about the effectiveness of ERM.  
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H8: Size is positively associated with combined assurance adoption.   
Listed Organization. Listed organizations are usually more likely to have mature risk 
management practices because of regulation and market pressure. For example, Kleffner et al. 
(2003) argued that compliance with Toronto Stock Exchange guidelines was one of the 
determinants that led Canadian companies to implement ERM. Listed organizations are 
usually more aware of best practices in their industries. As discussed above, many codes of 
corporate governance have put pressure on boards to apply more effective risk management 
oversight practices, such as combined assurance in South Africa. In fact, King III 
recommends that organizations apply or explain why they do not follow a combined 
assurance approach to their assurance activities. Thus: 
H9: Listed organization is positively associated with combined assurance adoption.  
5.4 METHOD  
We electronically surveyed
15
 internal auditors during May and July 2014 to obtain data on 
combined assurance because such specific information is not publicly available. We pre-
tested the online survey with academics and The IIA Research Foundation and we made 
revisions based on feedback received. The survey was sent to The IIA Research Foundation 
who in turn sent an invitation to local institutes to participate to the study. The survey was 
then administered to local IIA affiliates and to chief audit executives and other internal 
auditors. Research has shown that internal auditors are particularly knowledgeable when it 
comes to risk management (Arena et al., 2010; Hayne and Free, 2014; Spira and Page, 2003; 
Vinnari and Skӕrbӕk, 2014) and combined assurance issues (Decaux and Sarens, 2015; 
Sarens et al., 2012b).  
                                                     
15
 The survey instrument is available upon request. Please contact the corresponding author. Survey respondents 
were asked to provide information about specific aspects of their combined assurance framework. To help 
respondents understand the term “combined assurance”, we provided definitions from the King III report and 
that IIA standard 2050 on Coordination. 
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5.4.1 Sample 
In total, we received 264 partially or fully completed survey responses. Some respondents 
provided answers to selected questions and omitted others. Some questions were conditional 
on answers to other questions. As a result of our research questions, seventy-eight 
observations had to be deleted due to incomplete/non-applicable data for one or more 
variables in the model. The final sample
16
 included 186 chief audit executives or other 
internal auditors, which is a similar number to other studies (e.g., Abbott et al., 2010; Beasley 
et al., 2005; Raghunandan et al., 2001). The respondent profile was the following: 45.7% 
were chief audit executives, 21% were part of internal audit management, 16.7% were 
internal audit senior or supervisor, 9.6% were part of internal audit staff, and 7% were from 
other positions, such as risk manager or audit committee chairman. The organizations 
represented by these respondents came from: Europe (40.3%), Asia (28.5%), Africa (20.4%), 
Australia (8.6%) and America
17
 (2.2%). Finally, the internal auditors who surveyed the 
questionnaire rated their knowledge about combined assurance as very poor (10.8%), poor 
(15.1%), fair (33.3%), good (30.1%), and very good (10.8%). 
5.4.2 Variables 
CA ADOPTION is a dummy variable which represents whether or not an organization has 
implemented combined assurance. OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of 1 if the board assigns the responsibility for overseeing risk management to 
one of its committees, and 0 otherwise. OVERSIGHT MATURITY is on a Likert-scale which 
takes a value ranging from 1 (very immature) to 5 (robust) as in Beasley et al. (2015a; 2015b). 
NUMB AP is a computed variable. It corresponds to the sum of all applicable assurance 
providers that apply in the organization. Respondents had the opportunity to select all 
assurance providers in a predefined list of eighteen frequent assurance providers based on IIA 
                                                     
16
 We do not have data on how many survey requests were sent out, therefore we cannot compute a response 
rate. Data collection was delegated to The IIA Research Foundation.   
17
 The low response rate for America is explained by the fact that The IIA Research Foundation was busy with 
the Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK) at the same time, and they did not want to jeopardize that survey. 
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UK and Ireland (2010) and Sarens et al. (2012b). BOD INDEPENDENCE is the percentage 
of board members who are independent, given the full board size (Beasley et al., 2005; 
Subramaniam et al., 2009). DUALITY is a dummy variable with value of 1 if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. BIG-4 is a dummy variable for which the value 
depends whether the organization uses a Big-4 audit firm to review financial statements, or 
not. IIA COMPLIANCE is also a dummy variable: 1 if the internal auditor complies with IIA 
guidelines, 0 otherwise. We use the natural log of total assets in millions of US dollars as a 
proxy for firm SIZE. LISTED takes value of 1 if the organization is listed on a stock 
exchange, 0 otherwise.  
5.4.3 Logistic model  
We use the following logistic model to address our hypotheses with a nominal dependent 
variable: 
CA ADOPTION = ƒ [OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE; OVERSIGHT MATURITY; NUMBER 
AP; BOD INDEPENDENCE; DUALITY; BIG-4; IIA COMPLIANCE; SIZE; LISTED].  
5.5 RESULTS 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
We conducted univariate tests for differences between early and late respondents. We 
calculated descriptive statistics for combined assurance adoption and we found no statistically 
significant difference between early and late respondents. We concluded that the timing of 
responses did not affect our results.  
Of the sample of 186 observations, 45.7 per cent had somewhat adopted combined 
assurance. This number is well above the eight percent of organizations that admitted to 
coordinate their assurance activities in 2010 (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010). We asked the 
respondents about their organization’s risk management oversight characteristics, such as the 
stage of maturity of the risk management oversight and the presence of a board subcommittee 
with responsibility for overseeing risk management. Almost one-third (30.6 per cent) 
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admitted they have “mature” or “robust” risk management oversight. In 67.4 per cent of 
cases, the board had given risk management oversight responsibility to a board subcommittee. 
These findings are higher than those provided by Beasley et al. (2015a) who mostly 
considered organizations based in the United States. In addition, Table XII presents other 
descriptive statistics on the variables used in the regression model. 
[INSERT TABLE XII ABOUT HERE] 
Table XIII provides the Pearson’s correlations between the variables used in the 
regression model. An examination of the correlation matrix indicates that the variables are not 
strongly correlated, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. All variance inflation 
factors are less than ten with a high of 1.567. We find that CA ADOPTION is strongly 
correlated with OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, OVERSIGHT MATURITY, NUMB AP, BOD 
INDEPENDENCE, BIG-4, IIA COMPLIANCE, and LISTED.    
[INSERT TABLE XIII ABOUT HERE] 
5.5.2 Logistic regression 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to predict combined assurance adoption using 
risk management oversight characteristics, number of assurance functions, and organizational 
characteristics as predictors. A test of the full model against a constant-only model was 
statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between 
the adoption of combined assurance, and no adoption at all (Omnibus tests of model 
coefficients, Model Chi-Square = 70.440, p < 0.000 with df = 9). The indication is thus that 
predictors have a significant effect and essentially create a different model, than one with the 
constant-only (Agresti, 2007). Alternatively, the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic 
is greater than 0.05, as required for a well-fitting model. If the statistic is > 0.05, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between observed and model-predicted 
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values, signifying that the model’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable level (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 2000). Our Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic has a significance of 0.310 which means 
that it is not significant and therefore our model is quite a good fit. 
[INSERT TABLE XIV ABOUT HERE] 
Table XIV provides the results of the combined assurance adoption logistic regression 
model. Nagelkerke’s R² of 0.558 indicates that the predictors make a contribution to the 
variance in the decision to implement combined assurance. According to the Wald statistics, 
the presence of a committee responsible for overseeing risk management processes, risk 
management oversight maturity, the number of assurance providers, board’s independence, 
and whether the organization financial statements are reviewed by a Big-4 audit firm 
significantly predict combined assurance adoption (z = 6.700, p < 0.05; z = 4.905, p < 0.05; z 
= 5.704, p < 0.05; z = 12.660, p < 0.01; z = 5.896, p < 0.05, respectively). H1, H2, H3, H4 and 
H6 are therefore supported. Surprisingly, our results suggest that DUALITY is significantly 
and positively associated with combined assurance adoption (z = 6.841, p < 0.01). This result 
is the opposite of what we expected for H5. In organizations in which the roles of the CEO 
and chairman of the board collude, there is greater chance that the organization implements 
combined assurance. The remainder of the set of hypotheses were not supported. We did not 
find evidence for associations between combined assurance and compliance with IIA 
standards, SIZE and listing requirements respectively. The Exp(B) column in Table XIV 
presents the extent to which raising the corresponding measure by one unit influences the 
odds ratio. 
5.5.3 Additional analyses 
We performed a number of additional sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our results.  
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 First, we replaced our independent variable OVERSIGHT MATURITY by ERM 
MATURITY – a Likert-scale from 1 (no ERM in place) to 5 (complete formal ERM in place) 
– in our logistic model, and the results in Table XV were very similar to those presented in 
Table XIII, meaning that both variables may be used interchangeably.  
[INSERT TABLE XV ABOUT HERE] 
We also used an alternative dependent variable. The dummy variable CA 
IMPLEMENTATION was replaced by CA MATURITY to consider whether organizations 
had fully (=3), partially (=2), or not (=1) implemented combined assurance. The results of the 
ordinal logistic regression in Table XVI are not different from those reported in Table XIII 
except that OVERSIGHT MATURITY is now significant at p<0.01.  
[INSERT TABLE XVI ABOUT HERE] 
 We added several additional explanatory variables to our logistic regression based on 
the literature on risk management. Beasley et al. (2005) found that the presence of a chief risk 
officer (CRO) is positively associated with the implementation of ERM, although Beasley et 
al. (2015b) did not find such an association using a composite index for ERM maturity. We 
add a variable CRO to our model for combined assurance adoption to control for the presence 
of a chief risk officer. According to Carcello et al. (2005b) organizational COMPLEXITY 
increases with the number of business segments which increases the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms, such as combined assurance. Moreover, Baxter et al. (2013) found that more 
diversified entities have higher ERM quality programs. We therefore included the number of 
business segments in our model. Beasley et al. (2005) found that firms operating in the 
BANKING industry were more advanced in their ERM implementation. As a result, we 
added a dummy whether the organization operates in the banking industry, or not. Finally, 
some literature suggests that debt levels are positively related to monitoring mechanisms 
 - 123 - 
 
(Carey et al., 2000; Carcello et al., 2005b) and that LEVERAGE, represented as the 
percentage of debts to total assets, is a good predictor of ERM engagement (Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2011; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). Alternatively, Baxter et al. (2013) found a 
negative association between leverage and ERM quality. We then controlled whether our 
results were sensitive to a country dimension. We separately used dummy variables for each 
region (Africa, America, Asia, Australia, and Europe). Although not reported here, adding all 
these variables to our model of combined assurance adoption did not qualitatively alter our 
results presented in Table XIV, however, the results for AUSTRALIA suggested that it is 
significantly and negatively associated with combined assurance adoption, which means that 
Australian organizations tend to adopt combined assurance less often. 
5.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance failures, new regulation and recommendations have emphasized the 
importance of risk management oversight (Beasley et al., 2015b). On the other hand, 
interaction between corporate governance players has long been an important research area. 
According to Beasley et al. (2009), frequent and meaningful interactions between the audit 
committee, the internal auditor, the external auditor, management, and the board are critical 
for effective audit committee oversight. This study argues that this can be extended to 
coordination between multiple assurance providers.   
The present study provides first evidence of the determinants associated with 
combined assurance adoption, as a way to enhance the risk management oversight role of 
boards (Beasley et al., 2015a; 2015b; COSO; 2009; Landsittel and Rittenberg, 2010). Until 
now, there has been a lack of evidence of the processes that can help monitor the effectiveness 
of the risk management system (Landsittel and Rittenberg, 2010). This study fills this gap by 
providing preliminary evidence about the determinants associated with combined assurance 
adoption.  Our results suggest that risk management oversight characteristics, such as when 
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the board delegates risk management oversight responsibilities to a committee and ERM 
oversight maturity, explain the decision to adopt a combined assurance approach to monitor 
the effectiveness of risk management. These results extend the qualitative findings from 
Decaux and Sarens (2015) who suggested that a well-developed risk management framework 
drives combined assurance adoption. We also found that the number of different assurance 
providers is also positively associated with combined assurance adoption. Certainly, when 
organizations use multiple assurance providers to help boards with their oversight 
responsibilities, these organizations recognized that is more effective and efficient that these 
assurance providers coordinate their activities within a combined assurance framework. 
Finally, we found that some organizational characteristics are associated with a greater level 
of combined assurance adoption. As suggested by agency theory, a board’s independence is 
an important mechanism to reduce agency costs. Our results suggest that independent boards 
tend to ask their assurance providers to coordinate their activities more frequently. When 
financial statements are reviewed by a Big-4 audit firm, the client organization has higher 
propensity to adopt combined assurance. This result is consistent with Cohen et al. (2004) 
who suggested that Big-4 audit firms are good candidates to improve the quality of 
monitoring in their client organizations. Surprisingly, we found evidence that when the same 
individual simultaneously operates as chairman of the board and CEO, there is greater chance 
that the organization will adopt a combined assurance approach to its assurance activities. 
This result somewhat contradicts our expectations, as agency theory suggests that 
CEO/chairman separation is an important mechanism in reducing agency costs.  One possible 
explanation for this finding is that risk management is considered both as a monitoring tool 
and a strategic tool, so that when both CEO and chairman roles are the responsibilities of the 
same individual, they will ask assurance providers to coordinate their activities within a 
combined assurance framework. Accordingly, risk management oversight continuously helps 
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the strategic direction being taken by the board and CEO, and vice versa (Beasley et al., 
2015b; Reding et al., 2009).  
The findings of this study should be of interest to organizations that do not have 
combined assurance, academics, and regulators, as combined assurance may join the range of 
monitoring mechanisms that help boards to fulfil their oversight role appropriately. From a 
practical perspective, the results provide regulators and directors with a clearer picture of the 
organizational characteristics associated with combined assurance adoption. This knowledge 
may be useful, for example, if other codes of corporate governance, beyond King III, 
recommend combined assurance adoption. From a research perspective, the results highlight 
combined assurance as a potential further step for adequate risk management oversight.   
There are limitations to our research approach. First, the sample used in the study was 
only 186 organizations, and thus, the generalizability of the results is somewhat limited. A 
second limitation is that the data was derived from an online survey, as there is no publicly 
available data on combined assurance. We ask organizations directly through survey about 
their combined assurance adoption. This underreporting of practices may create inaccuracies 
in the evaluations of combined assurance adoption and it may somewhat affect the results of 
this study (Baxter et al., 2013; Bisbe et al., 2007; Lundqvist, 2014). Thirdly, this study only 
provides combined assurance insights from the perceptions of internal auditors as 
organizations do not disclose whether they coordinate their assurance activities. Surveys of 
company personnel provide a valuable inside view of the firm, but could also be biased as it is 
self-reported and dependent on a single answer without additional information and possible 
verification (Baxter et al., 2013). It is possible that there are other functions leading the 
combined assurance initiative within their organizations whose views are not captured in our 
responses. A fourth limitation is that the completion of the survey was voluntary, and 
therefore, there is some potential for bias if those choosing to respond are those who are only 
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interested in the topic. Our study’s results may be limited to the extent that such bias exists. 
Finally, this study is only exploratory so that there may be important determinants of 
combined assurance that are not reflected. Other determinants from the corporate governance 
and/or the auditing literature may also explain why some organizations combine their 
assurance activities among assurance providers, whereas others are not.  
We believe this study opens the door to future research in the area of combined 
assurance. During our additional analyses, we found that being an Australian organization is 
negatively associated with combined assurance adoption. This implies that Australian 
organizations tend to coordinate assurance activities less frequently. Future research could 
study the reasons that organizations do not coordinate their activities in depth. Is it a question 
of independence or whatsoever? This study only considers some risk management oversight 
and organizational characteristics in order to explain the decision to implement combined 
assurance, however, we further encourage researchers to also examine the behavioral 
characteristics of combined assurance. Relational coordination theory, for example, offers 
several relational characteristics that may somewhat influence the dynamics of coordination 
among multiple assurance providers.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
“People only accept to change when they are faced with necessity, and only recognize 
necessity when a crisis is upon them”. 
Jean Monnet, Founding Father of Europe. 
 
Nowadays, organizations are trying to strengthen their governance. The three lines of defense 
model, a widely accepted governance model considering all control activities within an 
organization (e.g., IIA, 2013a), has often given the impression of control and a false sense of 
assurance. The three lines of defense model has been criticized leading to metaphors such as 
“Maginot Line”, “Potemkin Village” or “Goodhart’s law”, because it is inadequately 
implemented (Chambers, 2014) and no longer provides a proper defense (IIA UK and Ireland, 
2010). The existence of these lines of defense remains ineffective without coordination.  
As recognized by Jean Monnet, crises offer opportunities. In light of the financial 
crisis, the related risk management failures, and the ineffectiveness of the three lines of 
defense model, there is ongoing debate among regulators and practitioners about how to 
improve risk management oversight. It is particularly so because expectations for more 
effective oversight of risks by boards have significantly increased (e.g., Beasley et al., 2015b; 
Hines and Peters, 2015). As a result, it is widely acknowledged that boards need better 
assurance (Chambers, 2014). Consequently, one of the biggest challenges today for 
organizations to strengthen their governance “is about marshalling assurance provision so that 
the people governing the organization and stakeholders know that objectives are being 
achieved through the management of risk” (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010, p. 1). Nevertheless, 
how can boards, the audit (risk) committee, and senior management achieve an integrated 
view of all assurance activities between the three lines of defense? 
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The need for effective assurance has become highly topical as organizations are 
increasingly complex and confronted by many assurance providers, accordingly. As a result, 
coordination between assurance providers in order to enhance governance has been 
recommended by researchers (e.g., Roussy, 2013; Sarens et al., 2009), regulators (IoD, 2009), 
policymakers (IIA, 2013a; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010), and practitioners (e.g., Dangre, 2013; 
KPMG, 2012b). However, research into this topic remains quite limited. This dissertation is 
intended to contribute to the discussion on how assurance activities can be organized in an 
effective and efficient way, by entering the black box of combined assurance. Such an 
objective is achieved through the innovative focus on combined assurance and the use of 
mixed methods research approach and multiple perspectives. The dissertation is presented in 
four papers. 
I start this concluding section by providing a summary of each paper. Then, I explain 
the main contributions of the dissertation, followed by a discussion of the main limitations. 
Finally, I propose future research opportunities in the area of combined assurance that may be 
of interest to academics and practitioners who wish to embark on the combined assurance 
journey. 
6.1 SUMMARY 
The first paper, a conceptual paper, offers insights into combined as recently practiced within 
the international accounting community, regarding its understandings, drivers, and benefits. 
The findings suggest that combined assurance is an effective and efficient assurance 
approach, and, therefore, an important organizational model to consider, providing a board 
with holistic assurance about the effectiveness of risk management. As such, it helps a board 
improve its risk management oversight on behalf of multiple stakeholders.  
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 The second paper explores the roles of the IAF in combined assurance. Based on five 
case studies, internal auditors perceive that they are legitimate candidates to lead the 
combined assurance approach by facilitating, coordinating, and reporting combined assurance 
activities. This paper argues that playing the combined assurance orchestrator may well be 
seen as the role-model of an effective IAF.  
 In the third paper, I investigate how to implement a combined assurance program. 
This paper uses qualitative data obtained through semi-structured interviews with key 
combined assurance participants in six multinationals at different stages of combined 
assurance implementation maturity. It finds that organizations are still learning from 
combined assurance implementation because no organization seems to have attained a mature 
combined assurance program. Nevertheless, the qualitative findings reveal that combined 
assurance implementation follows six important components: (i) having a mature risk 
management framework; (ii) creating awareness around the concept and obtaining the “tone at 
the top”; (iii) identifying a champion to lead the initiative; (iv) developing an assurance 
strategy with a combined assurance plan; (v) developing an assurance map to have a better 
understanding of roles and responsibilities in the assurance framework; and (vi) reporting 
combined assurance findings. 
 Finally, the fourth paper is an empirical survey. It presents the results of a global 
survey of internal auditors’ perceptions about the determinants of combined assurance 
adoption. Thanks to the assistance of the IIA Research Foundation for distributing the online 
survey to local affiliates, I developed a unique dataset of 186 usable responses from internal 
auditors. This original dataset, the first quantitative study since IIA UK and Ireland’s (2010) 
descriptive study, provides first evidence of the determinants of combined assurance 
adoption. I find that (a) risk management characteristics, (b) the number of different assurance 
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providers, and (c) other organizational characteristics are positively and significantly 
associated with the adoption of combined assurance.  
6.2 OVERALL CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The topic of combined assurance is an area of particular concern where little research has 
been carried out to date. As such, this dissertation makes a valuable and interesting 
incremental contribution to the risk management literature and to the auditing literature, as 
these disciplines are closely connected (Bhimani, 2009; Kaplan, 2011). It has also 
implications for practitioners, policymakers, and regulators by providing clear 
recommendations on combined assurance practices. 
Risk management literature 
Even if ignored for a long time, risk management oversight has been recently at the center of 
the risk management debate (e.g., Beasley et al., 2015a; 2015b; COSO, 2009), mainly because 
of its ineffectiveness at various occasions (e.g., Mikes, 2011). Particularly, how boards can 
monitor the effectiveness of their risk management programs largely remains an unaddressed 
question (Kaplan, 2011; Landsittel and Rittenberg, 2010). Due to the growing expectations 
from stakeholders that boards adequately monitor the effectiveness of risk management, this 
dissertation provides insights into an approach that several organizations are currently 
adopting to provide assurance over the effectiveness of their risk management systems. 
Ultimately, responsibility for the oversight of risk is at the board level (Beasley et al., 2015b). 
I consider how internal auditors can help boards exercise their risk management oversight 
responsibilities appropriately. According to internal auditors, combined assurance helps 
directors improve the risk management oversight in the eyes of stakeholders because if boards 
(1) do not understand the risks, and (2) do not receive assurance and have clear understanding 
whether these risks are being mitigated properly, then they cannot claim to be executing their 
duties fully. As such, this dissertation describes combined assurance as an appropriate 
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alternative to provide risk management assurance, and could well be seen as a relevant 
approach to monitor the effectiveness of risk management, as suggested by the ERM 
framework (COSO, 2004). It responds to some of the calls made by Kaplan (2011) and 
Landsittel and Rittenberg (2010), among others, to develop studies that address the 
effectiveness of risk management processes. 
Taken together, the findings from this dissertation suggest that, according to the 
insights collected from various assurance providers, combined assurance positively influences 
a board’s risk management oversight role, since boards receive more effective and efficient 
assurance, which then enhances governance, since directors can (1) express an opinion 
whether risk management functions appropriately and (2) whether key risks are managed 
adequately. Figure 4 represents a summary of the findings from the dissertation.  
Figure 4: Summary of the Findings 
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Auditing literature 
This dissertation also contributes to the auditing literature in several ways. First, it contributes 
to the internal audit literature (e.g., Gramling et al., 2004) by proposing an innovative role the 
IAF can play in governance, that of combined assurance orchestrator. An effective IAF is one 
that has a positive impact on governance (Sarens, 2009). By adopting a combined assurance 
approach to its assurance activities, I find that the IAF can enhance governance.  
Second, prior literature suggests that coordination between assurance providers may 
lead to enhanced governance (Anderson et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2011; Sarens et al., 2009). 
However, it widely considered the coordination between the IAF and the external auditor, 
without taking into account the other valuable assurance providers that an organization has in 
practice. In this study, I argue that the IAF and the external auditor are only two assurance 
providers in a more complex network of assurance providers. Then, I investigate a model that 
considers the co-dependencies and interdependencies that exist among these assurance 
providers. Beyond the internal and external auditors, all the assurance providers constitute 
complementary mechanisms rather than substitutes (e.g., Hay et al., 2008; Mat Zain et al., 
2015). By investigating combined assurance, I examine, as suggested by many researchers, 
the coordination of assurance activities between various organizational functions in order to 
provider a higher level of organizational assurance and comfort (Roussy, 2013; Sarens et al., 
2009). The combined assurance model may well be viewed as a model that makes optimum 
use of assurance resources as noted by Roussy (2013).  
Third, combined assurance also means relying on a combined assurance team to do an 
audit. As revealed by some case studies, a combined assurance team creates more value than a 
traditional audit, since it delivers a product that neither party working independently would be 
able to produce. Thus, it provides a foundation for making audit more efficient and 
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contributes to the debate on the joint-audit approach (e.g., Sarens et al., 2009) by considering 
assurance providers that are well beyond the traditional internal and external auditors.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the auditing for stakeholders literature by 
viewing combined assurance as an important mechanism helping boards to become more 
knowledgeable and transparent about risk management to their stakeholders (Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008; Collier, 2008; Freeman et al., 2010). 
Managerial implications 
 This dissertation has implications for practitioners, policymakers, and regulators. In 
fact, I believe that the richness of this dissertation lies in its applicability by offering insights 
into combined assurance that practitioners can further use (Parker et al., 2011) to assist 
organizations in their accountability and quest for effective risk management oversight. 
According to Kaplan (2011), the relationship between risk management and internal audit is 
an interesting line of research with high impact on the practice community.  
 I think that internal auditors can greatly benefit from this dissertation. As a key 
monitoring mechanism, the IAF helps a board and senior management “sleep at night” by 
providing assurance services (Marks and Taylor, 2009). As suggested by Lenz (2013, p.5), 
“providing assurance is a means to an end of helping the organization to achieve its 
objectives”. An area in which the IAF has great involvement is risk management because 
there is increasing pressure on boards and senior management to demonstrate their 
proficiency in risk management. Also, many codes of corporate governance require that 
boards ensure the effectiveness of risk management. Thus, the IAF has been widely 
acknowledged as an appropriate function for improving and monitoring the effectiveness of 
risk management. However, they are required nowadays to strengthen their role in governance 
due to their many critics (Lenz and Sarens, 2012). Chambers and Odar (2015) urged internal 
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auditors to provide more dependable assurance to boards. Lenz and Hahn (2015) suggested 
that providing more integrated assurance could well become the future role of an effective 
IAF. Moreover, for Shortreed et al. (2012), a lesson of the crisis is that IAFs must develop 
new techniques for monitoring, reviewing, and communicating to the board the effectiveness 
of risk management. Consequently, “Never before the IAF had a better opportunity for 
advancement” (Chambers, 2014, p.1), but studies have not considered so far (1) how the IAF 
can provide such assurance to a board, and (2) the practices and techniques that an IAF is 
using to be more effective in dealing with assurance activities. 
As more is expected of internal auditors, their status and their professionalism need to 
be enhanced. An IAF is often required to express an opinion on governance, risk 
management, and control, but also to improve these processes. According to Ridley (2008, 
p.287), “modern internal auditing has been built on the three Es of Efficiency, Effectiveness, 
Economy as targets”. I argue that using a combined assurance approach is an alternative that 
helps achieving that. The effectiveness of an IAF should be considered in line with the impact 
it has on the quality of governance (Sarens, 2009). In this dissertation, I first consider that 
combined assurance helps a board to discharge their risk management duties appropriately, 
which then improves governance. Second, I describe the role of the IAF as being the 
combined assurance leader. Therefore, it is proposed that the effective service an IAF can 
provide to a board is by leading the combined assurance initiative. The IIA position paper on 
the role of the IAF in ERM (see IIA, 2013a) suggested that the IAF can provide holistic 
assurance over ERM on its own. I argue that this is a wrong statement. A unique IAF may fall 
short in providing assurance over risk management because of its background and skills 
(Fraser and Henry, 2004). Internal audit is not the only department in the organization that 
provides assurance to the board and senior management. For internal auditors, this 
dissertation offers an opportunity to embrace combined assurance in order to provide overall 
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assurance. By developing working relationships with all sources of assurance, internal 
auditors can provide a global and comprehensive picture of assurance to the board. Then, by 
providing such holistic assurance to a board, internal auditors become much more meaningful 
and valuable to boards and enhance their role in governance by delivering a high-quality 
product. Therefore, combined assurance can well be viewed as the role-model of an effective 
IAF that considers the three Es. A recent study performed by Sarens and Swinkels (2015) 
suggest that combined assurance is a particularly good strategy for the IAF in transparent, 
change-minded and high performing organizations.  
The second practical implication is for policymakers, such as The IIA, the global 
setter for internal audit standards. As the idea of combined assurance has begun to emerge at 
The IIA
18
, this dissertation provides several insights into how combined assurance will 
enhance governance. The IIA standard 2050 requires that the chief audit executive 
coordinates its activities with other assurance providers in order to minimize duplication and 
ensure proper coverage. Furthermore, “the internal audit activity adds value to the 
organization (and its stakeholders) when it provides objective and relevant assurance, and 
contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency of governance, risk management, and control 
processes”, as written in the Glossary to the IIA standards (see IIA, 2013a). The IIA may well 
advocate combined assurance as the role-model for effective IAF. Furthermore, it may 
reasonably view the Chief Audit Executive becoming the Combined Assurance Executive 
when refining its guidance.  
 Finally, the dissertation has implications for regulators who are trying to improve risk 
management oversight in a context of crisis recovery. There are many organizations that 
suffered from risk management failures. Many organizations are also facing the challenge of 
                                                     
18
 The IIA has recently recognized the value of combined assurance as several items are now included in the new 
Global Internal Audit Common Body of Knowledge to capture some elements of combined assurance 
implementation and reporting (see, IIARF, 2015).  
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effectively and efficiently integrating the various sources of assurance. These organizations 
are looking for new standards and (best) practices to apply in order to improve their 
governance. Many of these organizations have recently made substantial investments and 
transformative changes aimed at strengthening their control functions. Combined assurance 
may well be the next logical step. I investigate combined assurance, a governance-related 
guidance, recommended by a country, which is viewed as a leader in governance (Baker, 
2010; Coetzee et al., 2015). This dissertation provides insights into how assurance providers 
can collectively provide holistic assurance to a board in order that they discharge their risk 
management oversight role more appropriately. By combining qualitative and quantitative 
research, this can assist regulators to develop more efficient governance mechanisms. First, I 
enter the black box of combined assurance by providing unique insights into organizations 
that have implemented such an approach. Therefore, it may help organizations to benchmark 
their approach or learn more about this effective and efficient approach. The evidence 
obtained is particularly interesting due to the fact that organizations that have adopted a 
combined assurance approach to their assurance activities are, according to them, on a road to 
better governance. Second, I provide evidence about the determinants that are associated with 
combined assurance adoption. To date, only South Africa has introduced combined assurance 
in the governance agenda, in making it a recommended practice in its code of corporate 
governance. My findings may therefore be of interest to other regulators as well.  
6.3 LIMITATIONS 
The biggest limitation is that the views expressed throughout the dissertation are mainly taken 
from internal auditors. Both qualitative and quantitative studies reflect internal auditors’ 
perceptions about insights of combined assurance and may therefore be subject to self-
reporting bias. I have only considered the “supply-side” of combined assurance (Lenz and 
Hahn, 2015) as the multiple studies in the dissertation focus on combined assurance at the 
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internal audit level, but I was not able to examine combined assurance as experienced at 
higher levels of the organization (i.e., board level, senior management level, etc.). It is 
therefore possible that there are other functions leading combined assurance whose views are 
not taken into account in this dissertation. 
 A second limitation is that the case studies and respective interviewees from the first 
three papers and the respondents from the global combined assurance survey reported in the 
fourth paper were recruited on a voluntary basis. This may skew the findings in favor of 
organizations in which combined assurance represents better practice than the wider 
population. 
 Third, I try to present the findings obtained from the case studies as fairly as possible. 
However, the impact of judgment when perceiving and interpreting the findings cannot be 
ignored. 
 Finally, some of the sections in this dissertation may appear (too) normative. This is 
because, when considering multiple groups of stakeholders, the normative base is 
fundamental. According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), the normative approach to 
stakeholder theory is categorical: “Do (don’t) do this because it is the right (wrong) thing to 
do” (p. 72). In several parts of this dissertation, I recommend organizations, and their 
assurance providers, to coordinate their assurance activities into a combined assurance 
approach, since it seems to be the right approach. In fact, there are probably not many 
alternatives for combined assurance in a changing business environment given the multitude 
of stakeholders that an organization has to consider, the multitude of risks it has to manage, 
and, accordingly, the overall assurance that an organization needs to consider whether these 
risks are managed appropriately.  
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6.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
I believe my dissertation provides a base line for future research as the area of combined 
assurance continues to evolve and mature. Also, the limitations mentioned in the above 
section may well be addressed through several further studies. 
 The focus on internal auditors throughout the dissertation is appropriate to gain 
insights into combined assurance as they are required to play an important role. Future 
research could compare several findings obtained from this dissertation with the perspectives 
of boards, senior management, and audit or risk committee members as regards combined 
assurance. This will further provide insights into the “demand-side” of combined assurance 
(Lenz and Hahn, 2015). According to Beasley et al. (2005), CEO and CFO support for ERM 
are positively associated with the implementation of ERM. Moreover, Beasley et al. (2015b) 
suggest that the level of formal board responsibility and engagement in risk oversight at a 
board level is positively associated with ERM program maturity. Some of my findings 
support the same argument. The “tone at the top” is important to facilitate the implementation 
of combined assurance such as if boards and senior management perceive value in that 
approach, they will dedicate resources in this combined assurance project. Furthermore, 
internal auditors perceive to add value to the assurance process by coordinating their activities 
with other assurance providers, and that will in turn positively influence a board’s risk 
management oversight. Because the audit or risk committee and the board assume 
responsibility for overseeing risk management, it might be interesting to collect evidence 
from these individuals to compare their views with those of internal auditors: 
- What are according to directors and senior management the most important drivers 
(not) to implement combined assurance?  
- How their assurance needs evolve over time and what kind of limitations does the ‘silo 
assurance approach’ have in their eyes?  
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- What is the role/involvement of board/senior management in combined assurance? 
- Does combined assurance really help them discharge their risk management duties 
more effectively as proposed by internal auditors? 
- What do IAF’s stakeholders think about the IAF’s role in combined assurance? 
To counterbalance the normative base of combined assurance, future research may 
also look at the alternatives of combined assurance, and investigate more closely the negative 
or ‘dark’ side of combined assurance. Moreover, combined assurance is certainly not a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach (Sarens and Swinkels, 2015) so that the following research questions 
deserve consideration: 
- Except for providing assurance services in isolation, do alternatives for combined 
assurance exist? If yes, how are they different from combined assurance? 
- What is the relationship between combined assurance and continuous auditing? 
- Being the coordinator of combined assurance may be something that not all internal 
auditors want to do. Why would an internal auditor not be willing to be the 
coordinator of combined assurance?  
- Combined assurance suggests that the chief audit executive almost becomes the right-
hand of the board. What are the problems associated with this?  
- What are the arguments against combined assurance? Why do assurance providers not 
want to coordinate their assurance activities? 
- Organizations may be subject to the “form versus substance” paradox when it comes 
to combined assurance if implementations are only done for symbolic reasons (Cohen 
et al., 2008). What are the differences between the organizations choosing the form 
and those choosing the substance in terms of practical coordination between assurance 
providers? Does it have any influence on the output of combined assurance? 
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- What are the contingency features/organizational characteristics conditioning whether 
combined is (in)effective or (in)efficient? 
- Do multidisciplinary audit teams impact on objectivity? 
- What is the cost of (combined) assurance? 
The dissertation suggests various ways in which combined assurance could be linked 
to well-known theoretical frameworks from the governance literature. For example, Beasley 
et al. (2015b) argue that the adoption of ERM finds argument in agency theory, resource 
dependence theory, and institutional theory. The same argument holds for combined 
assurance. What do these various perspectives say about combined assurance? Future research 
may explore how combined assurance (i.e. in terms of understanding, benefits, etc.) changes 
taking one perspective rather than another. Is one theory better for explaining combined 
assurance or is it better explained from a combination of various perspectives? This could 
counterbalance the normative base of combined assurance even more effectively, and provide 
a more comprehensive view of combined assurance, by capturing the greater complexity of 
such a practice (Cohen et al., 2008).  
Integrated (sustainability) reporting is a growing field. As noted by several 
participants during my interviews, there is a close connection between combined assurance 
and integrated reporting. These reports provide information on the management of some 
significant risks to various stakeholders (Ballou and Heitger, 2008). Combined assurance 
might help accordingly. Furthermore, O’Dwyer et al. (2011) argue that organizations must 
receive assurance about their sustainability reporting.  
- How does combined assurance support integrated (sustainability) reporting? 
- Could combined assurance replace external assurance over integrated reporting? 
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In Chapter 4, it is shown that engagement of all assurance providers with the concept 
of combined assurance is important, otherwise the benefits that organizations can get out of 
combined assurance will not be possible. Moreover, as combined assurance also means a 
combined assurance team to carry out an audit, internal auditors will need to develop, in 
purely practical terms, working relationships with a diverse range of assurance providers to 
cover broadly the complex risks that an organization faces. Linking combined assurance with 
the existing literature in other fields is a promising avenue for future research. For example, 
Steinbart et al. (2012) conducted an exploratory investigation on the relationship between the 
IAF and information security. They developed an exploratory model of the factors that 
influence the nature of the relationship between these two functions. Similarly, Gittel (2006) 
and Gittel et al. (2008) have developed a relational coordination theory for understanding the 
relational dynamics of coordinating work in highly interdependent tasks. By means of high 
quality communication (i.e., accurate, frequent, timely, and problem-solving) supported by 
high quality relationships (i.e., shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect), effective 
coordination is achieved and leads to better quality outcomes. As such, combining these two 
frameworks may be of interest in investigating the dynamics of the coordination between 
various assurance providers. This may also address the “form versus substance” problem 
related to combined assurance. 
- What are the contingency features/behavioral characteristics that assurance providers 
value the most to coordinate their assurance activities? 
- Do both combined assurance effectiveness and efficiency depend on the presence of 
high quality communication and high quality relationships? 
- As suggested by the IIA UK and Ireland (2010), what approach between coordinated 
assurance (combined assurance team) or coordination between assurance providers is 
more valuable to a board and its committees? Is there some optimum of coordination? 
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Finally, the survey instrument developed for this dissertation could be used for more 
in-depth research in future. The richness of the survey is not fully explored yet. Moreover, as 
noted by Beasley et al. (2015b), US based firms are significantly more likely to have more 
mature ERM processes than non US firms. Future research may consider investigating 
combined assurance in US firms as it was not captured in this dissertation. 
- Higher quality ERM is associated with better corporate governance and less audit-
related risk (Baxter et al., 2013). Does such a relationship exist for combined 
assurance? 
- What is the impact of combined assurance on audit fees? 
- How do US firms experience their combined assurance in comparison with non US 
firms? 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1 
 
Table I: The Roles of the Internal Audit Function in ERM 
 
 Source: The IIA (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core internal audit roles in regard to ERM Giving assurance on the risk management processes
Giving assurance that risks are correctly evaluated
Evaluating risk management processes
Evaluating the reporting of key risks
Reviewing the management of key risks
Legitimate internal audit roles with safeguards Facilitating identification & evaluation of risks
Coaching management in responding to risks
Co-ordinating ERM activities
Consolidated reporting on risks
Maintaining & developing the ERM framework
Championing establishment of ERM
Developing RM strategy for board approval
Roles internal audit should not undertake Setting the risk appetite
Imposing risk management processes
Management assurance on risks
Taking decisions on risk responses
Implementing risk responses on management's behalf
Accountability for risk management
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APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2 
 
Table II: Stakeholders’ Needs for Assurance (based on ICAEW [2008] and Reding et al., 
[2009]) 
 
Stakeholder Stakeholder’s Need for Assurance Potential Line of 
Defence 
Boards Discharge their duties to other stakeholders 
(i.e., assurance on the effectiveness of risk 
management and internal control systems) 
Third Line of 
Defence 
Managers Business advice to add value to processes Second and Third 
Lines of Defence 
Employees Job security (i.e., safety, security, wage 
benefits) 
First Line of 
Defence 
Customers and 
Suppliers 
Goods and services of quality 
Ability to pay for goods and services 
 
First Line of 
Defence 
Investors Financial return Third Line of 
Defence 
Community Being a good citizen 
Compliance with laws and regulations 
Environmental friendliness 
First Line and 
Second Line of 
Defence 
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Table III: Interview Summary and Characteristics of the Case Study Organizations 
 
 
 
Case Interviewee Business Turnover (2011) Employees (2011) Region
VP & Head of Internal Assurance Mining $90 billion 260 000 Europe
Head of Risk Management
Senior Auditor
B Chief Audit Executive Banking $6 billion 30 000 South Africa
Chief Risk Officer
Head of Regulatory Risk Management
External Audit Partner
C Head of Risk Management Mining $5 billion 60 000 South Africa
Senior Audit Manager
Senior Audit Manager – SOX Compliance
External Partner for IT
VP Group Internal Audit
External Audit Partner
Senior Audit Manager – Sustainability
Associate Director Group Internal Audit Banking $5.5 billion 35 000 Europe
Senior Audit Manager – SOX Compliance
E Head of Risk Assessment & Assurance Mining $70 billion 100 000 Australia
VP Risk and HSEC Assurance
VP Assurance Planning & Development
VP Compliance
F Director Health Safety and Environment, Human Resources Communications $25 billion 35 000 Australia
General Manager, Enterprise Security and Resilience, Corporate Security and Investigations
Group Manager – Assurance and Advisory, Risk Management & Assurance
Group Manager – Risk Advisory, Risk Management & Assurance
Senior Business Specialist, Finance Support and Governance and Compliance
Executive Director, Risk Management & Assurance
A
D
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Table IV: Descriptive Findings and Interesting Quotes from Case Studies 
Research question Construct/Themes Illustration 
Understandings  Risk Oversight 
 
 
 
Three Lines of Defence 
Coordination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined Assurance Team 
 
 
 
My concept of combined assurance is that it looks at all of the different parts of an organization 
that together and are able to provide executives, the audit committee, the board, the shareholders, 
the regulators, and other stakeholders with the comfort that the key risks that they are concerned 
about are being effectively assessed, mitigated, managed and reported – Group manager (Case F) 
 
I remember our earlier discussions when we started looking at combined assurance, because 
ERM, compliance, internal audit and external audit, have traditionally been planned in silos, 
which meant that the coverage of this assurance provider and the total coverage do not 
necessarily give the company a complete coverage of risk…And also there’s no synergy in terms 
of execution – Head of Regulatory Risk Management (Case B) 
Now 70%–80% of critical risks are technical or sustainability risks. As an internal auditor, you 
can be as clever as you want but you will not be able to give proper assurance on these issues. 
You will have to use other experts in the company to help you…If you’re a mining company, 
sustainability is so important. You work in communities, so you affect the lives of communities. 
Environmentally, you take huge risks around the environment, and this affects the community…So 
it’s not only about finance – Vice-president, Group Internal Audit (Case C) 
When the group wants to acquire a new company, you ask engineers to look at the quality of the 
assets, you look to a lawyer to review the legal commitments, you ask marketing to look at the 
market share and strategy, you ask one of the Big-4 audit firm to look into the financial 
figures…So, you have asked for different people about their opinion. And, for a merger, when you 
present the deal to the board, you try to combine these different opinions…Why don’t we do that 
on a regular basis for our assurance activities? – Head of Risk Management (Case A) 
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We take the risks from our risk register and we look at the top ones. On the basis of that, we might 
say a particular mine has a lot of environmental risks. We will put more environmental expertise 
into the combined assurance team. The team is about twenty people from all disciplines, and they 
will go through each operation…These assurance providers will do their own activities to come 
back and say: ‘these risks are looking right, these are wrong, you’re missing these’. They will also 
look at the actions and the controls that are undertaken to bring risk down further – Head of risk 
management (Case C) 
In the past, audit was where we would come now and check your heart. We would come again six 
months later and check your stomach. Management was saying ‘you’re telling me this now and 
then you’re telling me this, why don’t you come once, check everything, give me a full health 
report for my business? – Head of risk assessment and assurance (Case E) 
Drivers  Duplication 
 
Assurance Gap 
 
Inefficient Reporting 
Our mines are audited by so many people, it is frightening. We had a look in the pilot project, if 
we didn’t intervene next year, every week there would have been eighteen auditors at the mines, 
which is crazy – Vice-president Group Internal Audit (Case C) 
If the different assurance providers are not talking to each other, you might still be missing a 
critical area from a company risk perspective – External auditor (Case B) 
The other important aspect would be the way assurance providers report to the governance 
committees…There were often cases where different assurance providers worked in silos and the 
flow of information was never shared because each reported to a different committee. All 
assurance providers are talking to the committees, giving them different perspectives, but we’re 
not moving collectively…So combined assurance facilitates efficient and effective reporting to the 
governance committees in order to deliver a consistent outcome – Chief audit executive (Case B) 
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Benefits  Transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
Board’s Risk Management 
Monitoring Role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value creation and 
preservation 
 
 
 
Senior management, executives, and directors will have a much better understanding of what 
actually happens in the business…Combined assurance needs to make sure that the right 
assurance goes out to the right attention, because ultimately, what you’re trying to improve is 
transparency for decision-making…In Case C they had an incident in one of the mines. The CEO 
was able to go through their risk management system, identified the risk that caused the incident 
and was able to determine that there was an outstanding remediation on that particular site. With 
the remediation effective in time, they would not have had the incident. Now that to me is 
transparency beyond he has ever had and the CEO admitted it himself – External Audit partner 
(Case C) 
When you have a discussion with a senior manager and say what about you risks, at the end, you 
understand that he tries to convince you that he is very confident because he believes his processes 
are very stable. With such a combined assurance tool, you can challenge that…This is a tool to 
collect evidence from various providers, put them together, and start visualizing where the 
problems are – Head of Risk (Case A) 
Combined assurance gives the board comfort to be able to look at the risk profile and be able to 
say “Well, on these risks we’ve received assurance that we are managing risk properly” …It 
allows senior management to almost have a guide in terms of we’re reaching our strategies or 
we’re failing – Senior Audit Manager (Case C) 
Combined assurance brings the bad things to the surface in a formal report, on a formal table for 
discussion, and helps to resolve the problems – Associate Director of the Internal Audit group 
(Case D) 
Combined assurance helps executive management in discharging their responsibilities by giving 
them the information that they need in order to make the decisions that are going to impact their 
success – Vice president assurance planning and development (Case E) 
There is an art and a science to assurance. The science is to provide comfort to the board, and the 
art is how to present it in a way that makes it digestible and understandable to our stakeholders – 
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Rationalization 
Group manager (Case F) 
 
Assurance activities have a role of value maintenance. People must not forget that. Protecting 
value is making sure that value does not disappear. It is part of the mandate and must 
stay…Combined assurance adds value by itself just because it is protecting value. The add value is 
doing the assurance activities differently…Assurance providers not only find problems which is 
the value maintenance, they also say what could work, that is the value added – External audit 
partner (Case C) 
Each assurance provider is really here to provide value and that ultimate value is facilitating the 
achievement of strategic objectives…I think any organization, which does not understand or place 
as much importance on combined assurance, is really too insular and it will ultimately impact its 
success – VP assurance planning and development (Case E) 
There was a lot of duplication between assurance providers. Everyone was working on their own 
silo without talking to each other whereas there would have been things that the one was doing 
that had an impact on the other…Now we’re going to get everybody together for a period of time 
and do the combined assurance review…For the mine, they’ve got a disruption for two weeks, and 
then nothing until the next window…At the end of the day, we’ve got our feedback session where 
everybody sits together, discusses what they found, what are the significant things – Senior audit 
manager (Case C) 
Before the internal audit function goes into the field, we automatically examine and consider the 
work of other assurance providers during our facilitated assurance planning workshops – 
Associate director of the internal audit group (Case D) 
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APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3 
 
Table V: Organization Characteristics 
Case Sector 
Turnover (in 
2011) 
# employees (in 
2011) Country 
A Natural resources $90 billion 260000 Europe 
B Banking $6 billion 30000 South Africa 
C Natural resources $5 billion 60000 South Africa 
D Banking $5.5 billion 35000 Europe 
E Natural resources $70 billion 100000 Australia 
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Table VI: Organization Interviews 
Case First Interviewee Second Interviewee Third Interviewee 
A Vice-President (VP) & Head of Internal Assurance (CAE) Head of Risk Management Senior Auditor 
B Chief Audit Executive (CAE)     
  Chief Risk Officer (CRO)     
  Head of Regulatory Risk Management     
  Big-4 External Audit Partner     
C Head of Risk Management     
  Senior Audit Manager - Group Internal Audit     
  Senior Audit Manager (SOX Compliance) - Group Internal Audit     
  External Partner for IT     
  VP Group Internal Audit (CAE)     
  Big-4 External Audit Partner     
  Senior Audit Manager (Sustainability) - Group Internal Audit     
D Associate Director Group Internal Audit  
Senior Audit Manager - Group 
Internal Audit   
E Head of Risk Assessment & Assurance - Group Risk Assessment and Assurance     
  
VP Risk and Health, Safety, Environment and Community Assurance - Group Risk Assessment and 
Assurance     
  VP Assurance Planning & Development (CAE) - Group Risk Assessment and Assurance     
  VP Compliance     
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Table VII: Roles of the IAF in Combined Assurance 
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Table VII: Roles of the IAF in Combined Assurance (Cont’d) 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
 
Table VIII: Organization Interview Summary 
Case First Interviewee Second Interviewee Third Interviewee
A Vice-President (VP) & Head of Internal Assurance (CAE) Head of Risk Management Senior Auditor
B Chief Audit Executive (CAE)
Chief Risk Officer (CRO)
Head of Regulatory Risk Management
Big-4 External Audit Partner
C Head of Risk Management
Senior Audit Manager - Group Internal Audit
Senior Audit Manager (SOX Compliance) - Group Internal Audit
External Partner for IT
VP Group Internal Audit (CAE)
Big-4 External Audit Partner
Senior Audit Manager (Sustainability) - Group Internal Audit
D Associate Director Group Internal Audit Senior Audit Manager - Group Internal Audit
E Head of Risk Assessment & Assurance - Group Risk Assessment and Assurance
VP Risk and Health, Safety, Environment and Community Assurance - Group Risk Assessment and Assurance
VP Assurance Planning & Development (CAE) - Group Risk Assessment and Assurance
VP Compliance
F Director Health Safety and Environment, Human Resources
General Manager, Enterprise Security and Resilience, Corporate Security and Investigations
Group Manager - Assurance and Advisory, Risk Management & Assurance
Group Manager - Risk Advisory, Risk Management & Assurance
Senior Business Specialist, Finance Support and Governance and Compliance
Executive Director, Risk Management & Assurance
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Table IX: Characteristics of the Case Study Organizations 
Case Sector 
Turnover 
(2011) 
Employees 
(2011) 
Country 
A Natural Resources $90 billion 260,000 Europe 
B Banking $6 billion 30,000 South Africa 
C Natural Resources $5 billion 60,000 South Africa 
D Banking $5.5 billion 35,000 Europe 
E Natural Resources $70 billion 100,000 Australia 
F Communication $25 billion 35,000 Australia 
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Table X: Combined Assurance Matrix (adapted from Case C) 
   
 
Definitions 
Assurance: Assess compliance level with relevant legislation and/or policies and/or standards and whether it is adequate and/or effective in 
terms of significant risks. 
Line 1: Direct management oversight of day-to-day operations, for example control self-assessment and continuous monitoring mechanisms and 
systems. 
Line 2: Management once removed oversight from a more strategic/region/group point. 
Line 3: Independent and objective assurance of the overall adequacy and effectiveness of risk management, governance, and internal control 
within the company as established by the first and second lines of defense.  
Assurance Provider Adequacy Process Assessment 
  Reliance – Unqualified 
  Reliance – Qualified 
  Limited/No reliance 
  No assurance provider 
 
Line 2 Line 3
Objectives Critical risks Control StrategiesPre-treatment rating
Accountable 
Persons
Assurance Provider
Line 1
Assurance Rating
Post-treatment 
rating
Responsible persons
Post-treatment 
rating
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Table XI: Important Components Summary 
Important Component\ 
Organization Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F 
ERM maturity √ √ √ √ √ X 
Combined Assurance 
Awareness √ √ √ - √ X 
Combined Assurance 
Champion √ √ √ √ √ - 
Combined Assurance Strategy √ √ √ - √ - 
Assurance Mapping √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Combined Assurance Report √ √ √ - - - 
Key: “√” means the important component has been formally identified by the organization; “-
” means the organization has not commented on this important component; and “X” means the 
important component has not been taken by the organization 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
 
Table XII: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model (n=186) 
Variable Yes = 1 % No = 0 % 
CA ADOPTION 85 45.7 101 54.3 
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 124 67.4 60 32.6 
DUALITY 44 23.7 142 76.3 
BIG-4 122 65.6 64 34.4 
IIA COMPLIANCE 111 59.7 75 40.3 
LISTED 89 47.8 97 52.2 
  
   
  
OVERSIGHT MATURITY: n % 
 
  
Very immature 10 5.4 
 
  
Developing 56 30.1 
 
  
Evolving 63 33.9 
 
  
Mature 48 25.8 
 
  
Robust 9 4.8 
 
  
TOTAL 186 100 
 
  
  
   
  
  Mean SD Min Max 
NUMBER AP 7.67 3.77 1 18 
BOD INDEPENDENCE 62.07 28.96 0 100 
SIZE (LN TOTAL ASSETS) 18.55 2.92 10.31 24.46 
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Table XIII: Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CA ADOPTION (1) 1 
         OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (2) 0.296** 1
        OVERSIGHT MATURITY (3) 0.347** 0.354** 1
       NUMBER AP (4) 0.360** 0.148* 0.164* 1
      BoD INDEPENDENCE (5) 0.227** 0.056 0.133 0.059 1
     DUALITY (6) -0.028 0.037 -0.098 -0.257** -0.352** 1
    BIG-4 (7) 0.346** 0.084 0.145* 0.306** 0.058 -0.156* 1
   IIA COMPLIANCE (8) 0.314** 0.147* 0.279** 0.207** 0.080 -0.007 0.166* 1
  SIZE (9) 0.170 -0.014 0.316** 0.179* 0.200* -0.235** 0.102 0.081 1
 LISTED (10) 0.223** 0.109 0.293** 0.194** 0.173* -0.103 0.218** 0.085 0.437** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table XIV: Logistic Regression Results (DV=COMBINED ASSURANCE ADOPTION 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
Variable Hypothesis 
Exp. 
Sign Coefficient 
Wald Stat 
(z) p-value Exp(B) 
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE H1 + 1.609 6.700 0.010 4.999 
OVERSIGHT MATURITY H2 + 0.677 4.905 0.027 1.968 
NUMBER AP H3 + 0.189 5.704 0.017 1.208 
BOD INDEPENDENCE H4 + 4.125 12.660 0.000 61.837 
DUALITY H5 - 1.822 6.841 0.009 6.185 
BIG-4 H6 + 1.375 5.896 0.015 3.956 
COMPLIANCE IIA H7 + 0.839 2.623 0.105 2.315 
SIZE H8 + 0.027 0.074 0.786 1.027 
LISTED H9 + 0.381 0.440 0.507 1.463 
CONSTANT   -9.927 16.606 0.000 0.000 
Model summary -2 Log Likelihood ratio = 109.655 
  
  
Nagelkerke R² 0.558 
    
  
Hosmer & Lemeshow Test Chi-Square (8df) = 9.393, p-value = 0.310 
 
  
Omnibus Tests of Model 
Coefficients Chi-Square (9df) = 70.440,  p-value = 0.000     
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Table XV: Sensitivity Analyses 
Variable Hypothesis 
Exp. 
Sign Coefficient 
Wald Stat 
(z) p-value Exp(B) 
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE H1 + 1.702 8.184 0.004 5.484 
 
ERM MATURITY (1=No ERM in 
place; 5=Complete ERM in place) 
 
 
 0.754 7.703 0.006 2.126 
NUMBER AP H3 + 0.184 5.324 0.021 1.202 
BOD INDEPENDENCE H4 + 3.909 11.410 0.001 49.834 
DUALITY H5 - 1.487 4.614 0.032 4.424 
BIG-4 H6 + 1.504 6.802 0.009 4.501 
COMPLIANCE IIA H7 + 0.664 1.529 0.216 1.942 
SIZE H8 + 0.091 0.828 0.363 1.095 
LISTED H9 + 0.208 0.127 0.721 1.231 
CONSTANT H10 
 
-11.607 18.963 0.000 0.000 
Model summary -2 Log Likelihood ratio = 105.943 
  
  
Nagelkerke R² 0.580 
    
  
Hosmer & Lemeshow Test Chi-Square (8df) = 12.306, p-value = 0.138 
 
  
Omnibus Tests of Model 
Coefficients Chi-Square (9df) = 74.153,  p-value = 0.000     
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Table XVI: Ordinal Logistic Regression (DV=COMBINED ASSURANCE MATURITY: 
1=no adoption; 2= partial adoption; 3=full adoption) 
Variable Hypothesis 
Exp. 
Sign Coefficient 
Wald Stat 
(z) p-value 
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE H1 + 1.366 6.525 0.011 
OVERSIGHT MATURITY H2 + 0.779 8.988 0.003 
NUMBER AP H3 + 0.144 5.994 0.014 
BOD INDEPENDENCE H4 + 2.842 9.729 0.002 
DUALITY H5 - 1.334 5.665 0.017 
BIG-4 H6 + 0.868 3.198 0.074 
COMPLIANCE IIA H7 + 0.715 2.545 0.111 
SIZE H8 + -0.040 0.246 0.620 
LISTED H9 + 0.345 0.523 0.470 
Model summary 
-2 Log Likelihood ratio = 187.314, 
Chi-Square (9df)=69.918, p-
value=0.000 
  Nagelkerke R² 0.483 
    
Goodness-of-fit 
Pearson Chi-Square (249df) = 220.832, p-value = 
0.900 
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Case Study Interview Questions 
 
Context Questions 
 How is assurance coordinated across the organization? 
 In King III, risk is the cornerstone of corporate governance. Why is risk management so 
important today and how can you relate risk management to combined assurance? 
 Why has your organization decided to implement combined assurance? What are the key 
drivers? 
Combined Assurance Questions 
 Is your organization familiar with the concept of combined/integrated assurance? Can you 
explain your own interpretation of this concept? 
 Which assurance providers are required in your combined assurance framework? 
 How far along is your organization with its implementation of combined assurance? 
 Based on your experience with combined assurance, assuming that your organization has to 
advise another organization implementing combined assurance, what are the critical steps you 
would recommend? 
 What are the critical factors to make combined assurance successful? 
 What are the benefits of combined assurance? 
 What are the difficulties or barriers to the implementation of combined assurance? 
 What could you do in the future to improve your combined assurance? 
 Does combined assurance help to improve the effectiveness of organizational governance? 
How? 
 In your organization, who are the stakeholders of combined assurance? For whom is it 
relevant? 
Questions about the Role of Internal Audit in Combined Assurance 
 What is the role of the internal audit function in this model? 
 Should internal audit assume a champion role in leading combined assurance? Why or why 
not? 
 Since the implementation of combined assurance in your organization, what has changed for 
the internal audit function? 
 According to King III, the internal audit function should provide a written assessment on 
internal controls and risk management. In other words, internal auditors play an important role 
in combined assurance, although they cannot provide absolute assurance on the effectiveness 
of risk management for all the auditable entities in the risk universe every year. How does 
internal audit ensure that it receives adequate assurance from other assurance providers to 
enable the internal audit function to place reliance on their assurance work? 
 How can the internal audit function add value to the business through its role in combined 
assurance? 
Questions about Other Assurance Providers 
 What is your contribution to the combined assurance model? What assurance do you provide 
as an assurance provider? 
 In your opinion, who is the best positioned to lead the combined assurance initiative? Why? 
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